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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the dialectic of innocence and experience in the fiction of A.L. 
Barker (1918-2002). It is about her preoccupation with the relation between these 
states, which I argue is best understood through the figure of the child. Alluding to 
and critiquing Romantic, Victorian, psychoanalytic and modernist narratives of 
childhood and registering their influence on ideas about the child in mid-twentieth-
century culture, Barker’s fiction troubles dominant assumptions about what different 
identities of age entail, meaning that her oeuvre should be read as a ‘genealogy’ of 
age. I argue that the central question of Barker’s work is if, and how, the child can be 
written. She wrestles with this question for over thirty years, writing and rewriting 
the child figure in a number of alternative, innovative forms: the short story, the 
‘articulated novel’ and the retropulsive text. In each case she is preoccupied with the 
ways in which the child mirrors or intertwines with other categories of age that are 
constructed in opposition to adult identity.  
The thesis recognises the significance of the child figure in mid-twentieth-
century literature and highlights age as a crucial (though under-used) critical concept 
for reading modernist and after-modernist texts. In this way it contributes to recent 
literary debates concerning childhood and modernism and also takes part in 
discussions of age in Childhood Studies and in the newly-emerging field of Age 
Studies, which recognises age to be an attribute of identity as significant as gender, 
race, class, sexuality, disability, and so on. The thesis makes a distinct contribution to 
literary studies by providing the first introduction to Barker’s work and writing life, 
based not only on in-depth analyses of her published texts but also on extensive 
archival research undertaken at the A.L. Barker archive at the Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center. 
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Introduction: Figuring the Child 
 
I.  
In Life Stories (1981) A.L. Barker wrote about a childhood expedition to the home of 
her mother’s employer in the affluent south London suburb of Lawrie Park. Barker’s 
most vivid memory of the visit is the moment when, left alone in the kitchen while 
her mother cleaned, and only six years old, she turned on the tap in the door of the 
oven range and watched the water flow across the red tiled floor. ‘I admired the way 
the water clarified every crack and scrupulously filled every hollow’, she remembers.1 
Barker reimagines the episode in her novel, A Heavy Feather (1978) from the 
perspective of Almayer Jenkins: ‘[the water] magnified every crack, every grain. […] 
It is water I remember as my eye of childhood, a vision crystal clear and scrupulous. 
I like to think I saw everything like that. It is sentimentality, of course, for I had 
learned already to look without seeing.’2 Through the metaphor of the ‘eye of 
childhood’, the passage evokes ideas about the child’s freshness of perception even 
as it dismisses them as sentimental. By suggesting that experience already clouds 
Almayer’s vision, the novel questions Romantic conceptions of the fresh, ‘innocent’ 
gaze of the child, akin to that of the first humans or Adam in Eden. But Barker does 
not dismiss entirely the idea of a special clarity of childhood perception. Instead, the 
image of the ‘eye of childhood’ foregrounds not just the duality but the ambiguity of 
the child in her work. 
It also serves as a powerful metaphor for the way in which Barker’s fiction 
compels the reader to view the world through the lens of childhood. Like the water, 
which clarifies and magnifies the cracks in the kitchen floor, the ‘eye of childhood’ in 
Barker’s fiction illuminates the fault lines in constructions of innocence and 
                                                          
1 A.L. Barker, Life Stories, 1981 (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), p. 15. 
2 Barker, A Heavy Feather (London: The Hogarth Press, 1978), p. 17. The reference is to William 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth (c. 1606): ‘'[t]is the eye of childhood/that fears a painted devil’. See: William 
Shakespeare, Macbeth, A. R. Braunmuller, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
2.2.57-58. 
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experience in the literature and culture of the twentieth century. It does this by 
reworking and repurposing conceptions of childhood innocence and experience in 
modernist, Victorian and Romantic literature. Her fiction thereby creates a 
historiographical account of these states and their relation to childhood – a 
genealogy of age according to A.L. Barker.  
Barker’s concern with the child is perhaps typical of an author who began 
writing in the 1930s. Elizabeth Bowen (1899-1973), Rosumund Lehman (1901-1990), 
William Golding (1911-1993), Elizabeth Taylor (1912-1975), Angus Wilson (1913-
1991), Muriel Spark (1918-2006), and Doris Lessing (1919-2013), among others, all 
wrote about children. Because Barker’s fiction so often alludes to, borrows from, and 
reworks the writing of others it is difficult to distinguish a distinctive ‘Barkeresque’ 
child. My argument is not that Barker conceives the child in a completely different 
way to her peers. Like Bowen, Barker critically revisits the Jamesian child; like Wilson, 
she pairs children with the elderly; and her writing features a ‘feral’ child like those 
in Lessing’s work. Barker is also influenced by writers of the previous generation, 
learning about the dangers of innocence in the writing of Rebecca West (a great 
admirer of Barker’s work) and consulting James Joyce’s fiction for a model of the 
rejection of the Romantic epiphany.3 What makes Barker stand out is the intensity of 
her gaze on the child and the sheer variety of the children she imagines in her writing. 
Her fiction thinks critically about the tendency to understand childhood in terms of 
dichotomy, recognising the ways in which this restricts and burdens the child, and 
insisting instead on its ambiguity.  
Considering that the child figure regularly appears in the work of British 
twentieth-century writers, there is remarkably little critical scholarship on the 
representation of childhood in twentieth century British literature for adults. While 
much has been written about the figure of the child in Romantic and Victorian texts4 
                                                          
3 Barker wrote to West in 1980 to ask if she might dedicate Life Stories to her. Her letter reads: ‘To 
me, as to many people, you are our greatest living writer. I have known it since my ignorant ‘teens 
when I first read Black Lamb, Grey Falcon. It has been a matter of great pride and consolation to me 
that you have noticed my work and often gone out of your way to commend it to others. I suspect it 
was your influence which procured for me a fellowship of the Royal Society of Literature, an 
acknowledgement which means more to me than any award or literary prize.’ See: Barker, letter to 
Rebecca West, 6th June 1980, box 11, folder 1, HRHRC. 
4 For studies of childhood in Romantic and Victorian literature see especially: James Kincaid, Child 
Loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture (New York and London: Routledge, 1992); Claudia 
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– and about representations of childhood in nineteenth and twentieth century 
Children’s literature5 – literary critics rarely pay close and sustained attention to how 
British writers of the twentieth century wrote the child. The lack of criticism about 
childhood and modernism is particularly surprising given the importance of the child 
to modernist literature. Paul March-Russell argues that ‘the child acted as a catalyst 
for many of the Modernist debates that surrounded identity’, noting that although 
modernist critics frequently explore ideas of identity ‘the role of the child has rarely 
been examined.’6 Critical examinations of childhood in the fiction of this period are 
usually confined to the final section of a book that offers a broad chronological survey 
of childhood, for example, Peter Coveney’s famous study, Poor Monkey (1957).7 
Sometimes essays about twentieth-century British literary children feature alongside 
pieces on the representation of the child in film and popular culture within the pages 
of interdisciplinary edited collections.8 While these books provide useful new 
theoretical perspectives, their broad Anglo-American focus does not allow for a 
sustained examination of the child in British twentieth-century literature. On the 
whole, when literary critics writing about the period do show an interest in 
childhood, the ‘theme’ appears as just one of a number of preoccupations in a more 
general study. While it is likely that a critical account of the work of one of the 
                                                          
Nelson, Precocious Children and Childish Adults: Age Inversion in Victorian Literature (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2012); Robert Pattison, The Child Figure in English Literature (Athens: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1978); Judith Plotz, Romanticism and the Vocation of Childhood 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001); Catherine Robson, Men in Wonderland: The Lost Girlhood of the 
Victorian Gentleman (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001); Carolyn Steedman, 
Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority 1780-1930 (London: Virago, 1995). 
Steedman’s book does venture into the twentieth-century but its cut-off date is 1930.  
5 Studies of children’s literature fall outside the scope of this project, which exclusively focuses on 
fiction for adult readers. 
6 Paul March-Russell, ‘Baby Tuckoo Among the Grown-Ups: Modernism and Childhood in the 
Interwar Period’, in Adrienne E. Gavin, ed., The Child in British Literature: Literary Constructions of 
Childhood, Medieval to Contemporary (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), pp. 196-211, p. 196. 
7 Peter Coveney’s Poor Monkey was reprinted and revised as The Image of Childhood: The Individual 
and Society: A Study of the Theme in English Literature (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967). This 
study uses the later book throughout. Richard Locke’s study is also worth mentioning here, although 
it is largely focused on nineteenth century British and twentieth-century American literature: 
Richard Locke, Critical Children: The Use of Childhood in Ten Great Novels (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2011). For edited collections see: Gavin, ed., The Child in British Literature. 
8 See, for example: Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley, eds., Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Karen J. Renner, ed., The ‘Evil Child’ in 
Literature, Film and Popular Culture (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 
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aforementioned mid-century writers will take account of her writing about children, 
the child will rarely be the sole focus of the book.9 
Barker’s fiction, however, demands to be read in the light of the figure of the 
child. Nineteen of the thirty short stories she published between 1947 and 1964 are 
about children (more than this feature a child). The child figure lingers at the margins 
of her 1960s novels, returning to the foreground in her short fiction of the 1970s and 
1980s, and in her 1987 novel, The Gooseboy. In her final novel, The Haunt (1999), 
written when she was in her eighties, Barker in a sense comes full circle, returning to 
and developing the re-writing of the Romantic child she began in her debut 
collection, Innocents: Variations on a Theme (1947). The importance of the child to 
her work means that studying her fiction necessitates an examination of childhood. 
To write an introduction to Barker’s work without exploring the figure of the child 
seems impossible. So it is no surprise that all of the few pieces of literary criticism 
about Barker’s fiction address her preoccupation with childhood (I discuss this later). 
My thesis will not only provide the first full-length study of Barker’s work and life, but 
will also offer the first sustained examination of the child in the fiction of an individual 
twentieth-century writer since 1991. The two main parts of the thesis (Barker’s 
fiction and the history of the child) work together. Barker’s writing illuminates the 
child in twentieth-century literature and culture and allows us to see the history of 
the child figure more clearly, and in a new way. At the same time, understanding the 
history of childhood innocence and experience and the changing figure of the child 
gives us a ‘lens’ through which we can read Barker’s writing. The third part of the 
thesis concerns Barker’s life. Her preoccupation with the child figure seems 
appropriate considering that she, like the child, resists being known. I begin the 
section that follows by examining Barker’s careful representation of her own 
childhood. What interests me is that Barker’s biography, like her fiction, is 
characterised by a tension between being known and remaining secret. 
 
 
                                                          
9 To my knowledge, the only exception to this which may be termed ‘recent’ is: Carol Sklenicka, D.H. 
Lawrence and the Child (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1991). 
11 
 
II.  
A.L. Barker did not believe her childhood to be interesting. ‘Readers were 
accustomed and entitled to lives that were rich and/or strange,’ she writes in Life 
Stories. ‘I had no compulsion to write about the events in my life, most of them were 
only too predictable.’10 Barker’s certainty that her life is ‘predictable’ and thus not 
eventful enough to merit a standard autobiographical work is telling, suggesting 
either a lack of confidence, a desire to self-efface, or both of these at once. Also of 
interest is Barker’s sense that readers are ‘accustomed and entitled to’ particular 
kind of lives: ‘there was the consumer to consider’11 This raises the question of what 
we expect from a writer’s childhood (a degree of richness and strangeness?) and 
gives an insight into Barker’s sense of her work, and by implication her life, as a 
product for consumption. Significantly, Barker’s declaration that she ‘had no 
compulsion to write about the events in [her] life’ appears to be contradicted by a 
statement on the same page of Life Stories: ‘[w]hen I realised that I wanted to write 
something about myself and my writing I was dismayed.’12 It seems that Barker wants 
to write about herself and her writing but she doesn’t want to write about the events 
in her life. This tension between being known and remaining secret permeates her 
writing life, and perhaps explains the unusual form of Life Stories, which Jane Gardam 
describes as ‘a curious book of anecdotes about herself slotted between passages 
from her work’.13 Barker’s sense of ‘dismay’ at wanting to write about herself merits 
further attention. Her anxiety stems from the idea of ‘[a]ll those pages, x-hundreds, 
it could be x-thousands, peppered with I’s’.14 Bearing in mind that by this point Barker 
was in her early sixties, a Royal Society of Literature Fellow, an Arvon tutor, a member 
of PEN, and had written a novel shortlisted for the Booker Prize, her reticence is 
surprising. It seems appropriate that she would want to write about herself at this 
point in her life, after so many achievements.  
                                                          
10 Barker, Life Stories, p. 9. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Jane Gardam, ‘Introduction’, in Barker, Submerged: Selected Stories (London: Virago Press, 2002), 
pp. vii-xiv, p. xi. 
14 Barker, Life Stories, p. 9.  
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Barker’s inhibition about revealing herself on paper started at an early age: 
‘When, for the first time, something I had written appeared in print I hid it. Seeing 
my thoughts on a page was humiliating. One of two courses was open to me: I should 
have to destroy whatever I wrote, or I should have to write like someone else. I 
wanted nothing of myself on paper.’15 This desire for privacy comes across in Barker’s 
writing.16 In a review of A Source of Embarrassment (1974) Isabel Quigly writes of 
‘the almost impenetrable inner world of A. L. Barker’ and notes Barker’s ‘quiet 
reputation for sharpness, precision, perfect finish’.17 Reviewing the same novel, 
Anthony Thwaite describes Barker as a ‘delicate, muted novelist’ who ‘writes in a 
witty undertone, stylish, oblique, with a sense of claws beneath the surface […] like 
a 1970s Jane Austen’.18 But, Thwaite adds, ‘even [Barker’s] broadest comedy is 
‘civilised’ in a fastidious, slightly debilitated way’.19 Both Quigly and Thwaite make a 
distinction between the surface of Barker’s writing and what lies beneath. Quigly 
observes the ‘sharpness’ and ‘precision’ of Barker’s writing but suggest that her 
‘perfect finish’ does not allow the reader access to her ‘impenetrable inner world’. 
Thwaite notes Barker’s style and humour but, through his use of ‘fastidious’ and 
‘debilitated’, also registers his sense that she is restraining herself, supressing her 
‘claws’ with her ‘civilised’ humour. Both reviewers put emphasis on the ‘quiet’, 
‘muted’ quality of her prose. Barker’s writing, like her writing life, is characterised by 
a tension between concealing and revealing. 
Although Barker describes her life as ‘predictable’ her early years were 
unusual considering her profession. Most of the mid-century writers I mentioned 
earlier were from middle- or upper- class backgrounds and, although working-class 
writers were more common in the post-war period, female working-class writers 
were more unusual than male ones. In the section of Life Stories in which she recalls 
                                                          
15 Ibid, p. 55.  
16 Incidentally, Barker’s desire for privacy may be related to her preference for the short story, 
which she felt was a more private, personal form than the novel. ‘It’s very private, the short story’, 
she writes, meaning that reactions towards short stories differ a lot from one person to the next 
and, if a story is rejected, ‘It is very much a question of what that particular editor feels […] what 
makes them tick’. See: Barker, draft of Life Stories (undated), box 8, folder 6, HRHRC.  
17 Isabel Quigly, ‘Entwined Enchantment’ (review of A Source of Embarrassment), in the Financial 
Times, 21st March 1974, p. 15, box 5, folder 6, HRHRC. 
18 Anthony Thwaite, ‘Chapters of Accidents’ (review of A Source of Embarrassment), in The 
Observer, 24th March 1974, box 5, folder 6, HRHRC. 
19 Ibid. 
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her experience with the tap and the water, Barker lists the staff at the house where 
her mother worked: ‘a nurse, a cook, a house-maid and a gardener, and my mother 
to do the rough cleaning’.20 This reminds the reader of the still-rigid class hierarchies 
of British society in the early 1920s and emphasises her parents’, and her own, place 
within them. Barker was highly aware of her social class. Remembering her secondary 
schooling at a girls’ grammar school, she writes: ‘I felt mandatory, the pip put in to 
show that the jam was made with real fruit.’21 Unlike her mother and her aunts, who 
‘all had self-sufficiency and were happy about themselves’, Barker felt that she did 
not fit in, either at home or at school.22 Life Stories gives a sense of an insecure, 
unconfident young woman who doesn’t know her place in the world: ‘I had got a 
scholarship on a mistaken estimate of my abilities. […] I was at that school, that 
stronghold of knowledge and wisdom and the future, under false pretences. The 
Authorities had been grossly deceived. When I left […] I imagined them saying: ‘We 
won’t be caught like that again.’’23 In the chapters that follow, one of the arguments 
I draw on about childhood is that it is culturally constructed and inflected by race, 
gender, sexuality, and class. The last of these is relevant to Barker. Her childhood 
does not fit in with the idealised Victorian narratives of a middle-class childhood 
which still inform discourses of childhood in the 1930s and 1940s. Perhaps this is why 
Barker didn’t think her childhood interesting or worthy of a reader’s interest. 
In her 1990 introduction to Elizabeth Taylor’s Hester Lilly (1954) Barker writes 
that: ‘[Taylor] was serious and professional about her work, but never one to enjoy 
giving interviews and putting herself about. She regarded her private life as her own; 
what she chose to give of it to the world she transmuted into fiction.’24 Barker might 
be writing of herself. The archive shows that she too avoided ‘putting herself about’, 
preferring to remain at home in Carshalton Beeches, Surrey and steer clear of the 
social events that were an inevitable part of the London literary scene: ‘I know you 
hate coming up to London unnecessarily,’ writes Barker’s editor, Nora Smallwood in 
                                                          
20 Barker, Life Stories, p. 12. 
21 Ibid., p. 57. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p.98. 
24 Barker, ‘Introduction’, in Elizabeth Taylor, Hester Lilly (London: Virago, 1990), pp. vii-xiii, p. ix. 
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1951, ‘but next time you have to come up do suggest yourself for lunch’.25 John 
Carter, the manager of Scribner’s London rare book business, also notes Barker’s 
absence from the capital, though in a rather less tactful way than Smallwood: ‘[W]hat 
are you up to?’ he wonders, ‘I never see you’.26  
London didn’t appeal for several reasons. An intensely private person from a 
young age, Barker was very careful to restrict what she revealed about herself and 
disliked being, or seeming to be, out of control. In spring 1948, soon after the success 
of Innocents, Barker attended a party at the West-London home of Carter and his 
wife, Ernestine. Having been taken ill at the party, Barker was afterwards anxious 
about her behaviour, and sent an apology to the Carters. Her letter prompted an 
affectionate response from Ernestine: 
 
Thank you for a beautiful apology for nothing at all. Please, please 
don’t be ashamed. All that happened is that you got rather pale (v. 
becoming), + just [?]ful enough to make us fight for the chance to look 
after you – which you didn’t need at all – as one working woman to 
another, I know how easy it is to get [buzzed?] on a drink or 2 after no 
lunch or tea + please believe that your behaviour compared to mine 
on such occasions should be a source of pride not embarrassment. 
Come + see us soon again.27 
 
Appalled by the idea that Ernestine and John thought she had been drunk, Barker 
wrote to Smallwood, who did her best to reassure her friend. ‘My dear Pat,’ she 
replied, ‘[t]he thing that’s worrying the three of us here dreadfully is that you should 
think back on your collapse on Tuesday with such horror. We all of us knew, good 
though the Carter cocktails were, that they weren’t the cause of your feeling so 
rotten.’28 Such an acute concern about how people perceived her must have played 
a part in Barker’s position on the margins of the London literary scene.  
Social class and lack of confidence are other likely factors. Barker was not 
well-off and she worked full-time so there were practical and financial reasons for 
her absence from the capital (I discuss these in detail at the start of chapter three). 
                                                          
25 Nora Smallwood, letter to Barker, 18th April 1951, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
26 John Carter, letter to Barker, 17th April 1952, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
27 Ernestine Carter, undated letter to Barker (c. April 1948), box 8, folder 7, HRHRC.  
28 Smallwood, letter to Barker, 30th April 1948, box 8, folder 7, HRHRC.  
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Most of the literary people Barker was socialising with were from upper- or middle-
class backgrounds so perhaps she felt about the London literary scene the way she 
felt about her grammar school, ‘the pip put in’ to show that the jam was real. Barker’s 
lack of confidence in herself is well-documented. In 1951 Smallwood wrote to Barker 
thanking her for her recent letter: ‘For a distinguished Prize winner your modesty is 
unequalled. And never have I met a more self-critical writer.’29 Another incident that 
shows Barker’s lack of confidence is recounted in her piece about her travels in 
France in 1948, where she stayed with Smallwood’s friends, the le Cours, in 
Montaigne’s chateau. She writes: ‘One afternoon I was requested to present myself 
on the terrace at Montaigne where ‘some gentlemen from the Academie Française’ 
were to take tea with Madame le Cour. Mention was made of Monsieur Maurois……. 
I panicked and hid in the woods’.30 Barker’s self-confidence and belief in her writing 
improved as she got older but, as we saw earlier, even when she was in her sixties 
she was still ‘dismayed’ by the idea of writing about herself. 
 
III.  
Discussing the novel, 1945-1950, the writer P. H. Newby remarks on the 
‘extraordinary’ amount of fiction about childhood that emerged during this period.31 
In The Novel Since 1939 (1946) Henry Reed argues that the interest in childhood 
began during the war. For Reed, Gill Plain observes, ‘perhaps the most potent 
thematic preoccupation of the war years was the trope of childhood. Novelists 
retreated en masse […] to the remembered childhoods of the Edwardian or interwar 
period […] distancing themselves from current conflicts’.32 Also writing in 1946, 
Rosamond Lehmann remarks that: ‘[f]or the present most novelists are likely to turn 
back to the time when, the place where they knew where they were […] They will 
look to their youth’.33 For Barker childhood does not function as a period of stability 
                                                          
29 Smallwood, letter to Barker, 20th June 1951, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
30 Barker, undated typescript entitled ‘Year One of the Somerset Maugham Award’, pp. 3-4, box 13, 
folder 10, HRHRC. 
31 P. H. Newby, The Novel 1945-1950 (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1951), p. 8. 
32 Gill Plain, Literature of the 1940s: War, Postwar and ‘Peace’ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013), pp. 25-26. See also: Henry Reed, The Novel Since 1939 (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1946). 
33 Rosamond Lehmann, ‘The Future of the Novel?’, Britain Today, June 1946, quoted in Randall 
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or a place where she ‘knew where [she] was’. As I have suggested, Barker’s childhood 
is marked by not knowing her place and not fitting in. Newby’s suggestion is that the 
life experience of younger writers such as Barker ‘could be divided into two halves: 
childhood and adolescence on the one hand and war on the other’.34 Again, this was 
not quite the case for Barker. It is true that her twenty-first birthday on 13th April 
1939 was less than a month after Germany’s invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, but 
by this point she had already been working full-time for five years, since she left 
school at sixteen, and had had some experience of adult life between adolescence 
and war.  
The preoccupation with childhood at mid-century noted by Newby, Reed and 
Lehmann is also registered by Elizabeth Bowen. In ‘The Bend Back’ (1950), Bowen 
writes of society’s ‘disrelish for and uneasiness in the present’.35 Her suggestion is 
that mid-twentieth-century society is estranged from the present due to its focus on 
the past and she notes people’s inability to come to terms with and enjoy the 
present.36 This preoccupation with the past (what Bowen calls ‘the better days’) 
necessarily involves representations of childhood. Bowen draws attention to ‘the 
multiplication, in almost every country, every language, of books about childhood 
written for grown-ups’, proposing that ‘[t]he semi-mystical topography of childhood 
seems to be universal’.37 Bowen argues that in childhood people perceive ‘emotional 
simplicity – rebellions perhaps, but (we think) no conflicts. And, framing the whole 
picture, we see security’.38 It is important to note that Bowen herself did not see 
childhood as secure and in her fiction writes about ‘the self-deceiving myth of 
childhood innocence’.39 For Bowen, the mid-century unease with the present 
manifests itself as a longing for the past and makes adults child-like. She argues: 
‘Now, after a second war, with its excoriations, grinding impersonality, obliteration 
of so many tracks and landmarks, heart and imagination once more demand to be 
                                                          
Stevenson, A Reader’s Guide to the Twentieth-century Novel in Britain (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1993), p. 80. 
34 Newby, The Novel 1945-1950, p. 8.  
35 Elizabeth Bowen, ‘The Bend Back’, 1950, in Hermione Lee, ed., The Mulberry Tree: Writings of 
Elizabeth Bowen (Virago: London, 1986), pp. 54-60, p. 59. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 55.  
38 Ibid.  
39 March-Russell, ‘Baby Tuckoo Among the Grown-Ups’, p. 204. 
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satisfied – to be fed, stabilised, reassured, taught’.40 Bowen’s personification of the 
heart and mind of the mid-century adult imagines him or her to be a needy and 
anxious child. 
More recent literary criticism about the child in the fiction of this period has 
focused particularly on wartime. For example, Lyndsey Stonebridge identifies a turn 
to child analysis in 1940s Britain and argues that the figure of the child in the 
psychoanalysis of this period became both a figure of anxiety and a starting point for 
understanding the ways in which people reacted to anxiety in times of war. For mid-
century psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, as for Freud, Stonebridge argues, the war-
induced separation between mothers and their children generated anxiety but this 
anxiety was productive and essential for the formation of the ego.41 Similarly, N. H. 
Reeve argues that the preoccupation with childhood at mid-century may be 
explained by wartime experience: 
 
Perhaps that sense of a perplexingly excessive immediacy may itself 
have fed into the preoccupations with childhood – childhood not just 
as a symbol for whatever has been torn away or cast adrift, but as a 
condition of being and responding in which event, idea and sensation 
are only dimly distinguishable, a condition which certain 
contemporary traumas can appear to revive.42 
 
Reeve’s description recollects Bowen’s portrayal of childhood representing adults’ 
‘better days’ from which they have been cut off, and recalls her idea of the mid-
century-adult as a traumatised child. His suggestion that childhood is 'a condition of 
being and responding' to the overwhelming and incomprehensible nature of war is 
similar to Stonebridge's argument that the psychic trials of the infant 'become a sort 
of working metaphor for the anxiety of trying to imagine a world at war'.43 For Reeve, 
wartime is a ‘second childhood’, a ‘problematic breach in the continuity of the self’ 
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(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 20, 23.  
42 N. H. Reeve, 'The Girl on a Swing: Childhood and Writing in the 1940s', in Marina MacKay and 
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that may be either ‘a loss or a liberation’.44 Both Reeve and Stonebridge, then, make 
a link between the experience of being a child and the experience of 'being' in 
wartime. 
But the focus at mid-century was not just on the child; it was on the 
adolescent, the old person and the colonial subject as well. In 1950 Barker received 
a letter from a magazine editor asking for a story, on one condition: ‘[d]o you mind if 
I ask you to avoid children and old ladies? I say this because I seem to be fated to 
have this subject chosen by nearly every author at the moment.’45 This focus on the 
so-called ‘book end’ generations suggests that what is at stake in the period is the 
redefining of the ‘mainstream’ Western adult self.46 There is a crisis of national and 
adult identity at mid-century which manifests itself in a preoccupation with origins, 
and thus with the child. At the same time, the crisis aimed to resolve itself via the 
shoring up of the identity categories against which mainstream adult identity is 
defined. So I want to add a further idea to Reeve's two explanations of the mid-
century preoccupation with childhood. As well as the child being 'a symbol for 
whatever has been torn away or cast adrift' and childhood as 'a condition of being', I 
propose that the child in mid-century fiction is a figure that represents human nature, 
‘the father of the man’. And because the quality of human nature is called into 
question so forcefully in the post-war period, the question of what a child is – and 
subsequently, what a human is – becomes one that is being asked with new purpose. 
Representations of the child appear so frequently in mid-century literature 
precisely because the child figure is able to hold contradiction and thus speaks to the 
contradictory nature of being at that particular historical moment. The child figure 
that emerges from the adult imagination on to the pages of post-war fiction is either 
barbaric or a victim of the barbarism of society. The interest in childhood as a symbol 
                                                          
44 Reeve, 'The Girl on a Swing’, p. 94. 
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of human nature and cultural origins is signalled by, to give a few examples, a 
renewed focus on social anthropology, an 'anthropological turn' in literature and 
culture and concern about England's decline as a colonial 'Motherland' to its 
'children'.47 In mid-century fiction there are role reversals or age inversions, with 
infantilised adults and precocious children who dominate them. There are pairings, 
in which adult and child are doubled and their relationship examined. And in the 
subtext of much of this fiction a question appears to be being asked: if war makes 
children of adults then what kind of creatures do children become? One answer to 
this question is that in tandem with the intense focus on and regulation of children 
in British society and culture, the child in mid-century fiction becomes ever more 
strange and uncanny.  
As a figure that exposes and holds contradiction, the child also speaks to 
questions of literary categorisation, canonicity and fictional form. Like the fiction of 
many mid-century writers, Barker’s work is difficult to classify and this is one reason 
why it has been overlooked. Barker’s backwards-focus, another mid-century 
characteristic, means that her writing has been read as conventional and 
preoccupied with the past, with not much to say about its own historical moment. A 
good example of this kind of critical view may be found in A. S Byatt’s 1992 
introduction to Barker’s Booker-shortlisted novel, John Brown’s Body (1969):  
 
Anyone who struggled to find the right word, or correct a cadence, or 
shape a narrative must admire Barker’s passionate accuracy. She 
writes for the sake of the English language, though her subject is never 
its inadequacies and pitfalls, which is part of her distance from most 
major writing of our time. […]  
  You mightn’t put her on a reading list for The Novel Today (though 
you might for a course in writing) because she represents no trend, 
attacks no large social issues, opens no existential anxieties. You 
couldn’t form a cult around her novels; they aren’t cosy or cliquish; 
they are idiosyncratic and quietly estranged from the common. 
Because of a kind of inhuman and uncomfortable brightness in her 
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perception I think of her in the company of Walter de la Mare, but that 
may be misleading.48 
  
Byatt clearly appreciates John Brown’s Body, declaring it to be ‘an extraordinary 
novel’ and wondering ‘why [Barker] isn’t more widely read’.49 However, despite her 
admiration of the novel, Byatt’s characterisation of Barker’s oeuvre doesn’t stand up 
to scrutiny. Byatt insists that Barker’s work is not part of a ‘trend’ and does not follow 
most modern writers in dealing with ‘social issues’ or ‘existential anxieties’. But 
reading Barker’s 1960s fiction closely, as I do in chapter three, one cannot help but 
be struck by her concern, in The Joy Ride and After, for example, with familial and 
social disarticulation. Byatt’s assertion that Barker ‘writes for the sake of the English 
language’ and would be useful on the reading list of a course in writing characterises 
Barker as a ‘writer’s writer’, an expert craftsperson but a minor novelist because she 
does not engage with ‘social issues’ or language and is thus ‘distance[d] from most 
major writing of our time’. 
Byatt’s reading of Barker’s work as minor is representative of a 
misunderstanding of mid-century fiction as a whole. Marina MacKay and Lyndsey 
Stonebridge point out that the fiction of this period is often viewed as ‘domestic and 
domesticated’, noted for its parochialism, and branded as ‘a conservative literature 
of retreat’.50 Despite the publication of numerous revisionary works since the 1990s, 
the idea of mid-century fiction as insular has persisted.51 The period of insularity has 
been extended as far as the 1970s; for example, in an article on Ian McEwan for The 
Observer, Robert McCrum writes: 
                                                          
48 A. S. Byatt, ‘Introduction’, in Barker, A Case Examined, John Brown’s Body and The Gooseboy, 
omnibus edn. (London: Vintage, 1992), pp. 2-6, p. 2. 
49, Ibid., pp. 3, 2. 
50 MacKay and Stonebridge, ‘Introduction’, in British Fiction After Modernism, pp. 1-16, pp. 1-2. 
51 See, for example: MacKay and Stonebridge, eds., British Fiction After Modernism; Plain, Literature 
of the 1940s; Reeve and Rod Mengham, eds., The Fiction of the 1940s: Stories of Survival 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Sara Wasson, Urban Gothic of the Second World War: Dark London 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Jenny Hartley, Millions Like Us: British Women's Fiction of 
the Second World War (London: Virago, 1997); Nicola Humble, The Feminine Middlebrow Novel, 
1920s to 1950s: Class, Domesticity, and Bohemianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Kristin 
Bluemel, ed. Intermodernism: Literary Culture in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009); and Andrzej Gasiorek, Post-War British Fiction: Realism and After 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1995). 
21 
 
 
In 1970 […] an Englishman's world was a different place from what it 
is today. Ted Heath was PM; Europe was divided between East and 
West; the Beatles had just released 'Let It Be'. English fiction looked 
different, too: insular, frozen, and spinsterish.  
When the 1970 Booker prize winner, The Elected Member by Bernice 
Rubens, was short-listed with Al Barker [sic], Elizabeth Bowen, Iris 
Murdoch and William Trevor, the house of English fiction looked like 
a shabby, suburban Edwardian rectory. If you wanted to find energy 
or originality, you had to go down the road to the pub. There, in an 
upstairs room, you might find contemporary playwrights at work: 
Pinter in his prime, or the young sans-culottes like Christopher 
Hampton, Trevor Griffiths and David Hare. New fiction was in the 
hands of the middle-aged. To the children of the Second World War 
and its aftermath, English culture was irrelevant and boring.52  
 
McCrum’s statement that mid-fiction is ‘irrelevant’ and lacking in energy or 
originality is typical of the view that the mid-century novel was in crisis and, as 
Malcolm Bradbury put it, ‘No Longer Novel’.53 In addition, McCrum’s use of the word 
‘Edwardian’ supports the point made above about the backwards-focus of mid-
century fiction and how this outlook has contributed to a misreading of the fiction of 
the period. The most salient aspect of McCrum’s critique, however, is the way in 
which he genders ‘English fiction’ as ‘spinsterish’. The book of Barker’s to which 
McCrum refers is John Brown’s Body (1969), a novel about an agoraphobic young 
wife’s sexual obsession with a neighbour she believes to be the acquitted murderer, 
John Brown. Hardly ‘spinsterish’ or ‘Edwardian’. McCrum’s misreading of Barker’s 
fiction recalls the sexist fiction of, and critical response to, the so-called ‘Angry Young 
Men’ by assuming that women’s fiction is conservative and lacking in energy (an idea 
I discuss in chapter four). 
For Nick Turner, ‘novelists who do not foreground issues such as race, gender 
and class, or embrace post-modernism, are not seen as worthy of being written 
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about’; he adds: ‘[t]his can explain A. L. Barker’s marginalization’.54 Turner’s 
statement is a little simplistic. Barker’s fiction does foreground class, gender and 
race, embracing postmodernist ways of thought but critics have not perceived this in 
her work (as we see with Byatt) because they notice her writing style first. So it is not 
that Barker is overlooked because she does not foreground questions of 
marginalisation, but that critics have overlooked Barker because they have missed 
these elements in her work. They focus on her style and miss the substance. As 
Ronald Blythe shrewdly observes: ‘[Barker’s] composed and formal writing blandly 
obscures her edgy intention until the moment of its finest effect.’55 
Marina MacKay and Lyndsey Stonebridge emphasise the ways in which mid-
century fiction does not easily fit into categories established in relation to other 
literary periods (for example, realism and experimentalism) and requires its own 
critical vocabulary.56 They note that mid-century writing tends to be claimed either 
as late modernism or early postmodernism and suggest that the fiction of this period 
responds to being considered ‘precisely as mid-century fiction’.57 In light of these 
ideas, Byatt’s description of Barker’s work is again useful in demonstrating how critics 
have misread mid-century writing. Byatt’s second paragraph, for example, is 
characterised by negative lexis: ‘mightn’t’, ‘couldn’t’, the repetition of ‘no’. Barker’s 
writing is defined here not so much by what it is, as by what it is not. Furthermore, 
the vocabulary Byatt does choose to describe Barker’s prose, words such as 
‘distance’, ‘idiosyncratic’, ‘estranged’, ‘inhuman’, and ‘uncomfortable’, suggest that 
Byatt is unable to place Barker’s work. The only positive comparison made is with 
Walter de la Mare (1873-1956), a writer best known for his supernatural short 
stories. What is ‘uncomfortable’ about Barker’s work, then, is that it does not fit into 
Byatt’s categorisation of ‘The Novel Today’ and cannot be placed (by Byatt) within 
the ‘major writing’ of the twentieth century.  
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This sense of unplaceability and in-betweeness characterises mid-century 
fiction, and Barker’s oeuvre in particular. As a literary-historical category that is hard 
to place and seems always to be in between one thing and another (modernism and 
postmodernism, realism and experimentalism) mid-century fiction is like the figure 
of the child. Critics attempt to pin it down but it resists definition and categorisation, 
is characterised by ambiguity and marginality, and is poised between states or in 
suspension. The concept of liminality is useful here. In The Rites of Passage (1909) 
Arnold Van Gennep proposed that these ceremonies include a transitional or liminal 
stage between a person’s ritual separation from one state and their incorporation 
into the next.58 In The Ritual Process (1969), Victor Turner developed and modified 
Van Gennep’s theory, emphasising the ambiguity of ‘threshold people’ and arguing 
that they ‘elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate 
states and positions in cultural space’.59 For Turner, a threshold person is ‘in and out 
of time’, in between the future and the past, in a moment when normal life is 
suspended.60 The term liminality, then, not only denotes the idea of marginality 
(which is significant for many mid-century writers including Barker). It also suggests 
a moment of temporal suspension or a discontinuity. This is important to an 
understanding of mid-century fiction. Turner’s notion of threshold people being both 
‘in and out of time’ speaks to an idea voiced by several mid-century writers, including 
Bowen, that the period during and immediately after the Second World War was in 
some way difficult or even impossible to represent because people felt suspended, 
estranged or adrift from their historical moment. As George Orwell puts it in ‘Inside 
the Whale’ (1940), the production of any major literature is impossible ‘until the 
world has shaken itself into its new shape’.61 The general consensus is that this 
settling took some time. MacKay and Stonebridge, for example, propose that ‘the 
post-war sensibility violently sheds its historical and ideological skins in 1968’.62 
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Other accounts argue that the legacy of the Second World War loomed large in 
Britain for at least three decades, citing economic crises and the threat of the Cold 
War as reasons to extend the ‘post war’ era until the mid-1970s.63  
If we read the British mid-century – the period from the early 1930s to the 
late 1960s – as a liminal era, a moment of suspension and ambiguity, then we gain a 
greater understanding of the preoccupation with the child during this period. The 
child is used to look forward and to look back when people are unable to ‘be’ in the 
present. The child registers and holds the social and political contradictions of this 
historical moment and also its literary complexities. Literature is backwards-looking 
with an eye on new forms, realist and experimental. There is a hybridity of genres 
and forms, with writers making new fiction out of what has come before. This 
backwards- and forwards- focus relates to the preoccupation with the child. The child 
also speaks to the marginality of mid-century fiction which, like the child, may be 
thought of in relation to oppositions such as inside and outside, and mainstream and 
marginal. MacKay and Stonebridge tell the story of ‘how the English literary ‘centre’ 
[…] ceased to understand itself as central’.64 They argue that ‘the most paradoxical – 
but also the most symptomatic – dimension of British culture after modernism is the 
way that its writers of central significance so relentlessly and wilfully positioned 
themselves on the outside’.65  
Of course, Barker is not (yet) considered to be ‘of central significance’ but she 
does purposefully position herself on the margins, self-marginalising through the 
form, style and content of her work, and choosing to live on the margins of the 
literary centre. The meanings of marginality are twofold. The first is to do with 
importance: the marginal lacks significance; the second concerns geography: the 
marginal is near a limit. Barker is marginal in both these senses. She writes both short 
stories and novels, literary fiction and genre fiction. She begins writing at mid-
century: the era after modernism but before postmodernism. She is at once 
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connected with the London literary scene and distanced from it. None of her novels 
are set in London and she didn’t want to spend time there. Indeed, her geographical 
situation is representative of her literary position. Not only is Barker’s fiction itself 
marginal, it is interested in liminal figures: children, older people, those on the 
margins of society. Finally, the liminal preoccupations of her writing relate to her own 
position as a mid-century adult, part of the generation discussed by Bowen and 
Newby.  
So the various applications of the idea of liminality and marginality I discuss 
above and in the rest of the thesis relate both to the sense of unplaceability and in-
between-ness of Barker herself and to how this study of her work might inform future 
discussions of mid-century fiction. There has been a recent critical trend towards the 
recuperation of neglected mid-century British writers. MacKay and Stonebridge 
argue that the revaluation of the fiction of this period in relation to its cultural history 
shows how close study of the work of non-canonical figures disrupts accepted 
narratives about what happened to British fiction at this time. The crucial word is 
‘disrupts’ in the sense that a marginal, non-canonical figure such as Barker has a 
haunting effect on the centre. Forms of writing relegated to a marginal position will 
not stay beyond the margins; what is excluded and repressed always returns. These 
ideas will be discussed in more detail in chapter four, which argues that Barker’s 
ghost stories help us understand her position as both a marginal and a mainstream 
writer. 
 
IV.  
  Innocence and experience: one cancels out the other; they merge, 
they invert, they infiltrate, they transmute, they are permeable states, 
and they permeate each other.   A.L. Barker66 
 
Earlier I proposed that the metaphor of the ‘eye of childhood’ makes clear the 
importance of the child in Barker’s fiction. But while a consideration of the child 
figure particularly illuminates the ways in which ideas of innocence and experience 
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function in Barker’s writing, the child cannot be separated from the adult, the 
adolescent and the old person. Her work shows that these age categories are 
constructed against and in relation to one another, and often understood through 
the symbol of the child. So Barker’s oeuvre is as much about the adult as it is about 
the child. It asks how adults have created the child at particular moments in British 
literature and history and what these different constructions of childhood reveal 
about adult anxieties and preoccupations. Barker’s fiction recognises that age defines 
us in ways that are connected to but also distinct from other aspects of identity such 
as gender, race, sexual orientation or social class. Her writing is a part of the 
twentieth-century fascination with age but at the same time it responds critically to 
the tendency to think about age and other attributes of identity in oppositional 
terms. It calls into question dualisms such as innocence/experience, young/old, 
child/adult, emphasising that these ideas are ‘permeable states’ that do not exist in 
static isolation but are dependent on one another, ‘merging’, ‘inverting’ and 
‘infiltrating’ in dialectical relationships.  
In 1986 Barker wrote to her friend, the psychologist Charlotte Wolff, about 
Wolff’s book, Magnus Hirschfeld: ‘I do so agree when you point out that the ‘complex 
meaning of youth and age should exercise sociologists [...]’ It should indeed!’67 As 
well as emphasising that for Barker youth and age are always intertwined, her 
comment shows that she considers the complex attributes of categories of age to be 
ideas that require analysis. For Barker, writing the figure of the child is a way of 
conducting this analysis. In her fiction the child is a deconstructive figure that draws 
attention to the instability within and between age categories, in turn exposing what 
Barker calls ‘the terrible arbitrariness of age’.68 Age is arbitrary in the sense that 
identities of age are imposed on people by their culture. And while these ageing 
identities and the systems to which they belong appear to be ‘natural’ and ordered 
(or naturally ordered), in fact they are often inconsistent and unstable, changing 
according to different historical and geographical cultures and individual beliefs and 
experiences. Because of Barker’s sense of the complexities of age and the child as a 
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figure that deconstructs or ‘queers’ age by drawing attention to its arbitrariness I 
want to read her fiction in the light of Age Studies and queer theory.  
The still-emerging field of ‘Age Studies’ or ‘Aging Studies’ emphasises that 
ageing is not a process that should be solely associated with older people.69 Devoney 
Looser, for instance, points out that age is not something that only ‘the old’ possess 
and ageing is something we are all doing all the time from cradle to grave.70 Research 
in the field has called attention to the connections that can be made between the 
social positions of the ‘book end’ generations: the very young and the very old. Since 
1945 these age categories have been subject to increasingly protective and 
restrictive regulation by the British government. Dominant twentieth- and twenty 
first- century narratives emphasise the idea that what is at stake in the protection of 
children and the elderly is the humanity of adult society. This kind of view is 
exemplified in a speech to Senate given by the American politician, Hubert 
Humphrey, in which he argues that ‘[t]he ultimate test of a society’s humanity is its 
treatment of the oldest and the youngest members’.71 Age studies theorists are 
interested in the ways in which the book end generations are marginalised in society 
despite governmental claims to the contrary. Peter Hopkins and Rachel Pain, for 
example, argue that ‘[b]oth older and young people inhabit the social-chronological 
margins […] and in Western societies are stereotyped as economically dependent, 
physically less able and socially excluded’.72 As I discuss in chapter three, Barker’s 
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writing stages the disarticulation of intergenerational relationships and inverts adult 
and child roles in order to consider the tensions of the Welfare State as ‘parent’ in 
mid-century Britain. Her fiction represents the ways in which adulthood defines itself 
against what it is not, so that childhood and old age must be dependent for adults to 
remain dominant.  
The idea of adult self-definition taking place by way of the marginalisation of 
other age groups speaks to concepts of self and other in gender, race, disability, post-
colonial and sexuality studies. Writing in the first issue of the Age Studies journal, 
Age, Culture, Humanities, Looser highlights the connections between age and other 
identity categories, arguing that: 
 
We must continue to seek out the ways that the meanings and 
practices of age and aging changed from decade to decade, generation 
to generation, or century to century. We must do so in conversation 
with the other categories of identity that have become central to our 
work in the humanities, particularly in cultural studies: gender, race, 
class, nation, and sexuality among them.73 
 
The thesis recognises the interrelation Looser describes. One example of how age 
relates to other identity categories, again taken from chapter three, is the way in 
which Barker’s 1960s fiction becomes increasingly concerned with the 
representation of childhood and old age in relation to the marginalisation of the 
(non-white) colonial subject. Historically, this figure has been characterised as child-
like but this characterisation became particularly significant after the Second World 
War due to decolonisation. In chapter one I show that the child and the colonial 
subject are linked due to their longstanding association in the child/savage parallel. 
Barker’s deconstructive child figure overturns the oppositions on which this parallel 
is based and also destabilises the terms used to define categories of sexuality, class 
and gender. 
The dismantling of sexual categorisations in sexuality studies and queer 
theory has aided my understanding of how the dialectic of innocence and experience 
and the child/adult opposition function in Barker’s work. The central proposition of 
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Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s influential study, Epistemology of the Closet (1990) is that 
the heterosexual/homosexual opposition, which she calls a ‘master term’ of the 
twentieth century, is characterised by ambiguity and instability: 
 
[C]ategories presented in a culture as symmetrical binary oppositions 
– heterosexual/homosexual, in this case – actually subsist in a more 
unsettled and dynamic tacit relation according to which, first, term B is 
not symmetrical with but subordinated to term A; but, second, the 
ontologically valorized term A actually depends for its meaning on the 
simultaneous subsumption and exclusion of term B; hence, third, the 
question of priority between the supposed central and the supposed 
marginal category of each dyad is irresolvably unstable, an instability 
caused by the fact that term B is constituted as at once internal and 
external to term A.74 
 
This technique may be applied to the analysis of categories of adult (A) and child (B) 
in the thesis. Term B is subordinated to term A. This may be seen in the associations 
made with a child’s physical size, in family hierarchies, in educational institutions, in 
terms of legal agency; children are for the most part physically, emotionally and 
financially dependent on adults. But term A is dependent on term B. As I will show, 
much twentieth century thought has emphasised the extent to which the formation 
of adult identity depends on childhood experience. The child is positioned as the key 
to unlocking the adult self; the child one once was shapes the adult one becomes. So 
term B is internal to term A. At the same time, the meaning of ‘adult’ is defined 
against the meaning of ‘child’; what is adult is what is not childish, not child-like. So 
term B is external to term A.  
Term B, then, is at once internal and external to term A. As in Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s account, this results in a fundamental instability in the adult/child 
opposition. Further, the privileging of youth over age (which, as Looser noted earlier, 
is synonymous with old age) means that childhood is prized as ‘the best time’ of 
people’s lives and youth is associated with health, beauty, fun, and so on. So term B 
is valorised over term A. However, the dependence of the meaning of term A on term 
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30 
 
B and the valorisation of term B has resulted in the further subordination of term B. 
The idealisation of childhood has led to the restriction of what ‘the child’ and 
‘childhood’ can or should mean. The resistance of adults to the strangeness of the 
child suggests that the regulation of children is less about the protection of ‘real’ 
children and more about the preservation of certain ideas of the nation, the family, 
the adult, the self which depend on the meaning of the child being static and fixed as 
innocent, unknowing, and so on. Kathryn Bond Stockton suggests this when she 
notes that ‘even conservative Americans who trumpet family values juxtapose their 
children with “homosexuals.” Of course, they do so in order to oppose them to each 
other […] Yet by doing so, they make the concept of homosexuality central to the 
meaning of the children they embrace’.75 Homosexuality, darkness, evil, madness, 
strangeness – all of these qualities must be eradicated from the category of ‘child’ in 
order for it to play its part in the preservation of the oppositions on which Western 
culture is based. 
Sexuality studies and queer theory recognise the child as a ‘queer’ figure that 
resists and disrupts classification. The figure of the child ‘queers’ conceptions of age 
in a sociological sense by deviating from the narrow idea of what ‘the child’ is and 
should be offered by dominant cultural narratives about childhood. The child is also 
queer because it makes a person other to herself and disrupts temporality: the child 
is what one once was and no longer is but one’s childhood never really goes away. 
Bond Stockton argues that ‘from the standpoint of “normal” adults [the child] is 
always queer’ but that the gay child in particular brings into view some central 
problems with Anglo-American ideas of growing up.76 She draws attention to what 
she calls ‘the gay child’s “backward birth”, by which she means that because children 
are not permitted to be sexual (though all children are presumed to be heterosexual) 
the gay child is only ever ‘gay’ in retrospect.77 Because of this ‘backward birthing’, 
Bond Stockton argues, ‘the gay child makes us perceive the queer temporalities 
haunting all children’ and reveals how the child is always other to ‘normal’ adult 
                                                          
75 Kathryn Bond Stockton, The Queer Child: Or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth Century (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2009), p. 3. 
76 Ibid., p. 7. 
77 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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identity.78 Ideas of the ‘queer temporalities’ that haunt the figure of the child, and its 
position as other to adult identity are essential to an understanding of Barker’s 
oeuvre. Her writing engages with Sigmund Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality, which 
figures the child as the unconscious, and thus the origin of primitive, aggressive and 
sexual impulses and desires. Staging Freud’s ideas about repression, latency and 
return, Barker’s fiction considers the ways in which childhood always returns and 
thus defines adult experience. As I will show in chapter two, in Barker’s writing the 
child figure is uncanny: familiar and strange, present and absent, known and 
unknown. Reading Barker’s fiction in the light of Freud’s ideas about childhood, and 
ideas of the child in the work of later psychoanalysts such as Melanie Klein, I sketch 
out the ways in which the queer child is a figure that haunts twentieth-century 
Britain. 
Barker’s dialectical view of innocence and experience, which are ‘permeable 
states [that] permeate each other’, puts emphasis on the disruption of chronology 
and hierarchies of age. In her fiction innocence acts upon experience as well as vice 
versa, meaning that chronological accounts of ‘development’ and growth are called 
into question. Bond Stockton argues that the idea of the ‘backward birth’ of the gay 
child requires an alternative to the notion of vertical growth. In contrast to the idea 
of ‘growing up’, which she argues ‘may be a short-sighted, limited rendering of 
human growth’, Bond Stockon proposes the idea of ‘“growing sideways” [which] 
suggests that the width of a person’s experience or ideas, their motives or their 
motions, may pertain at any age, bringing “adults” and “children” into lateral contact 
of surprising sorts’.79 The suggestion is that the assumed differences between adults 
and children, often based on solely on biological growth, are problematic and 
unsustainable. What happens, for example, when the child becomes physically larger 
than the adult? (Chapter four explores the representation of the adolescent as an 
unformed, liminal and dangerous figure.) Categories of age should be viewed as 
interdependent rather than hierarchical and oppositional; they are fluid in the sense 
that ideas of childhood are not only associated with people who might legally, 
medically or culturally be called children. Growing, changing, perpetually in motion, 
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the figure of the child in Barker’s fiction refuses to be pinned down as either innocent 
or experienced, past or present, known or unknown. It deconstructs categorisations 
of age and insists on the plurality of meaning. The queer child in Barker’s fiction 
exposes the queerness of ageing identity. 
 
V.  
In the chapters that follow I trace the cracks in constructions of innocence and 
experience that are exposed by Barker’s fiction. My overall argument is that Barker’s 
refiguration of the child is both thematic and formal and necessarily involves the 
reconceptualisation of associated categories of age, such as adolescence, old age and 
adulthood. Barker’s reworkings of innocence and experience are written in a variety 
of alternative forms – the short story, the articulated novel, the ghost story and the 
‘retropulsive text’ – and her interest in the links between different categories of age 
may be seen in the formal structure of her writing.  
Chapter One considers the figure of the Romantic child that Barker inherited 
when she began to write in the 1940s, carrying out a broadly chronological survey 
beginning in the 1790s. It maps out the ways in which people have thought about the 
figure of the Romantic child at particular historical moments, always keeping in mind 
the idea that constructions of childhood are restricted by adult needs and desires. 
Rather than attempting an exhaustive survey of the Romantic child, I concentrate on 
moments when ideas of childhood innocence and experience are challenged and 
disrupted, or reinforced: the origins of the Romantic child; Blake’s dichotomous child; 
the influence of Wordsworth’s divine child on the Victorians; the challenge posed to 
the ‘innocent’ child by the ideas of Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud; Henry James’s 
critique of innocence; the symbolism of the dichotomous modernist child; and the 
ways in which this recalls the duality of the child in Romantic literature. I also consider 
the relationships between the child, the short story and modernism, arguing that, for 
Barker, the short story is a form that is able to hold contradiction. An understanding 
of these historical moments is essential to my later explorations of Barker’s 
genealogy of age, which rewrites the Romantic child in the light of new configurations 
of childhood and innocence and experience in the 1940s. 
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 These configurations are the focus of Chapter Two, which begins by analysing 
the child as a figure that is both ‘close’ and ‘closed’ in two of Barker’s early short 
stories. After establishing the dominant narratives of childhood in 1940s intellectual 
and popular culture, I turn to ‘The Iconoclasts’ (1947) and ‘Domini’ (1949), arguing 
that Barker’s stories dramatise Freudian theory. Through their staging of 
psychoanalytic ideas about children Barker’s stories resist the objectification of the 
child in psychological, psychoanalytic and anthropological models of childhood and 
put emphasis on the ways in which the child is figured as ‘other’ to adult identity. 
Finally, responding to Barker’s contention that every writer has only ‘one basic 
theme’, I analyse a later book, The Gooseboy (1987), arguing that the novel critiques 
the objectification of childhood in popular journalism in the late-twentieth century.  
In Chapter Three I build on ideas of the child as figure against which adult 
society defines itself, considering the inversion of adult and child roles in Barker’s 
fiction of the 1960s. I argue that the gap or silence in Barker’s writing career should 
be read as a period in which she was developing her ‘articulated novels’, The Joy-Ride 
and After (1963) and The Middling (1967). In these books domestic failures of 
articulation, shown through ‘bad talk’ and inappropriate verbal articulations, signal a 
failure of articulation on a wider scale: the disarticulation of British citizens from one 
another and from the state as a result of the legacies of the war and decolonisation. 
Age inversion in these texts signals familial and social instability and expresses 
Barker’s misgivings about the relations between state and citizen in 1960s Britain. 
Just as Barker’s consideration of post-war inequality is inflected with ideas of 
innocence and experience, so too is her examination of marginal female sexuality 
and masculine identity. In Chapter Four I argue that Barker’s ‘ghost stories’, ‘View in 
a Long Mirror’ (c.1952), ‘Charley’ (1989), and ‘Element of Doubt’ (1987), are 
concerned with the ghostliness of age. The representation of aged and adolescent 
female sexuality in these stories challenges the conventional gendering of sexual 
knowledge. But while Barker’s ghostly female adolescents resist definition, 
disrupting the male desire to know, the representation of the adolescent girl as 
unformed and incomplete speaks to the ideas that the fragmentary female is 
necessary for the construction of male identity and that psychoanalytic ideas of 
female adolescence require the adolescent girl to be unstable and incomplete. For 
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Barker, the ghost story is an ideal form in which to explore the ways that age may be 
liminal, abject and ghostly.  
Chapter Five builds on ideas about the ghostliness of age, considering age, 
place, past time and form in Barker’s final novel, The Haunt (1999). I propose that the 
language of age is one of place and that childhood and old age are spatially 
represented as other to adult identity. The Haunt troubles the idea that child and 
adult, past and present can be separated, using Barker’s notion of ‘retropulsion’ to 
stage the ways in which the primitive, infantile unconscious haunts the ‘civilized’ 
conscious mind. Through its engagement with Wordsworth’s Prelude, The Haunt 
undermines both the idealised child and the conception of an ‘ideal’ old age. 
Conversely, the novel calls into question the assumed connections between old age, 
physical immobility and mental stasis, emphasising the importance of 
intergenerational relationships. Its overlapping and intertwining stories, created as 
Barker converted the book to a novel, produce a non-teleological, non-‘progress’ 
narrative which is better able to convey ageing experience than a conventional novel 
of old age.
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Chapter One 
Innocence and Experience: (Re)Writing the Child at Mid-Century 
 
The period of the inconsequence of the child was over and in a playbox 
way the new requirements were being met. A scaled-down world had 
been provided, with its own morals and mores […] 
   […] The limits were rigidly defined, but not definable. Nobody put 
them into words. They were like the markings on a tennis-court and to 
play the ball outside was to lose not just a point, but the game. As I 
found out, Children were supposed not to know about sex or murder 
or disease or drugs or vice. They were allowed fibbing, thieving, 
cheating and sprained ankles. They were protected, especially from 
themselves. The result was a small world, simple, scanty, and free from 
nightmare. Dark feelings and disreputable thoughts, being ignored, 
went away, at any rate for the people who wrote the stories. […] 
   Oddly, or perhaps ordinarily enough, the girls’ fiction-writers were all 
men. They used female pen-names: Linda had been in the Navy, 
Marjorie was a lapsed parson, Susan was a night-porter, Deirdre an 
antiquarian bookseller. One of the most popular serials was the work 
of cab-driver who could outdrink anyone in Fleet Street. 
 Barker, Life Stories1 
 
A.L. Barker’s description of the period during the late 1930s when she worked in the 
department of juvenile fiction at the Amalgamated Press illustrates many of the 
preoccupations of this chapter. She notes the fictionality of children, and that the 
writing of the child is done by adults, significantly by men. The idea of childhood as a 
cultural category created by adults is by now well established. Barker’s image of the 
fictional world of childhood as a tennis court on which one might accidentally ‘play 
the ball outside’ the lines registers the arbitrariness of the limits of ‘the child’. The 
rules at the Amalgamated Press restricting how children could be portrayed signal 
both commercial pressure, and a lack of imagination. Barker recognises the 
commercial nature of this enterprise, and reveals an awareness of several different 
strands of restriction and control: writers, editors, publishers, and parents are all 
involved in producing ‘the child’. Her description of the recycling and repeating of 
                                                          
1 Barker, Life Stories, pp. 143-145. 
36 
 
stories, which was justified by the fact that the children who read the 1920s versions 
were ‘in the Forces’ by the first years of the war, indicates the limited ability of adults 
to envision children.1 Children from one generation to the next are not permitted to 
evolve and develop, not because they do not but because adults cannot imagine 
them doing so. Barker’s humorous characterisation of the male writers posing as girls 
suggests an element of playful imaginativeness in adult writings of the child. But this 
is undercut, first, by the modern connotations of men pretending to be little girls and, 
second, by the restrictiveness of this process of ‘child’ creation, which produces a 
regulated childhood world that is ‘scanty, and free from nightmare’. 
Childhood, always defined against and by what it is not – sex, experience, 
death, age, nightmare, darkness – is empty and, suggests Barker, insufficient. And it 
is not for children (or not only for children) that this fictional childhood is created. 
Elements that do not belong in childhood, darkness and disreputability, are written 
out and disappear, if not for children themselves, writes Barker, then ‘for the people 
who wrote the stories’. This adult refusal to acknowledge the ‘darkness’ of children, 
their multi-dimensional nature, shows how the limits of ‘the child’ are in turn set by 
the limits of the adult writer’s imagination. James R. Kincaid notes the restrictiveness 
of adult imaginings when he writes that ‘the child is the perceptual frame we have 
available to us for fitting in just about anything we choose – or nothing. What the 
child is matters less than what we think it is and just why we think that way’.2 The 
restrictions imposed on how the child could be represented in the Amalgamated 
Press stories of the 1930s allegorise the cultural limits placed on the category of ‘the 
child’ from its inception, restrictions that are imposed by the adults who imagine and 
write those children.  
By the mid-twentieth century the child had again become a significant figure 
in British literature. In The Novel 1945-1950, Newby remarks upon the 
‘extraordinary… number of novels and stories [in these years] that were devoted to 
the pleasures and pains of childhood’.3 Barker is one of the authors he singles out as 
having a particular interest in childhood. Barker’s experience in juvenile fiction may 
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explain her preoccupation not only with children, but with what the child means to 
adults. Her apprenticeship at the Amalgamated Press raises key concerns, which will 
be addressed in the chapters that follow, about her representation of the child and 
other categories of age, and her choices of fictional form. In this chapter I argue that 
Barker’s explicit engagement with innocence and experience suggests that we should 
look for the ‘Romantic child’ in her work. I will provide a kind of historical mapping of 
the Romantic child through British literature from the 1790s to the 1940s. It will 
concentrate on elements that appear to have contributed to the image(s) of the child 
we find in Barker’s writing. It will not be comprehensive but will instead focus on 
moments of crisis, fracture and change, such as the ‘birth’ of the Romantic child; 
Blake’s dialectic of innocence and experience; the influence of Wordsworth on 
Victorian notions of childhood; the Dickensian child; notions of childhood innocence 
in the fin de siècle; and modernist uses of the child. I will consider how 
representations of the child in literature and history have changed over time and 
evaluate the extent to which nineteenth- and twentieth- century British writers 
either accepted or adapted the inherited model of the Romantic child. Finally, I will 
consider what the Romantic child looked like in the 1940s, the decade in which 
Barker’s work was first published. 
 
I. Innocence and Experience 
When I saw what usage and abusage could do to words, what a load of 
associations, inhibitions and conceits they had to carry, I decided that 
all I could hope to do was explore. Theme and variations seemed like an 
ideal format. My theme was infinite, the impact of innocence on 
experience, any sort of innocence on any sort of experience – the first 
story in the bible: ‘Issues from the hand of God the simple soul’. It was 
more of a fundamental principle than a theme.     Barker, Life Stories4 
 
In Life Stories, Barker describes her thoughts on writing her first collection of short 
stories. The book she mentions is Innocents, subtitled ‘Variations on a Theme’, and 
every story bar one is about a child. Barker’s description of her work gives several 
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references that suggest we look for the Romantic child in her writing. ‘The first story 
in the bible’ is, of course, Genesis, the first book of Moses in The Old Testament, 
which states: ‘the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth’.5 Romantic 
writers contested the idea of original sin and focused on childhood innocence. 
Barker’s phrase ‘any sort of innocence’ registers the various conceptions of 
innocence involved in the life of the Romantic child. In particular, her sense of the 
‘impact’ of innocence brings to mind the forcefulness of innocence in William Blake’s 
Songs of Innocence and of Experience (1789, 1794). Finally, the phrase in quotation 
marks, ‘Issues from the hand of God the simple soul’ is the first line of T. S. Eliot’s 
poem, ‘Animula’ (1929). Critics have argued that the poem, which emphasises the 
‘heavy burden of the growing soul’, is an anti-Romantic version of Wordsworth’s 
‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood’ (1802-4).6 
Thus the three texts to which Barker gives reference represent three different stages 
in the life of the Romantic child; and each contains formulations of innocence and 
experience and ideas about the nature of the child that Barker seems to want to 
evoke at this point. But what is especially interesting is her language. By naming ‘the 
impact of innocence on experience’ an essential principle of her writing, Barker 
reverses the traditional hierarchy in which experience impacts upon innocence. This 
suggests that innocence, and by association the child, may itself be an active force 
for change, rather than being acted upon – an idea that recalls the work of Blake and 
Henry James. Furthermore, Barker’s choice of the term ‘principle’ rather than 
‘theme’ suggests a moral element and rejects the terminology used to describe 
fiction in favour of a term more frequently aligned with philosophy. Barker’s reading 
of innocence and experience thus appears to be a serious principle that underpins 
the outlook of her work.  
I argue that Barker’s allusions, her reversal of the innocence/experience 
opposition, and her use of philosophical terminology signal to us the nature of her 
project. Her oeuvre is a genealogy of age. It not only explores how others have 
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James Version (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 11. 
6 Michael O’Neill, for example, argues that ‘Eliot provides a complex, ambivalent rewriting of ‘Ode’’ 
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written the child but if (and how) the child may be written at all. This is why Barker 
moves from a discussion of the ‘uses and abuses’ of language straight on to a 
discussion of innocence and experience and, by implication, the child. Both words 
and the child have ‘associations, inhibitions and conceits’ to carry. The association of 
childhood and innocence has been (and often still is) considered ‘natural’ and 
unquestionable. Barker’s fiction recognises the burden and restriction placed on the 
child by the adult tendency to imagine childhood in terms of opposition, and children 
as devils or dolls. Her fiction attempts to move past dichotomous ways of thinking, 
privileging the ambiguity of the child. Barker’s preference for short fiction may 
perhaps be explained by her refusal of dichotomy and her simultaneous desire for 
‘wholeness’ or ‘completeness’, as the short story is a form able to hold contradiction. 
Similarly, the child that Barker writes is not either/or but a figure that overcomes this 
duality. It does this not by being divine or ideal but because it is undecideable: 
suspended between innocence and experience.  
 
II. The Romantic Child 
Before thinking about the Romantic child in the mid-twentieth century I want to 
explore its origins, history and development. What are the main characteristics of the 
Romantic child? When did the figure originate? What has it represented at different 
historical moments? What might the early life of the Romantic child tell us about how 
the figure goes on to be represented in mid-twentieth century literature? The survey 
begins in the late eighteenth century, despite the debate surrounding this 
chronology. Judith Plotz, for example, asserts that ‘[i]t is customary to date the so-
called cult of childhood to the late eighteenth century […] Like most originary dates, 
this one is […] dubious’.7 Others have shown that the figure of the child was 
associated in previous centuries with what we might view as Romantic 
preoccupations: questions of innocence, free will, salvation, relations between the 
child and nature, questions that later preoccupied Romantic writers.8  
                                                          
7 Plotz, Romanticism, p. 254. 
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writing, Robert Pattison identifies ‘a minor tradition of eighteenth-century verse about children 
before Blake’. He acknowledges that ‘[t]he ‘romantic child’ of Blake’s Songs of Innocence may have 
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Despite the inevitable omissions involved in locating the ‘birth’ of the 
Romantic child in the late eighteenth century, there is good evidence to support this 
chronology. It is not that the pre-Romantic tradition of writing about children did not 
cover some of the same ground as Rousseau, Blake and Wordsworth but that 
Romantic writers felt that their conception of the child was something new, asserted 
it as such, and succeeded in convincing contemporary readers of the originality of 
their theses. Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in Emile: or, On Education (1762), ‘[w]e 
know nothing of childhood’ and, as Peter Coveney points out, Rousseau’s audience 
appeared to agree: there was an increase in writing on education, with ‘at least 200 
treatises… published before the end of the century, all in some way influenced by 
Emile’.9 Coveney argues that the impact of Emile lay in its rejection of both original 
sin and of the primacy of reason, and by implication its rejection of orthodox Christian 
thought and rationalism. He identifies in the late-eighteenth-century ‘a central 
conflict between Reason and Feeling, within which the romantic child was created’, 
arguing that ‘[i]t was […] against [the] materialist, rationalist, perfectionist, and 
essentially secular eighteenth century that Rousseau, Blake and […] Coleridge 
reacted’.10 Hugh Cunningham agrees that the Romantic child emerged out of conflict 
in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century, but argues that this opposition 
was between Romantics and evangelicals, with rationalists in between.11 Whether 
the Romantic tradition was a reaction against rationalist thought, or evangelical 
thought, or both, it is clear that the Romantics understood the child in a very different 
ways to earlier schools of thought.  
The rationalist tradition, influenced by John Locke’s Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education (1693), was concerned with the perfectibility of humanity and 
the creation of an ideal man through experience, reason and knowledge, giving little 
attention to the child itself, only to what it might become. In Locke’s formulation, the 
child is a blank slate, a ‘tabula rasa’ on which experience leaves its mark. Evangelical 
                                                          
been already there in embryo in the generation before him’ but argues that Blake’s Songs have the 
‘impact of a major talent upon the currencies of a minor literary convention’. (Pattison, The Child 
Figure, pp. 52-3.) 
9 Coveney, The Image of Childhood, pp. 44, 46. 
10 Ibid., pp. 37, 40. 
11 Hugh Cunningham, The Invention of Childhood (London: BBC Books, 2006), p. 130. 
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thought, following the dogma of original sin in earlier Christian doctrine, emphasised 
the sinful nature of human beings and expected childhood obedience, neatness and 
religious education.12 The early Romantic view of childhood was very different. 
Rousseau focused on what the child was in itself rather than only what it might 
become. In Emile, he encouraged readers to value childhood for its own sake; writers 
such as Locke, Rousseau argued, ‘are always looking for the man in the child, without 
considering what he is before he becomes a man’.13 The additional theses of 
Rousseau’s text are that children are born with natural goodness, that adults, too, 
can choose to be without sin, and that feeling is as important to human development 
as reason.14 For Rousseau, the child is so important because it is associated with ‘the 
feeling of life’.15 The child is ‘completely absorbed in the present, rejoicing in 
abounding vitality,’ and should be encouraged to exercise this concentration and 
energy in pursuits appropriate to children.16 Rousseau’s work, with its concentration 
on childhood and assertion of the importance of feeling, was a hugely significant 
influence on later Romantic writers. ‘His influence lies behind the whole progressive 
concentration of interest upon the child in the second half of the century’, argues 
Coveney: ‘Rousseau’s great contribution was to give authoritative expression to the 
new sensibility, and to direct its interest towards childhood as the period of life when 
man most closely approximated to the ‘state of Nature’’.17 Four elements, then, are 
central to Rousseau’s conception of the child: inherent difference from adults, 
natural innocence, ‘the feeling of life’, and primitivism. I argue that these are the 
same characteristics associated with the particular figure we now think of as the 
‘Romantic child’ and that this figure originates in the late eighteenth century. 
The last of these characteristics – primitivism – merits further attention. In 
Emile, Rousseau sets up an opposition between uncorrupted nature and corrupt 
society. He argues for a system of education in which the child’s ‘natural goodness’ 
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15 Ibid. 
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is protected and developed.18 This requires the child’s isolation from external 
influences until she reaches puberty, something that is possible for Rousseau 
because he views the child as a naturally whole and independent being.19 Placing the 
child in opposition to the corruptions of ‘civilized’ society encourages a comparison 
between the child and the primitive: both live within themselves, existing 
independently from society and in harmony with nature.20 Here Rousseau draws on 
ideas of the ‘noble savage’ as a model of primitive innocence and goodness and 
suggests that the child may be considered to be such an example too.21 
  
III. Blake’s Dichotomous Child 
The relationship between the child and innocence and experience is a central focus 
in the current exploration of the heritage of the Romantic child because the 
relationship between these states is so important to Barker’s writing. Both Locke and 
Rousseau make assertions of childhood innocence in their own ways: Locke in his 
argument against innate human characteristics, in which the child is ‘white paper, 
void of all characters, without any ideas’; Rousseau in his rejection of original sin and 
insistence upon childhood being akin to man’s natural state.
22
 William Blake is 
influenced by both of these conceptions of childhood innocence, as is particularly 
clear in his Songs of Innocence and of Experience. Writing of Blake’s poem ‘Infant Joy’, 
Hugh Cunningham argues that it expresses ‘an almost revolutionary perception that 
a child is not a piece of paper […] that adults can write on or mould at will, nor scarred 
by original sin. There is, at birth, an individuality, a voice’.23 Thus, Blake’s Songs 
definitively rejects Locke’s thesis of the child as an empty vessel, asserting instead 
the presence within the child of individuality, imagination and joy. But this does not 
                                                          
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile; or, On Education, 1762, trans. by Allan Bloom (USA: Basic Books, 
1979), p. 9. 
19 Ibid., pp. 85-6. 
20 Ibid., pp. 39, 85. 
21 Many thinkers believe that Rousseau ‘invented’ the noble savage; as Terry Ellingson has shown, 
this is not the case. See: Terry Jay Ellingson, The Myth of the Noble Savage (Berkley, Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2001). 
22 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1689 (New York: Digireads Publishing, 
2008), p. 52. 
23 Cunningham, The Invention of Childhood, p. 129. 
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necessarily mean that Blake concurs with Rousseau’s version of childhood. Indeed, 
Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley argue that while the child of Rousseau’s Emile was 
a figure of ‘essential goodness and innocence’, Blake’s child is not bestowed ‘with 
such an uncomplicated Rousseauistic innocence’.24  
In the introductory poem to Blake’s Songs, for example, the child on the cloud 
is a laughing, joyful figure enjoying the speaker’s ‘piping’; however, in ‘Infant Sorrow’ 
the child is described as ‘piping loud;/Like a fiend hid in a cloud’.25 Blake’s repetition 
of images of the cloud and piping encourages comparison between the two child 
figures whilst also setting them in opposition to one another. Discussing a similar 
oppositional relationship between two child figures in Blake’s ‘Cradle Song’ and a 
correlative poem, Bruhm and Hurley argue that ‘Blake’s desirous and cunning child 
operates as a kind of necessary other for the angelic, pristine infant […] To make the 
child innocent is to suppress the disruptive alternative to innocence – which, in fine 
binary logic, makes that “other” essential to our understanding of innocence itself’.26 
The important point here is the idea of the alternative to innocence as a ‘necessary 
other’. Neither innocence nor experience may be abstracted as ‘natural’ human 
states. It is not a question of making a choice between innocence and experience: 
innocence and experience are necessary to one another. Indeed, as Mary Y. Hallab 
argues, neither state alone is desirable because on its own each is ‘equally 
incomplete and static’: 
 
Joyful innocence, apparently the free and guiltless expression of 
desire… is made possible by ignorance and passive dependence; 
cynical experience, the guilty restraining of desire […] is characterised 
by fear, suspicion, cunning. But innocence prolonged can become 
hardened or reasoned into something very much like experience. 
Passiveness imposes its own demands; love becomes possessive 
tyranny […] At worst […] innocence is limiting and stultifying, trapping 
its possessor in a partial and incomplete existence, bounded by fear 
and resistant to change.27 
                                                          
24 Bruhm and Hurley, eds., Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children, p. xvi. 
25 William Blake, Songs of Innocence and of Experience: Shewing the Two Contrary States of the 
Human Soul, 1789, 1794 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 132, 151.  
26 Bruhm and Hurley, Curiouser, p. xvi. 
27 Mary Y. Hallab, ‘Carter and Blake: The Dangers of Innocence’, in Joe Sanders, ed., Functions of the 
Fantastic: Selected Essays from the Thirteenth International Conference on the Fantastic in the Arts 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 177-184, p. 177. Pattison also notes the dangers of 
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Blake’s conception of childhood innocence involves ‘Vision’ and ‘imaginative joy’, 
which children possess but adults have lost through experience.28 However, for 
Blake, the movement from innocence to experience is not framed in terms of 
sentiment and loss, as it is for Rousseau and Wordsworth. Coveney observes Blake’s 
‘unregretful perception of Experience,’ arguing that, ‘[t]hrough knowledge, 
acceptance, lay the reconciliation and power to ‘be born again’. There is no 
‘romantic’ nightmare, no cul-de-sac of debilitating regret’.29 
Instead Blake posits a dialectical interaction between innocence and 
experience – ‘the two Contrary States of the Human Soul’ – that, through 
contradictions, results in progression. This dialectical understanding brings to mind 
Barker’s statement, quoted in my introduction, that innocence and experience cancel 
one another out. The two states, she writes, ‘merge… invert… infiltrate… transmute’. 
Barker’s statement not only evokes Blake but also recalls Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel’s concept of “Aufhebung” or ‘overcoming’. In the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807) Hegel used the life cycle of a plant to emphasise the absurdity of the fixation 
in ‘conventional’ thinking on ‘the antithesis of truth and falsity’.30 He emphasises that 
conflicting states are in fact ‘reciprocally necessary moments’, as are the different 
forms that occur in the development of a plant.31 Hegel’s use of the life cycle of the 
plant, which begins with the bud, is also echoed by Barker’s use of the metaphor of 
the bud to describe the child in her story, ‘Domini’, which I discuss in the following 
chapter. 
                                                          
innocence in Blake’s poetry, arguing of ‘The Chimney Sweeper’ that: ‘Blake sees… that innocence is 
at least partially ignorance, and ignorance merely perpetuates the existing enormities of the sweep’s 
life and the world at large.’ On the other hand, in the correlative poem in Songs of Experience, the 
sweep understands the reality of his situation, rather than being fooled by ‘visionary innocence’ as 
in the first poem, and is better for it. ‘Here at least the sweep is imprisoned by corrupt earthly 
agents, not by his own false impressions. His clearer understanding of the situation is a kind of grace, 
a true baptism by which to lift himself from the fallen state.’ (Pattison, The Child Figure, pp. 66-67.)  
28 Coveney, The Image of Childhood, p. 53. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807, trans. by Arnold V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 2. M.H. Abrams, among others, has noted the influence of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology on Romantic thought. See: M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and 
Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1973), pp. 225-
237. 
31 Ibid.   
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IV. Wordsworth and the Victorian child 
Blake’s ‘unregretful perception of Experience’ is an important point to remember as 
we proceed, via Wordsworth, into the Victorian period. The child of Blake’s Songs, is 
a nuanced and unsentimental figure. However, because Blake’s work had no real 
impact in England until Alexander Gilchrist’s The Life of William Blake (1863), it is 
Wordsworth’s Romantic child that was the most influential in the early nineteenth 
century. Blake did not regret human experience per se; neither did he conceive of 
growing up as an irretrievable loss of innocence. A state of innocence and salvation, 
in the sense of joy and imaginative vision, might be achieved by a person of any age, 
not just by a child. This contrasts with Wordsworth’s view, in which the state of 
childhood is exalted high above anything that most adults are able to experience, 
although poets can of course experience child-like moments of ‘vision’. In his ‘Ode’, 
Wordsworth conceives of the child as being divine: ‘trailing clouds of glory do we 
come/From God’.32 In contrast to the divine, ‘visionary’ child, he presents the 
blinkered adult: ‘Inmate Man’, who ‘can see no more’.33 This novel view of childhood 
had a huge impact in England. ‘By the middle of the nineteenth century,’ argues Hugh 
Cunningham: 
 
[M]any Christians had come to believe that children came direct from 
heaven, bearing messages from God... What Wordsworth had done 
was to break decisively with all previous thinking about children. 
Childhood now became a repository of sensitivity and wisdom. And if 
that were so, it became almost a duty to stay in touch with childhood, 
to remember as an adult what it felt like to be a child.34 
 
                                                          
32 William Wordsworth, ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood’, in 
Stephen Gill, ed., William Wordsworth: Selected Poems (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), pp. 157-
164, p. 159, lines 64-65. Pattison argues that Blake undercuts this kind of Wordsworthian 
sentimental exaltation when, in the ‘Introduction’ to Songs of Innocence, he presents a child figure 
seated on a cloud, suggesting divinity, and then in ‘Infant Sorrow’ reveals this figure to be a fiendish 
child. (Pattison, The Child Figure, p. 68.) 
33 Ibid., pp. 157-160, lines 56, 82, 9. 
34 Cunningham, Invention of Childhood, p. 134. 
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But staying in touch with one’s childhood was problematic. Robert Pattison 
argues that childhood for Wordsworth was ‘a condition which for the vast majority 
of men is irretrievably lost as soon as completed’ and that the poet ‘felt that the loss 
of the childhood state was a natural inevitability […] childhood is a lost realm 
somewhere in the past of our lives and the past of our culture’.35 Through 
Wordsworth, childhood becomes, on the one hand, a divine state of ‘sensitivity and 
wisdom’ that adults are duty-bound to attempt to access; and, on the other, a ‘lost 
realm’ from which they are excluded. If ‘Inmate Man’ was locked into adulthood, so 
too was the Romantic child imprisoned in this lost realm called ‘childhood’. The child 
that an individual once was represents his or her own personal history, and childhood 
is made abstract as the past of adulthood. Carolyn Steedman argues that: 
 
Romantic writing in general, and in Britain the moment of thought 
expressed by the Wordsworthian ‘Romantic Child’, located individuals 
in time and chronology by possession of their own personal past. In 
this kind of account, a self was formed by the laying down and 
accretion of bits and pieces of a personal history, and this detritus, 
these little portions of the past, most readily assumed the shape of a 
child when reverie and memory restored them to the adult. The child 
within was always both immanent – ready to be drawn on in various 
ways – and, at the same time, always representative of a lost realm, 
lost in the individual past, and in the past of the culture.36 
 
In Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’, the child, figured as a stage of life, does not appear to be 
important in itself. Rather, it has importance only in relation to the adult speaker, as 
a source of inspiration for the poet ‘to draw on’, as Steedman puts it. For 
Wordsworth, childhood is ‘that immortal sea/Which brought us hither’.37 Adults, 
poets especially, can see their childhood on the shore, in the distance, and are able 
to remember their childhood past and ‘find/Strength in what remains behind’.38 
Wordsworth’s poem gives us the child Steedman describes above: a child that is 
eternally present but at the same time always ‘lost’ and absent.  
                                                          
35 Pattison, The Child Figure, pp. 57-8. 
36 Steedman, Strange Dislocations, p. 10. 
37 Wordsworth, ‘Ode’, in Gill, ed., Selected Poems, p. 162, lines 168-169. 
38 Ibid., p. 163, lines 182-183. 
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Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’ is a crucial text for understanding conceptions of the 
child in the Victorian period. Childhood is figured as the Garden of Eden, a place to 
which adults cannot return, a stage of life they have lost. Catherine Robson argues 
that ‘the story of Adam’s ejection from Paradise in Genesis, previously important to 
the perception of childhood because of its explanation of the source of original sin, 
increasingly offered itself as a myth of personal development to middle-class 
Victorian individuals, both religious and otherwise’.39 Therefore, particular currents 
of Christianity ‘which effectively transformed the Garden of Eden from a place to a 
stage of life, naturally found [themselves] largely in sympathy with Wordsworth’s 
progressive narrative of the early bliss of childhood and the falling-off of maturity’.40 
But as well as being figured as a lost realm, the Wordsworthian Romantic child 
appears to be held in a static, abstracted state of innocence, particularly when 
compared to Blake’s dialectical interaction between innocence and experience. For 
Wordsworth in the ‘Ode’ children and adults are, as Robson puts it, ‘entirely different 
eras’, and this view of children as essentially different to adults, as we shall see, is 
particularly important to Victorian conceptions of the child.41 Plotz argues that ‘an 
unchanging child forever fixed in childhood is an important Romantic trope: the trope 
of the Erl King‘s grasp’.42 Plotz focuses on what she calls ‘this Romantic fixation of 
“the eternal child,” “the immortal child,” “the child forever,” the “child / And nothing 
more”’.43 This is the child figure that makes the most impact on the Victorian 
imagination. 
The urge to fix and define the child increases from the 1830s. One cannot help 
but feel that this is an attempt to stabilize an increasingly conflicted idea of 
‘childhood’. Sally Shuttleworth argues that definitions of childhood as a category 
attracted ‘unprecedented levels of attention across medical and historical sciences 
at this period’ but that ‘the question of what it meant to be a child [was] increasingly 
                                                          
39 Robson, Men in Wonderland, p. 8. Robson’s argument is that in the Victorian period the early 
blissful stage of childhood is fundamentally associated with the little girl. Rather than look at gender 
at this point, I want to focus instead on which elements of the Romantic child were, or were not, 
preserved in Victorian images of childhood. 
40 Ibid., p. 23. 
41 Ibid., p. 22. 
42 Plotz, Romanticism, p. xiii. 
43 Ibid., p. xiv. 
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unclear’.44 Steedman points out that in the middle years of the nineteenth century 
technical knowledge about children increased, as did information about human 
physical development. The way in which this knowledge was used is important, 
argues Steedman: ‘new information about childhood was abstracted, or 
conceptualised into the figure of ‘the child’, or the idea of the child’.45 The child, then, 
as a literary figure and object of study – which is, crucially, separated from but 
completely bound up with Western adult identity – is hugely important to the 
Victorian period. Robson notes ‘the highly visible centrality of the child in any number 
of arenas and at all class levels in Victorian life’.46 Cunningham too observes that: 
 
[I]n the adult imagination childhood as an ideal became more 
separated from adulthood than it had ever been before. Children 
were valued, rather than chided, for their childishness. Precocity, 
much esteemed in previous centuries, was now to be avoided. Some 
adults even began to think that childhood was the best time of life, 
something unknown before the romantics had sown the seed of that 
idea.47  
 
The Victorian focus on an ‘ideal’ state of childhood, in which children should be 
innocent, undeveloped, and confined to the domestic sphere, had both positive and 
negative consequences. Robson argues that ‘the belief that the child has but recently 
come to us from the hand of God carries an inescapable double edge: it both 
promotes the reformers’ zeal… and it gives rise to a punishingly high expectation of 
children’s behaviour’.48 As I will discuss later, this idealised image of the child had 
consequences for real children who did not (could not) live up to it and were instead 
designated as criminal, ‘non-child’, non-human or savage. 
 
 
                                                          
44 Sally Shuttleworth, ‘The Psychology of Childhood in Victorian Literature and Medicine’, in Helen 
Small and Trudi Tate eds., Literature, Science, Psychoanalysis, 1830-1970: Essays in Honour of Gillian 
Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 86-101, p. 100. 
45 Steedman, Strange Dislocations, p. 5. 
46 Robson, Men in Wonderland, p. 6. 
47 Cunningham, Invention of Childhood, p. 140. 
48 Robson, Men in Wonderland, pp. 29-30. 
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V. The Dickensian Child and the Condition of England 
An important writer of children in the Victorian period was of course Charles Dickens, 
who recognised the middle ground between the ideal child and its criminal 
counterpart to an extent but still maintained a belief in the Romantic notion of 
natural childhood innocence seen in Wordsworth’s writing. Robert Newsom suggests 
a complication in the critical narrative that credits Dickens with the importation into 
the Victorian novel of Wordsworth’s innocent child figure.49 There was, argues 
Newsom, ‘a competing version of the child, no less widespread among Victorians 
than that of the Romantic child, [which] held that children are especially […] given to 
disobedience, the hallmark of original sin’.50 Newsom argues that although Dickens 
resisted this extreme religious position ‘he was nevertheless as adept at imagining 
wicked children as spotless ones’ (his examples are the Artful Dodger, Tom Scott, and 
Tom Gradgrind).51 This may be true, but a crucial characteristic of Dickens’s ‘wicked’ 
children is that they are not innately so. Take one of the child characters mentioned 
by Newsom, for example, Tom Gradgrind in Hard Times (1854). There is no doubt 
that Tom is selfish in using his sister, Louisa for his own ends, but Dickens suggests 
that the faults in Tom’s character arise from his upbringing: Tom’s ‘imagination had 
been strangled in his cradle’; all of the Gradgrind children ‘had been lectured at from 
their tenderest years’.52 The emphasis on adult intrusions into the cradle places the 
blame for Tom’s monstrosity not upon original sin (as Newsom suggests) but upon 
the adults who raised him, and particularly on their stifling of his imagination and 
expression. Contrary to Newsom’s protests, I argue that Dickens’s view of childhood 
is in line with the Romantic image of the child. Dickens’s children are born innocent; 
if they are corrupted, it is by adult institutions and systems. 
With Dickens the wellbeing of children and the preservation of the state of 
childhood became associated with the ‘Condition of England’. His fiction stresses the 
importance of childhood not just for the individual but for society as a whole. 
                                                          
49 Robert Newsom, ‘Fictions of Childhood’, in John O. Jordan, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Charles Dickens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 92-105, p. 92. 
50 Ibid., p. 93. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Charles Dickens, Hard Times, 1854 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1985), pp. 165, 53.  
50 
 
Individuals and systems which enslave and exploit children and do not allow them ‘a 
childhood’ are the mark of an uncivilized country. Richard Locke argues that: ‘Dickens 
extended the romantics’ moral, psychological, and philosophical use of the child from 
the realm of lyric and personal epic poetry into that of the encyclopaedic Victorian 
novel so that a child’s welfare now also became the crucial index of a nation’s – 
indeed, an empire’s – social and political health and even its survival.’53 Child welfare 
was a central preoccupation of the Victorian era. Throughout the nineteenth century 
a number of Acts of Parliament came into force concerning, on the one hand, the 
exploitation and abuse of children and, on the other, the problem of juvenile 
delinquency. Robson notes that the Factories Regulation Act of 1833 set a minimum 
age of nine for textile mill workers.54 In addition, the 1854 Youthful Offenders Act 
standardised the treatment of children convicted of crimes.55 But while these pieces 
of legislation were in many ways positive developments in terms of children’s rights 
and welfare, they had additional consequences that were less beneficial, especially 
for working-class children. As Robson notes, labouring or criminal children were 
often represented as un-child-like or inhuman in writing of the period: ‘children who 
do not behave as children should behave are not children’.56 As well as protecting 
children, legislation gave them less freedom to be different from the imagined 
idealised model of the innocent ‘Romantic child’. Robson argues that ‘[t]he absolute 
division of adult and child […], results in no less rigidity within the new category of 
the child, which can only countenance the true child of innocence and purity, and the 
“not-child,” the juvenile delinquent. The construction of the ideal inevitably spawns 
its demonized opposite’.57 The opposition of innocence and experience, ideal and 
criminal, child and not-child is entirely polarised; there is no possibility of integration. 
Dickens’s novels also appear sympathetic to the Wordsworthian Romantic 
view of childhood through their association of the child with the past. We saw earlier 
how Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’ was taken up by the Victorians, for whom childhood was 
figured as the Garden of Eden, a blissful place to which adults cannot return, a stage 
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of life long since lost. Dickens participates in the consolidation of this process of 
‘fixing’ the Romantic child as a figure associated with the past. ‘Children for Dickens’, 
Cunningham argues:  
 
[B]ecame a symbol of all that was good in the world before adult 
behaviour and adult institutions began to make their impact. […] 
Christmas became… important… because it was a celebration of 
childhood, of birth, a time when children could be centre stage and 
adults could, from their memories, regain strength for the struggle of 
life. This requirement that adults feed off their childhood memories 
had the effect of associating childhood with the past’.58  
 
The idea of childhood memories as a kind of restorative food to nourish the 
emotionally depleted adult has similarities with Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’, in which the 
child is figured as a source of inspiration for the poet to draw on. It is worth noting 
that in the 1890s, as Victorian literature intersected with literary modernism, Freud’s 
theories strengthened the association between childhood and the past but added a 
different inflection. Writing about ‘Freud’s modern individual’, Adam Phillips argues 
that: ‘Adulthood, for many people, has become a long hangover created by 
childhood. The modern individual […] is furtively seeking only the pleasures of the 
past.’59 According to Phillips, psychoanalysis maintains the earlier association 
between the past and the child but represents childhood as a source of pain as well 
as pleasure. Freud’s challenge to the Victorian idea of the innocent ‘Romantic child’ 
appears to prompt the return of Blake’s dichotomous child. But the tendency to view 
childhood as a place of stability and safety survives Freud and continues into the 
twentieth century. I noted in my introduction that the idea resurfaces during the 
Second World War, when writers looked back to their Edwardian and interwar 
childhoods. Barker’s fiction problematises the idea of childhood as an idyllic, 
innocent stage of life on which adults can ‘draw’ for strength and solace. 
The beginnings of the ‘death’ of the innocent Victorian child can be detected 
from mid-century. The more that children are prized for their childishness, the more 
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innocence is revered and fixed, the less willing adults are to let children grow up. 
Coveney argues that the Victorian literary solution to the corruption of innocence 
that would come with the end of childhood was child death. He argues: ‘The 
Victorians seem to have taken to themselves the romantic image of childhood, and 
negated its power. The image is transfigured into the image of an innocence which 
dies. […] the image of a purity which must die before it is corrupted.’60 We see this 
phenomenon in the character of Little Nell in Dickens’s The Old Curiousity Shop 
(1840-41). Pattison suggests that Nell has a kind of ‘deadly innocence’, by which he 
means that she is always surrounded by images of mortality; she inhabits places of 
death, such as graveyards, and is connected with old men. He argues that Nell’s 
preservation as an innocent divine child involves her own death: ‘Her innocence, like 
the innocence and beauty of nature, is somehow fatal […] Possessed of every virtue, 
pure beyond the sympathies of modern audiences […] Innocent children always have 
a certain morbid quality in Dickens, even those he permits to survive’.61 
 
VI. The Savage Child and the Colonial Subject 
Over the course of the nineteenth century the idea of ‘the child’ became increasingly 
contradictory and unstable at the same time as it became ever more taxonomized 
and regulated. The ideas of childhood discussed above, in which it is both an 
idealized, abstracted state of innocence and a ‘lost’ realm of the past, demonstrate 
the instability and contradiction of the category of child. If, in the Victorian period, 
childhood was mythologized as the ideal stage of life and the maturity of adulthood 
was seen as a ‘falling off’ (as Robson puts it) then how do we account for concurrent 
nineteenth century narratives in which the child is associated with the primitive, 
unenlightened, savage stage of the development of the human species? In the first 
formulation, which draws on the Romantic idea of the ‘noble savage’, the child and 
the primitive are models of natural innocence in opposition to the corruptions of 
maturity and civilization. In the latter formulation, however, the maturation of 
society away from savagery and towards civilization is highly desirable; and thus the 
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child is associated with an earlier stage of human development against which 
nineteenth century Western society is compared and found to be superior.  
Shuttleworth notes the duality, arguing that ‘[t]he child, as primitive, is the 
idealized focus of children’s literature, but that: 
 
Psychiatric models […] tended to emphasize the burden of somatic 
and psychological inheritance carried by children, in a new 
evolutionary rendering of the biblical notion that the sins of the 
fathers will be visited on the sons. The child, according to this model, 
is doubly burdened: the carrier of primitive, animalistic passions, but 
also the attenuated nerves of an overdeveloped civilisation and 
unbidden memories of the past.62 
 
This suggests that at the end of the nineteenth century the child was viewed in the 
same dichotomous terms as it was at the end of the eighteenth century: the innocent 
child of nature versus the inherently sinful child. Shuttleworth argues that ‘[t]he 
1890s witnessed the coming of age of the science of child development, but also, 
concomitantly, a dissolution of the boundaries of childhood’.63 By her account, the 
late Victorian desire to ‘fix’ the child was a response to Charles Darwin’s theory of 
evolution and subsequent child psychology and represents an attempt to maintain 
and stabilise the distinction between adult and child in the face of these 
complications. Attempting to fix the child was a defence against what Shuttleworth 
calls ‘a science that would abolish the category of childhood as previously 
understood’.64 ‘Innocence’, she argues, ‘was replaced with experience, as the child 
came into the world bearing the marks of familial and racial history, offering itself up 
as a ‘key’ to lost worlds. An individualised study of one infant gave birth to a science 
that would subsume the particularity of childhood within a larger narrative of human 
development’.65 The late-Victorian sense of the child as a ‘key’ to understanding the 
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history of humankind represents a return to the idea that the child is nothing in itself 
but only matters in relation to what it signifies about the adult and the human race.  
The association between the child and primitive may be seen in 
anthropological discourse. Edward Tylor argued that children’s games bear a trace of 
‘primitive warlike arts’ and reproduce ‘early stages in the history of childlike tribes of 
mankind’.66 The child/primitive association may also be seen in British imperialist 
discourse. Alan Sinfield links ideas of development and enlightenment with 
narratives of imperialism, arguing that: 
 
[I]n the period of imperial enterprise, progress seemed easy to 
demonstrate, in science and technology, economic and political 
institutions, in the arts and humanitarian concerns. An ideology of 
progress appeals to a rising class – it seems to bespeak its coming 
dominance. […] The savage was that which European Man had left, or 
was leaving, behind, and imperial enterprise could be taken as the sign 
of that achievement.67 
 
But, as suggested above, the primitive stage could not be simply or easily left behind 
because of the idea of childhood as a ‘lost’ realm of human development prior to the 
corrupting influences of Western society that indelibly marked the mature adult. It 
appears to be the case, then, that maturity degrades individuals but represents the 
progress of society. The conflicted ‘European man’ (to use Sinfield’s figure) yearns 
for a lost paradise of primitive childlike innocence but also congratulates himself on 
the development, enlightenment and historical progress of his society away from its 
primitive and savage past.  
Another reason that the primitive or savage could not be easily consigned to 
the past of the European man was the barbarity of the colonial enterprise itself. 
Sinfield argues that ‘[t]he attributes that are fastened upon the colonial subject are 
[…] fraught and contradictory’ and that these contradictions ‘derive from the 
structure of the colonial situation’: 
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[T]he natives have to be savage so that it is right to occupy their 
country and mistreat them; they have to be subservient so that they 
can be made to serve. They have to be innocent so that they can be 
dominated by the settler, and to be dishonest so that you can never 
trust them very far. Therefore stereotypes of the native have 
continually to be reworked, rediscovered, reaffirmed.68 
 
The colonial subject is conceptualised here as a figure whose identity must be 
constantly stabilised in order to authorise the imperial right to rule. The native always 
has to be other to the identity of the European man, always has to be ‘savage’ so that 
the European man may be ‘civilized’. Sinfield’s characterisation of the colonial 
subject thus speaks to the contradictory and unstable figure of the child that 
develops during the Victorian period. Indeed, as Steedman points out, ‘child’ was not 
always a chronological category: “Childhood’ was a category of dependence, a term 
that defined certain relationships of powerlessness, submission and bodily inferiority 
or weakness, before it became descriptive of chronological age.’69 The colonial 
subject or ‘native’ is often placed in a childlike position in relation to European man 
and colonial territories are figured as the ‘children’ of the Empire. As I argue in 
chapter three, an understanding of relations between the Britain and its colonial 
subjects in the language of parent and child continues through the early twentieth 
century and into the post-Second World War period. 
 
VII. Henry James and the Limits of Innocence 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the process of fixing the child had led to the 
consolidation of different stages of childhood. By this point, argues Steedman, 
childhood was fixed ‘not just as a category of experience, but also as a time-span’.70 
The fixing of childhood also defined related age categories, most notably, according 
to John Neubauer, the category of adolescence. Neubauer argues that the term may 
have been used earlier but that the emergence of ‘interlocking discourses about 
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adolescence […] in psychoanalysis, psychology, criminal justice, pedagogy, sociology, 
as well as in literature […] testifies that human life was perceived in terms of a new 
category by the end of the nineteenth century’.71 If we follow Neubauer in locating 
the emergence of the adolescent in the late nineteenth century then we might argue 
that this new category was a sort of culmination of the Victorian process of fixing the 
child, whereby adult and child ended up being completely separated with 
adolescence as a transitional period in between.  
At the turn of the nineteenth century Henry James wrote two texts focused 
on ideas of childhood innocence and the limits of knowledge and experience: his 
novel, What Maisie Knew (1897) and his gothic novella, The Turn of the Screw (1898). 
One of James’s main preoccupations in these texts is the fragility of boundaries 
between innocence and corruption. His fiction draws attention to the way in which 
the supposedly opposed states of innocence and experience are dependent on one 
another. It is preoccupied with epistemological questions: what are the limits of 
knowledge and experience? Can we know what another person knows? James’s 
fiction is part of the modernist move from objective to subjective representation, 
which Randall Stevenson calls, ‘the trend from objective to subjective, the spatial 
shift of attention from ‘outer world’ to ‘inner world’.72 Stevenson argues that James 
is one of the early modernist writers (along with Joseph Conrad, Ford Madox Ford, 
D. H. Lawrence, Dorothy Richardson and May Sinclair) who are concerned with 
perception and perspective. James’s use of limited perspective stages questions 
about epistemological and ontological limits.  
The preoccupation in James’s fiction with the ambiguity of distinctions 
between innocence and experience is part of a wider investigation into limits and 
boundaries. Stevenson notes ‘James’s general interest in how innocence encounters 
experience’, with the word ‘encounters’ suggesting James’s focus on the borderline 
between these states.73 Neubauer argues that ‘James started from the romantic 
dichotomy between innocence and experience but concentrated on the hesitant 
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sensibilities in the obscure intermediary zone between them’.74 T. J. Lustig agrees 
that James is preoccupied with intermediary states, asserting that: ‘James is 
undoubtedly raising questions about boundaries. It is […] in the way in which he 
questions the notion of boundary itself that he makes […] some of his most 
powerfully unique and original contributions.’75 James’s fiction reminds us that there 
is a limit to how much we can know the world, other people, and ourselves. 
Discussing The Ambassadors (1903) in particular, Stevenson notes that the novel 
focuses on the mind’s ‘capacity to grasp what is happening’ and on the protagonist, 
Lambert Strether’s constant ‘[g]uessing, interpreting, doubting’.76 Stevenson argues 
that this tendency in James’s fiction anticipates the questioning in high modernism 
‘about how the areas of mind and world can be related; about how, and how 
accurately or completely, individual perception can reflect the world it encounters’.77  
James’s focus on subjective experience draws attention to the limits of 
perception. Stevenson notes that James tends to use a central character and that the 
fictional material is ‘shaped and focused’ through this character’s ‘perceptions and 
perspective’.78 In the case of What Maisie Knew, for example, the limitations of 
Maisie’s understanding of the adult world are highlighted. She is constantly trying to 
fill in the gaps and make sense of what is happening around her. Stevenson argues 
that Maisie ‘is a child whose limited but suggestive perceptions are used to build up 
a highly ironic, provocative vision of the moral dilemmas surrounding her.’79 The 
irony is created by a disparity between what Maisie knows and what the reader 
knows. I argue, though, that James’s novel suggests a further irony that is born out 
of the similarity between Maisie’s position in the novel and the reader’s position in 
both fictional and non-fictional worlds. Like Maisie, we can only make sense of our 
environment using the knowledge we have. Our vision of the world, like hers, may 
be confused and will always be incomplete. 
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Something similar is being staged in The Turn of the Screw when Miles dies at 
the end of the novel in the arms of the Governess, an adult desperate to find out the 
truth about the innocence/corruption of the child in her care. Many of the numerous 
critical interpretations of the novella have noted that the text continually resists the 
attempts of the Governess, and the reader, to find out ‘the truth’ about Miles and 
Flora and that meaning in the story is repeatedly deferred and finally slips away.80 
The novella resists the desire in literary criticism to overcome ambiguity. Lustig 
argues that the ‘classic phrase’ of this critical debate ‘acts out the polarized 
paradigms of a previous period’ with ‘[t]he conflicting accounts of the governess’ 
resembling ‘an opposition between the madwoman in the attic and the angel in the 
house: the very terms in which the nineteenth century tended to see women in 
general and […] governesses in particular’. Similarly, Lustig observes, the debate 
‘replicates the ambivalent Victorian response to children: are they pure and innocent 
(Wilson) or corrupted, guilty, full of impure knowledge (Heilman)?’ 81 In The Turn of 
the Screw our ability to know the nature of world and other people is questioned. 
The story’s deferral of meaning ensures that there is always the possibility of 
innocence or experience: for Miles and Flora and for the Governess. Each of the 
characters is potentially virtuous and potentially corrupt. I suggested above that the 
attempt to pin down innocence renders it static, powerless and deathly. The death 
of Dickens’s Little Nell makes the connection between innocence and death. It is 
significant, then, that The Turn of the Screw ends with Miles’s death rather than the 
revelation of any final ‘truth’ regarding his character. This ‘paradox of innocence and 
licentiousness in the same character,’ argue Bruhm and Hurley, ‘serves as a fine 
allegory for the erotic enigma that is the modern child’.82 James’s children tread the 
borderline between innocence and experience. 
In Coveney’s view, James takes the themes of childhood and innocence and 
creates something ‘separate altogether from the tradition [of Romantic innocence] 
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we have been discussing’.83 I argue that, on the contrary, James engages explicitly 
with the Romantic child, although his treatment of the figure, especially the Victorian 
version, is highly sceptical. Critics of What Maisie Knew have put great emphasis on 
Maisie’s emptiness. She is a ‘cup’, ‘vessel’, ‘shuttle-cock’, ‘go-between’, ‘hollow’; ‘a 
ready vessel for bitterness’; a moral tabula rasa’.84 In the novel, argues Pattison:  
 
Except in [the] final pages… Maisie remains an innocent […] She must 
remain “a ready vessel” – and an empty one. […] Innocence, then, is a 
purely negative state, a void into which all manner of evil intentions 
will rush. Indeed, it is almost a necessary condition for the propagation 
of evil; without Maisie’s innocent presence, the various cruelties of the 
novel would not have been possible. […] Maisie’s innocence is a weak, 
passive thing till she acquires the knowledge to which the title 
alludes.85  
 
Pattison’s point about innocence and evil as states that are dependent upon one 
another is crucial. However, I would argue that for James innocence is not necessarily 
a passive state. I agree instead with Ellen Pifer, who argues that Maisie, though 
‘innocent’ of the full implications of the actions of adults, does not maintain a passive 
role for long. Pifer points out that James, in his preface, calls Maisie the ‘little wonder-
working agent’, and repeatedly emphasises her ‘freshness’.86 Pifer argues that: ‘[t]o 
survive and finally to flourish in her distinctly modern environment, James’s child 
calls on the resources – freshness, spontaneity, and wonder – that she, like Dickens’s 
literary children, has inherited from the novelist’s Romantic predecessors.’87  
This is not to say that James is championing a simple Romantic innocence (as 
Pifer notes, he also mentions Maisie’s ‘demonic foresight’) but that James is aware 
of the ambiguities of the Romantic child and enjoys occupying the between of 
innocence and experience. Similarly, in The Turn of the Screw, he restores a Blakean 
duality and movement to the relationship between innocence and experience. Adult 
attempts to impose absolutes, to fix the child as either devil or doll, are shown to 
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have violent consequences. James’s novella may therefore be read as an appeal for 
ambiguity. As James shows in both What Maisie Knew and The Turn of the Screw, 
innocence prolonged or alone may be a weak, negative and empty state. For James, 
as for Blake, innocence and experience are necessary to one another, and a 
prolonged or static state of innocence is not to be desired. In this sense, Blake and 
James are the two major influences on Barker’s fiction. Both contribute to her 
preoccupation with the child and her dialectical understanding of innocence and 
experience.  
 
VIII. The Short Story and the Child 
Because of its shared history with the child, the short story is an ideal form for Barker 
to use in her re-examination of the relationships between innocence and experience. 
Mary Louise Pratt argues that the short story has traditionally been seen as a genre 
focused on a single moment in the life of an individual rather than on the whole of a 
life, and thus ‘as a training or practice genre, for both apprentice writers and 
apprentice readers’.88 Attempts to define the short story, argues Pratt, invariably 
place it into a hierarchical relationship with the novel, ‘with the novel on top and the 
short story dependent’.89 Such definitions of the short story highlight the importance 
of the notion of development to traditional criticism about the genre. Descriptions 
of the short story as ‘dependent’ or as an ‘apprentice form’ understand it as under-
developed and infantile, an incomplete form when compared to the supposed 
maturity and completeness of the novel.90 This unequal relationship between short 
story and novel mirrors the one between child and adult, in which the child is seen 
as an undeveloped body which will mature into a finished adult form. 
 The short story is also associated with the child through the notion of 
epiphany, which is often considered by short story theorists to be a defining 
characteristic of the genre, and is thought to originate with Wordsworth’s ‘spots of 
time’. Wordsworth explicitly linked his ‘spots of time’ with childhood. He argues that 
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these moments ‘[a]re scattered everywhere, taking their date/From our first 
childhood’ and places them in opposition to ‘trivial occupations and the round/Of 
ordinary intercourse’.91 So from the outset epiphany is associated with childhood and 
opposed to the trivia and mundanity of everyday adult life. Modernist 
understandings of epiphany or epiphanic experience draw on Wordsworth’s 
framework. Vicky Mahaffey argues that: ‘[t]he temporary apprehension of a 
precious, unattainable wholeness is what much modernist literature aims to 
recapture, through Joyce’s epiphanies […] Woolf’s moments of being, or the “image” 
of Imagist poetry’.92 Mahaffey’s book shows that childhood often provides these 
moments of ‘temporary apprehension’, as is the case in Virginia Woolf’s ‘An Evening 
Party’ (1917-1918) when an unidentified character asks: ‘Don’t you remember in 
early childhood when […] some imperceptible shock froze the universe to a solid ball 
of crystal which one held for a moment […] then we were absolute and entire; 
nothing then was excluded; that was certainty – happiness.’93 In ‘A Sketch of the Past’ 
(1939), Woolf suggests that everyday life consists of two phases: ‘being’ and ‘non-
being’. She argues that ‘[a] great part of every day is not lived consciously. One walks, 
eats, sees things, deals with what has to be done’.94 Woolf’s contention that the vast 
majority of everyday life consists of ‘this cotton wool, this non-being’ has similarities 
with Wordsworth’s description of ‘the round/Of ordinary intercourse’, in which 
‘round’ gives a sense of monotony and repetition.95 Although she does not suggest 
that ‘non-being’ is exclusively associated with adulthood, Woolf’s ‘moments of being’ 
are most strongly associated with childhood: the ‘three instances of exceptional 
moments’ that Woolf recounts take place when she is a child.96   
Barker’s understanding of the short story and ‘the moment’ draws on and 
reworks both Romantic and modernist traditions. In Life Stories, Barker argues that 
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in good writing ‘the moment was all and ought to be caught in the telling […] The 
moment ought to persist like a flavour so that the reader would discover it complete 
[…] and beyond reproach or censure’.97 Barker’s sense that there is a wholeness to 
the revelatory moment echoes Woolf’s description of a ‘shock [that] froze the 
universe to a solid ball of crystal which one held for a moment’. But her view of 
childhood is very different to the one expressed in Woolf’s ‘An Evening Party’. For 
Barker, the wholeness of the moment does not have its source in childhood as 
‘absolute and entire’ but in the ambiguity of childhood. This ambiguity is best 
expressed in short fiction. For Barker, the short story is, on the one hand, ‘one of the 
two literary forms in which it was just possible that complete integration could be 
achieved’ and, on the other hand, ‘a contradiction in terms and yet with its essence 
contained in those terms’.98 These seemingly incompatible statements suggest that, 
in Barker’s view, the moment brings together opposing forces and the short story is 
able to contain or hold this opposition. This view gives some insight into Barker’s use 
of short fiction to represent the ‘fundamental principle’ of her work: the dialectic of 
innocence and experience. The short story is a form in which the dialectic of 
innocence and experience may be contained and sustained. She does not try to (or 
want to) resolve the contradictions between these two states but wishes to 
represent their dialectical relationship in a form that can tolerate difference. The 
short story is able to hold the contradiction between innocence and experience that 
is inherent in the ambiguous figure of the child.99  
 
IX. The Short Story, Modernism and Adolescence 
Dominic Head situates the rise of the modernist short story at the end of the 
nineteenth century, arguing that ‘the birth of a new kind of short story […] was 
concurrent with the emergence of literary modernism’.100 When he argues that the 
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modernist short story ‘has an enduring ability to capture the episodic nature of 
twentieth-century experiences’, Head is referring to the way the short story 
represents difference, opposition and fragmentation.101 His use of ‘episodic’ 
emphasises the fragmented character of the experiences of the modern self and its 
interactions in society and the word ‘capture’ picks up on the importance of the 
moment to the short story form. Head proposes that traditional distinctions between 
the novel and the short story are complicated by modernist fiction. After all, he 
argues, the short story tradition ‘was the immediate inheritance of the modernists, 
a tradition which they questioned and subverted.’102 He argues that in the context of 
modernist fiction the novel/story distinction doesn’t work because ‘the modernist 
story, far from being ‘smaller and lesser’ in any technical sense, actually exemplifies 
the strategies of modernist fiction.’103 Barker also disputes the idea of the short story 
as ‘modest’, stating that she ‘found it at once easier and more difficult to write a 
short story than a novel; because it was both an unassuming and wildly ambitious 
project to get life […] into a nutshell’.104 This suggests that although she would agree 
that distinctions between novels and short stories are complicated, Barker would 
maintain the categorisation between them because, in her view, the short story does 
something very particular, something different to even the modernist novel. 
The ‘strategies of modernist fiction’ are well known: techniques such as 
stream-of-consciousness and interior monologue are hallmarks of literary 
modernism. Stevenson argues that the new literary forms and techniques of 
modernism may be accounted for by the original nature of the modern experience 
and a widespread sense of change: 
 
Analogous innovations in so many contemporary art forms may have 
arisen not from mutual influence […] but from common apprehension 
of the shifting nature of life, and of the methods of perceiving it, in the 
early twentieth century. In other words, if contemporary novelists 
‘changed everything’ in their work, […] it would be reasonable to 
suppose that this was simply because they perceived everything 
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around them as changed – even, in Woolf’s view, human character 
itself.105 
 
Stevenson notes the sheer pace of industrial and technological change from around 
1880-1910 and shows how this is interwoven with contemporaneous conceptual and 
philosophic change: ‘new speeds, a new pace of life, […] new conceptions of the 
fundamental coordinates of experience, space and time’.106  
The modernist sense that everything had changed suggests that there are 
useful connections to be made between literary modernism and the emergence of 
the category of adolescence. Neubauer locates the birth of this ‘new’ category in the 
fin-de-siècle and argues that its emergence occurs at the same time as literary 
modernism.107 He argues that the ‘characteristic traits of adolescence, such as the 
blurring of identity, rapid role changing, and the merging of the individual into a 
group, can only be represented by means of [the] shifting narrative perspectives that 
[…] became the hallmarks of literary modernism’.108 The argument is not only that 
the instability of the new category of adolescence required representation by the 
fragmented narratives of modernism. It is also proposed that the adolescent 
experience speaks to the modernist experience: that adolescence is representative 
of the trials of becoming a modern subject. A sense that the nature of life, the way 
one perceives things, even one’s entire character may be ‘shifting’, or have shifted, 
is a common experience of adolescence. What is suggested, then, is that the 
modernist experience of rapid, overwhelming change that renders the world 
unknowable is akin to experiencing the shifting liminal phase of adolescence. In other 
words, as Catherine Driscoll puts it: ‘[t]he concept of adolescence is central to the 
development of the modern subject’.109 Both the adolescent subject and the modern 
subject undergo what Neubauer calls a ‘crisis of identity’ – a crisis that ‘can only be 
represented’ by the fragmentations of modernist texts.110  
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X. The Modernist Child 
The instability and fragmentation of the modernist experience resulted in a renewed 
focus on the duality of the child. Margaret R. Higonnet argues that modernism is from 
the beginning marked by the child metaphor and that it is the duality of the child that 
appeals to modernists.111 The way in which modernists imagined the child certainly 
differed from Victorian ideas of childhood because they drew attention to the duality 
of the child rather than trying to efface it. However, as Adrienne E. Gavin argues, ‘old 
models were not simply swept away’.112 According to Higonnet, the child is not only 
‘an image of an increasingly technological and mechanically innovative future’ but 
also continues to be ‘an image of origins, nature, and archaic expressiveness’.113 I am 
interested in the duality of the modernist child because this divided conception of 
childhood is what Barker inherits from modernism and what preoccupies her in her 
writing of innocence and experience.  
On the one hand, in modernist fiction the child is associated with the past. 
War and revolution link the child to the past and, Higonnet argues, lend the child 
special importance: ‘[s]et in contrast to the civilized adult, the child as a figure for 
nature and the primeval can be assimilated to a critique of the industrialized and 
mechanized World War’.114 Modernist fiction is preoccupied with a loss of innocence 
and the disenchantments that experience brings. Vicki Mahaffey notes that ‘all of 
[Joyce’s] shorter works record the experience of some loss: the Epiphanies seems to 
have been arranged to depict the loss of innocence’ and that ‘[m]any of the poems 
in Pomes Penyeach echo the theme of lost youth’.115 This theme is important in 
Woolf’s To The Lighthouse (1927), a novel that displays a pessimism about childhood. 
In a moment reminiscent of Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’, Mrs Ramsay panics because her 
children are growing up and she feels that they ‘will [never] be so happy again’.116 
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Coveney argues that in Woolf’s writing, ‘[t]he sense of children conveyed […] is one 
of fragility, enchantment, joy, and painful vulnerability to the disenchantment of 
experience’.117 This conception of the child appears similar to Wordsworthian 
notions of childhood. Finally, modernism’s focus on psychology emphasised the 
importance of childhood experience to the adult mind, making a firm association 
between the child and the past. Stevenson notes ‘the extent to which psychology had 
become an area of ‘conscious and deliberate’ study, and of widespread public 
interest, especially by the 1920s’.118 Higonnet argues that: ‘the Surrealists linked 
Freudian dream theories to a conception of childhood as prerational, closer to the 
unconscious or subconscious, in which primal drives lie close to the surface. Thus, we 
find allegories of the innocent child [that] deploy a nostalgic, backward-turned 
strain’.119 The Surrealists’ idea of the child as ‘prerational’ and more subject than the 
adult to ‘primal drives’ registers and develops late-nineteenth-century ideas of the 
child as primitive. The nostalgia of modernism is also noted by March-Russell who 
argues that: ‘[d]espite the establishment of Modernism […], the use of idealized 
children to contrast with the corruption of adult society remained a literary 
convention’.120  
On the other hand, modernists associate the child with the future. The 
Freudian child may have been utilised in nostalgic allegories but psychoanalysis 
simultaneously prompted what Sarah Bilston calls a ‘new understanding of children 
as beings who could lie, express murderous rage, and experience sexual desire’.121 
Higonnet argues that ‘artists adapted the [psychoanalytic] figure of the destructive 
child to align themselves with a forward-looking revolutionary vision’.122 The child 
was connected to the new modernist aesthetic, Higonnet argues, which involved a 
‘metaphoric understanding of the “new” through the child’.123 She notes the 
associations made between the child and new technologies, observing ‘the 
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dynamism achieved through an ambiguous juxtaposition of violence with innocence 
or naivete’ and arguing that ‘[t]his paradox […] coincides with the Modernist concern 
to meld the symbol with technology’.124 So it appears that for modernists the child is 
an inherently divided symbol. Indeed, following Franco Moretti, Higonnet argues that 
modernist avant-gardes choose youth ‘over the multitude of other possible signs, 
because of its ability to accentuate modernity’s dynamism and instability’.125 
Higonnet argues ‘that the emblematic role of the child possesses an ambivalence that 
reaches back to Romanticism’:  
 
The symbolic child is linked both nostalgically with the past and 
proleptically with an increasingly mechanized future. We need to 
recognise the divergences and stylistic richness of this figure that 
adapt it to what Moretti calls the “instability” of Modernism, since the 
new – the future – appears in tandem with the past. Such ambiguities 
in the concept of the child point towards ambiguities in Modernism 
itself.126  
 
In some ways the modernist recognition of the ambiguities of childhood 
enabled the creation of more nuanced and complex representations of the child than 
might be found in Victorian literature. The Victorian child was not, of course, one-
dimensional but there is an attempt in the period to erase any contradiction or 
duality in the category of ‘the child’. By contrast, modernist representations restore 
the duality of childhood, using it symbolically to emphasise the dynamism of 
modernism as a movement. But most modernist representations of the child figure, 
although they put emphasis on its duality, do not move past this. Higonnet observes 
the symbolic power of opposition: the ‘juxtaposition of violence with innocence’. 
Modernists such as F.T. Marinetti draw upon ideas of the innocent child in particular, 
as Higonnet suggests when she states that ‘[t]he innocent child is an emblem of the 
future and, therefore, of modernity’.127 By drawing on the established opposition of 
innocence and experience and using it for symbolic power modernists are not 
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challenging old constructions of childhood or creating new ones but reworking 
conventional ideas about the child.  
Coveney argues that in modernist fiction there is a strong desire to convey 
the perspective of the child, and that this shows that the child is not there simply as 
a source for adults to draw inspiration from. He relates the desire to convey the 
child’s perspective to the influence of psychoanalysis and its focus on the child as the 
source of adult identity. In writing after psychoanalysis, argues Coveney: 
 
The child would no longer be used for a romantic ‘message’, or as the 
vehicle for self-pity, indulgent pathos, or escape. If he were ‘impure’, 
malicious, cruel, tender, kind, painfully sensitive – and most often an 
amalgam of all these qualities – then he would be presented in his 
reality. He would no longer be used as the guiltless ‘angel’ of a romantic, 
moralizing idyll; or the child of the Puritans’ sin and the Devil; and child 
neither of ‘purity’ nor ‘wrath’, nor necessarily ‘happy’ in a fallacious, 
romanticized Nature, nor poignantly and inevitably ‘unhappy’ as the 
‘victim’ of industrial society. He would be conveyed as a child, with his 
awareness conveyed as it was experienced, from within.128 
 
Coveney suggests that modernist fiction tries to capture the multidimensional 
character of the child. The child may be ‘impure’, malicious, cruel, tender, kind, 
painfully sensitive – all of these things. She does not have to be confined to just being 
one of them. While I agree that some modernist writers were preoccupied with 
writing from the perspective of the child, I argue that Coveney overstates the 
radicality of representations of childhood in modernism. The modernist child is often 
still a symbol, still a cipher. Modernist fiction does not undertake a general 
overturning of the dualism of the child; rather, modernist texts tend to use this 
duality for symbolic purposes.  
There is a sense of arriving full circle in the similarities between modernist 
and Romantic views of childhood. In both periods the child was a symbol both of the 
past and of the future, and the contemporary era was thought of as the end of the 
old ways and an age of new beginning. In the early period of the French Revolution 
many of the leading English writers, including Blake and Wordsworth, were in favour 
of radical change. Wordsworth writes in the Prelude about ‘human nature seeming 
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born again’.129 This may be compared with Woolf’s statement, quoted earlier, that 
human character changed in 1910. For both the Romantics and the modernists, 
though, early optimism about a reborn or changed human nature turned to 
pessimism. In the Romantics’ case this was due to the terrors of the French 
Revolution; for modernists it was because of the fallout of the First World War and 
the sense of repetition that was felt with a second war on the horizon. Coveney 
argues that modernist writers such as D. H. Lawrence saw the early twentieth century 
as ‘essentially a tragic age’, in a way similar to Romantic writers’ view of their era: 
 
The predicament was continuous, and, for them, continuously 
worsening. The response – ‘we’ve got to live’ – was very much the 
same. And it is within this response that they directed their interest 
towards the child, as a symbol of sensitive growth towards viable 
maturity. For them the child was, if you like, a creative symbol; a focal 
point of contact between the growing human consciousness and the 
‘experience’ of an alien world, about which they could concentrate their 
disquiet, and, importantly, their hopes for human salvation. We see just 
how significant Blake’s initial definition of ‘innocence’ and ‘experience’ 
became to the long tradition of Romantic protest through the symbol 
of the child.130 
 
The connection Coveney makes between the Romantic and modernist periods seems 
an apt way in which to end this section because the modernist child is both a product 
of and a reworking of the Romantic child. Writers of both periods found in the child 
a way to think about the adult self and express a sense of the unprecedented change 
of their historical moments.  
 
XI. The Child at Mid-Century 
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted P. H. Newby’s observation about the unusual 
number of novels and stories in the years 1945-1950 that were devoted to the theme 
of childhood. The survey that followed was intended to contribute to an 
understanding of why the figure of the Romantic child becomes prominent in British 
literature and culture after the end of the Second World War. I have tried to show 
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how, from the late nineteenth century onwards, we see a rewriting of the Romantic 
child and the Victorian child in modernist fiction, which provides new understandings 
of notions of innocence and experience. But I have also proposed that modernist 
representations of the child utilise the duality of the child rather than questioning it. 
Particularly important for the chapters that follow is the idea that both adolescence 
and the short story are ‘born’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and that there is a connection between these and the advent of literary modernism; 
a tradition in which epiphany and representation of childhood experience are 
central, a tradition that Barker, like other mid-century writers, is writing after.  
If we follow Coveney in seeing the modernist child as ‘a creative symbol; a 
focal point […] about which [modernists] could concentrate […] their hopes for 
human salvation’ then it is clear that the child’s role in modernism differs from the 
place of the child in fiction after modernism. For modernists, an association between 
the child and new technologies put emphasis on the novelty of modernism and the 
‘juxtaposition of violence with innocence’ was dynamic. For late-modernist or after-
modernist writers, the juxtaposition of children and violence had very different 
connotations, partly due to the privileging of youth in fascism and totalitarianism, 
and the child certainly was not a focal point for hopes of human salvation. The child 
that emerges in British literature around mid-century is more a figure of the past than 
of the future. Gavin argues that: ‘literary childhood in the 1945-70 period often 
reflected nostalgia for a more secure, idealized past Britain, often symbolised by 
large country houses and portrayed through an innocent child’s-eye perspective’.131 
MacKay and Stonebridge note that the ‘nostalgic fantasies of the belle époque’, 
familiar after 1918, resurfaced after the Second World War: ‘Never such innocence 
again’, as Philip Larkin famously lamented in his poem about 1914’.132 Nostalgic 
associations between childhood and an idealized, secure and innocent past are 
certainly a feature of mid-century writing.  
But while some post-war fiction focuses on ‘[a]dult betrayal of children’s trust 
and innocence’, other writers undermine or reject the idea of innocence 
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altogether.133 The fiction of this period is preoccupied with the illusory nature of an 
‘innocent’ past. MacKay and Stonebridge note that writers such as Rebecca West and 
Angus Wilson show how the century’s ‘lost innocence’ is an illusion and that private 
domestic violence foreshadows the public violence of twentieth-century warfare.134 
Other mid-century writers like Elizabeth Bowen and Graham Greene extend James’s 
investigation of the ambiguities and dangers of innocence. We find that innocence 
attracts danger and is itself dangerous. Writing of Elizabeth Bowen’s Eva Trout (1968) 
Eibhear Walshe argues that the novel is ‘a story of innocence and vulnerability and 
the betrayal and exploitation that such unprotected innocence attracts’.135 In 
Greene’s The Quiet American (1955), Pyle’s innocence is represented as a dangerous 
fundamentalism, ‘a kind of insanity’.136 Fowler says of Pyle: ‘Innocence always calls 
mutely for protection when we would be so much wiser to guard ourselves against 
it: innocence is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning 
no harm’.137  
Barker’s fiction is also a critique of innocence but her focus in her early writing 
is on childhood innocence and experience. As I attempted to show in the survey 
above, by the time Barker came to write Innocents in the 1940s the child figure had 
accrued an extraordinary number of competing and overlapping connotations, 
connections and relations: innocence, original sin, free will, salvation, the fall, loss, 
history, nation, memory, language, knowledge, interpretation, and fictional form. 
Barker’s emphasis in the passage at the start of the chapter is on the weight of 
meanings under which words – and, by implication, the child – are subsumed. The 
symbolic weight of the Romantic child prompts Barker’s investigation into innocence 
and experience. Her genealogy of age considers the ways in which others have 
figured the child and critically reworks these figurations in her own fiction. The child 
that Barker’s fiction registers most strongly is the Blakean version of the Romantic 
child: a dialectical figure whose innocence is always implicated in experience. This 
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figure speaks to the ambiguity about innocence and children in the mid-century 
British imagination. There is a preoccupation in this period with what childhood is 
and what it means, ideas that were increasingly unclear in a post-psychoanalytic, 
post-war world. The dialectical Blakean child allows Barker to move past the 
modernist duality of the child. Her fiction not only highlights and overturns 
oppositions of innocence and experience but dismantles them, insisting on the 
undecideability of the child. In this way, and in several others, Barker’s treatment of 
the child figure anticipates postmodernist understandings of childhood. She 
recognises that ‘the child’ is a concept and that childhood is not ‘natural’ but 
constructed. Her fiction is suspicious of ‘grand narratives’ of childhood and stages 
and parodies representations of the child in literary, psychoanalytic, psychological, 
and anthropological texts. Like many writers at mid-century Barker looks back, 
returning to childhood. But she is not looking back on the past as ‘innocent’, on the 
innocence of her younger days, or on that of childhood in general. She looks back at 
‘the child’ as a concept, rewriting it in order to deconstruct earlier figurations of 
childhood. 
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Chapter Two 
“Could I say I was possessed?”:  
The Uncanny Child in ‘The Iconoclasts’, ‘Domini’ and The Gooseboy 
 
She put out a hand to the bowl of roses by her chair and touched a 
close green bud. “A child is furled on itself. Not so vulnerable as one 
might suppose. And because it is a child, may we take for granted to 
what fidelities it owns?”   Barker, ‘Domini’1 
 
The image of a child as a 'close green bud', new, perfect, vulnerable and full of 
potential waiting to flower, is a familiar cliché. Barker’s fiction disrupts this way of 
thinking about children, presenting them as violent and mad as well as vulnerable 
and innocent. Barker was a careful writer; her work is widely praised for its precise, 
sparse style, so the ambiguous syntax in the phrase 'close green bud' should not be 
seen as accidental. A child is 'closed', shut up, 'furled on itself', suggesting self-
containment, strength and inaccessibility; a child is 'close': near, intimate, secretive, 
stifling.2 Such uncertainty is also at work in the question: “may we take for granted 
to what fidelities it owns?” This might mean that we take for granted the truths to 
which a child will confess; but the more salient meanings of the word 'fidelities' are 
faithfulness and loyalty, with the word 'owns' being as much associated with 
possession as confession, suggesting that it is the child’s loyalties that are being taken 
for granted. The ambiguity of the passage implies that, for Barker, when it comes to 
children, taking anything for granted is a mistake. The inconclusivity of her prose 
echoes the strangeness of what it describes: the uncanny unknowability of the child. 
Children are the main focus of nineteen out of thirty of Barker’s short stories 
published between 1947 and 1964. This chapter begins by considering how Barker's 
obsessive writing and rewriting of the child in her early short fiction both reflects and 
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resists some of the central narratives being told about children in mid-twentieth-
century society and culture. When Barker began to write in the 1940s Freudian and 
post-Freudian ideas of infantile sexuality and aggression had become widespread 
and influential in both intellectual and popular culture. First, I examine the history of 
mid-century psychoanalysis in order to establish the dominant narrative about the 
child in the immediate post-war period. Then I analyse Barker’s short story, ‘The 
Iconoclasts’ (1947) in relation to this narrative, arguing that through its engagement 
with Freud’s famous case study, ‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy’ (1909), 
more commonly known as ‘Little Hans’, the story stages the ways in which the child 
became both an object of study and a focus of concern for anthropologists, 
psychoanalysts and politicians of the 1940s. Next, I read Barker’s gothic ghost story, 
‘Domini’ (1949) as a work that questions both the knowledge of children and the 
adult desire to ‘know’ them. Through its allusions to Henry James’s The Turn of the 
Screw, I argue, Barker's story explores the shortcomings of notions of childhood 
innocence and presents children as figures of ambiguity. Her staging of the Freudian 
theory of the uncanny draws attention to the way in which the child is often figured 
as the unconscious of the adult, as ‘other’ to adult identity.  
The chapter then turns to a much later novel, The Gooseboy (1987), thus 
addressing Barker’s contention that ‘each writer has but one basic theme’ which is 
re-shaped and re-submitted ‘again and again in his work’.3 I propose that this late 
novel not only shows Barker’s preoccupation throughout her career with the dialectic 
of innocence and experience and the figure of the child, but also demonstrates the 
ways in which ideas of childhood innocence and corruption linger in the late-
twentieth-century imagination. The Gooseboy draws attention to the inherent 
strangeness of the child. Through its representation of the ‘oieboy’, a mute ‘wild’ or 
‘feral’ child living in the French countryside, the novel alludes to the case of Victor, 
the eighteenth-century ‘wild boy of Aveyron’, thereby evoking a further example of 
how the child has been studied in order to explain human behaviour. In different 
ways, then, these three texts challenge the objectifying tendencies of child-study and 
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collapse binary oppositions of savage/civilized and innocence/experience, insisting 
that the child be understood as a figure against which adult society defines itself.  
 
I. ‘The Child is Father of the Man’ 
In mid-century Britain there was intense interest in the child. Interest from 
government ministers and the press, from Mass Observation and documentary-
makers, from writers, artists, photographers and directors. As the BBC aired radio 
programmes about good parenting, MPs lectured on juvenile delinquency, youth 
gang crime, lack of parental control and decreased morality, participating a 
widespread moral panic about youth. This was partly to do with issues of child 
welfare. There were worries about the evacuation of children from British cities 
during the war and the humanitarian crisis around the issue of lost and displaced 'war 
children' in Europe as a whole, highlighted by UNESCO.4 But, I suggest, the panic was 
more to do with concerns over the welfare and morality of society in the future. Like 
the ‘lost children’ of Europe after the war – who, as Tara Zahra argues, ‘spawned 
dystopian fears of European civilization in disarray’5 – at mid-century in Britain 
children were viewed with suspicion and uncertainty; they figured variously in 
discussions about human morality, as threats to society, as yardsticks showing the 
corruptive influence of the war, and as symbols of a future about which many were 
so unsure. The 1940s British preoccupation with the child thus follows a long-
standing association made between the child and the nation; however, the 
connection made between them in the post-war period was particularly intense 
because it came at a point at which young people were becoming increasingly 
defined – the term ‘teenager’ is coined in 1945 – and restricted and protected – the 
Children Act came into operation in 1948. 
If the future of society is intimately bound up with the nature of the child, 
then childhood becomes a political issue. The concerns of politicians about issues 
such as evacuation and juvenile delinquency were no doubt influenced by the 
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research of psychologists, psychoanalysts and, to a lesser extent, anthropologists.6 
The research of these disciplines had always shared common ground through a 
mutual focus on the child; but in the late 1930s, as Denise Riley shows in her book 
War in the Nursery (1983), this shared interest in the child assumed in some areas a 
more pronounced undercurrent of political ideology. Parallels were drawn between 
individual and national character structures and in America data on children was 
used to formulate the psychology of national character 'types' with a particular 
interest in the so-called 'fascist' character.7 During the war psychoanalysis became 
more prominent in Britain, argues Michal Shapira, and analysts such as Melanie Klein, 
John Bowlby, and Donald Winnicott were asked to treat a wide variety of people, 
with a particular focus on children, who ‘came to be seen, on the one hand, as 
vulnerable and in need of protection; on the other hand, as anxious, aggressive 
subjects requiring control’.8 Ideas of the child as savage were influenced by Klein, 
who argued that: 'The repeated attempts that have been made to improve humanity 
– in particular to make it more peaceable – have failed because nobody has 
understood the full depth and vigour of the instincts of aggression innate in each 
individual'.9 This figuring of the child struck a particular chord in the postwar 
imagination and, as Riley notes, in the 1940s Klein’s ideas were taken up (in part) by 
other psychologists, most notably Bowlby, and disseminated to the general public in 
radio programmes and women's magazines that gave advice to parents about how 
effective nurture could overcome the savage nature of the child.  
On the 30th June 1947, Barker’s first collection, Innocents was published to 
widespread critical acclaim. In a letter to Barker the previous summer accepting her 
stories for publication, Leonard Woolf wrote: ‘It is a long time since I have come 
across short stories as good as these, and, if you will allow me to say so, I do not think 
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I have ever read short stories about children which are so convincing.’10 Due to her 
focus on children, the earliest readers of Barker’s fiction considered it to be 
influenced by psychoanalysis. (I discuss the contemporary reception of Innocents in 
detail later.) Two months before Woolf’s correspondence, Barker received a letter of 
rejection from the publishers Jonathan Cape thanking her for her ‘short stories 
concerned with child psychology and childish psychology in adults’.11 Although 
Barker writes of ‘Freudian deeps’ in her introduction to Hester Lilly, the archive does 
not confirm that Barker read either Freudian or post-Freudian psychoanalysis in the 
1940s.12 However, a number of factors suggest her psychoanalytic knowledge. Her 
use of the word ‘animus’ in ‘The Iconoclasts’ suggests that she was familiar with Carl 
Jung. English translations of Freud’s work were published in the early 1950s by 
Barker’s publisher, The Hogarth Press. Barker read psychologist Charlotte Wolff’s 
writings on female sexuality and lesbianism and corresponded with Wolff about her 
work, suggesting not only that Barker had an interest in this area but that she was 
familiar enough with psychological terminology to fully engage with Wolff’s work.13 
In the pages that follow I examine how ideas about childhood in the work of Klein 
and Bowlby differ from those in Freudian psychoanalysis. Considering the 
widespread dissemination of psychoanalytically-informed ideas in mid-century 
popular culture, and the likelihood that Barker was familiar with psychoanalysis, it is 
important to establish the conceptions of the child that were dominant when Barker 
began to write. Just as an examination of the child in mid-century psychoanalysis 
illuminates the preoccupations of Barker’s work, so Barker’s fiction informs our 
understanding of psychoanalytic narratives about the child in post-war Britain.  
Klein’s focus on the innate aggression of the child develops from, but also 
alters, Freud’s theories. According to Freud, the mother’s breast is ‘[t]he child’s first 
erotic object’, which it does not at first understand to be separate from its own 
body.14 It is only ‘when the breast then has to be separated from the child’s own 
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body, transferred ‘outwards’ because he so often finds it absent, [that] it takes the 
part of the originally narcissistic libido-investment with it as an ‘object’’.15 This first 
object is later formed by ‘the whole person of the mother’ who Freud describes as 
the child’s ‘first and strongest love-object’ – ‘its first seductress’.16 Freud’s 
characterisation here of the infant making a separation between the mother and 
itself, and thus conceiving of its first ‘object’, is helpful in understanding post-
Freudian developments in psychoanalysis, particularly the theory of objects 
relations. Klein’s ideas were based on her work with young children in the 1920s 
using her new play technique. She considered a child’s play to be a symbolic 
expression of the conflicts in its unconscious. In The Psycho-Analysis of Children 
(1932) Klein writes that: ‘The child expresses its phantasies, its wishes and its actual 
experiences in a symbolic way through play and games.’17 Hanna Segal notes that 
although Klein’s observations of children’s play largely confirmed Freud’s theories, 
Klein also observed some unexpected phenomena, such as ‘children of 2½ displaying 
oedipal phantasies and anxieties which clearly already had a history’ and the early 
appearance of the super-ego, which ‘seemed to have very savage characteristics’.18 
Thus, Klein came to understand that the object relationships of the child had an early 
origin in its relationships with part-objects, for example the mother’s breast. Klein’s 
observations ‘led her to a formulation of the earliest stages of the Oedipus complex 
and the super-ego in terms of early object relationships, with an emphasis on 
anxieties, defences and object relations, part as well as whole’.19  
Klein emphasised the aggression of the child: ‘[t]he object-world of the child 
in the first two or three months of its life could be described as consisting of hostile 
and persecuting, or else of gratifying parts and portions of the real world’.20 The child 
splits the ego and objects, for example the breast as a source of food, into good and 
persecuting part-objects in order to try to, as Segal puts it, ‘retain good feelings and 
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introject good objects, whilst expelling bad objects and projecting bad feelings’.21 The 
anxieties of this early stage of the paranoid-schizoid position are considered by Klein 
to be essential to the development of the ego. Later, at around four or five months 
old, writes Klein, ‘the ego is […] made to realize that the loved object is at the same 
time the hated one, and in addition to this that the real objects and the imaginary 
figures, both external and internal, are bound up with each other’.22 This is the 
depressive position, the overcoming of which, argues Klein, ‘depends on how [the 
infant] is able to find its way out of the conflict between love and uncontrollable 
hatred and sadism’.23 Juliet Mitchell argues that the infant’s later ‘normal’ 
development depends on ‘whether or not it can identify with an internalized ‘good’ 
mother to the extent that it can repair the damage done by its destructive urges to 
the ‘bad’ mother, or whether it must flee the implications of the position’.24 The 
depressive position involves feelings of guilt and empathy, which are focused on the 
object (mother). Psychosis develops in those who cannot reconcile love and hate and 
distinguish between real and imaginary or external and internal objects. 
John Bowlby trained under Klein and, like her, realised the importance of 
aggression in childhood. However, he disagreed with Freud’s and Klein’s 
understanding of the mother-child bond as the outcome of libidinal drives and came 
to attribute more significance to the environmental factors affecting the bond 
between mother and child. Bowlby was influenced by ethology, notes Shapira, in his 
view of children as being frequently in conflict with one another, like ‘primitives’ or 
animals, over ‘possession of goods or affection and frustration after failure or 
punishment’.25 For Bowlby, argues Shapira, the withholding of affection or goods 
‘should be seen as one of the chief sources of hatred and aggression in childhood’ 
and ‘[t]hese hazardous feelings of aggression could last into adulthood, endangering 
democracy’.26 This argument illuminates the connection Bowlby went on to make 
between the separation of mother and child and juvenile delinquency. In 1939, for 
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example, he, Winnicott, and Emanuel Miller, published a letter claiming that the 
evacuation programme ‘[could] lead to a big increase in juvenile delinquency in the 
next decade’.27 Furthermore, he concluded his 1944 article, ‘Forty-Four Juvenile 
Thieves: Their Characters and Home Life’ with the following statement: ‘prolonged 
separation of a child from his mother (or mother-substitute) during the first five years 
of life stands foremost among the causes of delinquent character development and 
persistent misbehaviour.’28 Shapira notes that after the war analysts from the 
Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency (ISTD) ‘contributed to the 
discussion of what was seen as a wave of juvenile delinquency due to the upheaval 
of war and the breakup of families’.29 It is important to note that the connection 
Bowlby makes between childhood aggression and national instability implies that 
state intervention in families, particularly with regard to mother-child relations, 
would result in a more peaceable nation.30 
Bowlby’s sense of children as primitives or animals and the links he makes 
between the child and the nation suggests the influence not only of ethology but of 
anthropology. The relationship between the child and nation, most obviously 
expressed in the child/primitive or child/savage parallels, has a long and complex 
history. As Heather Montgomery puts it: ‘Children have been continual motifs since 
the earliest days of anthropological writing, the savage and child existing in parallel 
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to explain social and cultural development'.31 The parallel was also key to early child 
psychology, and later to psychoanalysis. Riley observes that late-nineteenth-century 
psychologists would 'note in infantile behaviour shadows of our forgotten 
ancestors'.32 For psychologists, Riley argues, ‘[t]he child appears to present a life 
caught at its start in an unmuddied form, a pure object for study. The child is in this 
sense the genesis of the adult, the 'father of the man''.33 The reference to 
Wordsworth’s conception of childhood in ‘My Heart Leaps Up When I Behold’ (1802) 
reminds us that in British literature, too, there has long been a parallel between 
primitive and child. The most well-known expression of this comparison, as discussed 
in chapter one, is Romantic writers’ use of the figure of the ‘noble savage’. Rousseau 
played a crucial part in formulating the characteristics of the figure of the Romantic 
child: inherent difference from adults; natural innocence; “the feeling of life”; and 
primitivism. The last of these – the sense that the child, like the primitive or savage, 
lives within itself in harmony with nature and independently from society – is 
particularly relevant to the current argument. In contrast to Rousseau, 
psychoanalytic theory understands children to be inherently conflicted. Whereas 
Rousseau argues that the child is self-sufficient and should therefore be without 
desire, psychoanalysis highlights the child’s sexuality and aggressive drive for 
domination. Wordsworth’s formulation, then, provides a good illustration of the dual 
role of the child in the twentieth century. Not only is the child ‘father of the man’ – 
the key to understanding individual consciousness and development, as is the case 
in psychoanalysis and developmental psychology – the child is father of all men, the 
starting point for understanding the development and character of whole societies, 
as is the case for psychoanalytic anthropology and group psychology.  
Although psychoanalysis registers the complexities of the child it is still based 
on a child/primitive association, on the observation and study of the behaviour of 
children, and the sense that children can provide the model for understanding the 
behaviour of adult individuals and whole societies. Freud writes: 
 
                                                          
31 Montgomery, An Introduction to Childhood, p. 18. 
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Surely there must be a possibility of observing in children at first hand 
and in all the freshness of life the sexual impulses and wishes which we 
dig out so laboriously in adults from among their own debris […] 
  With this end in view I have for many years been urging my pupils and 
friends to collect observations of the sexual life of children […].34 
 
Freud makes a distinction between the easily accessible ‘first hand’ child, and a 
historic child figure that is hard to reach and hidden from view by the ‘debris’ of adult 
life. He suggests that the process of extracting the child from the adult resembles an 
archaeological ‘dig’ in which buried artefacts are brought to light ‘laboriously’. By 
contrast, ‘the sexual impulses and wishes’ of the ‘first hand’ child may be more easily 
accessed through observation. The adult gaze, applied to the figure of the child as an 
object of study, will elicit ‘hidden’ knowledge about individuals, societies, and the 
history and future of the species without the need for a drawn-out, difficult process 
of unearthing. This objectification of the child reinforces a sense of adult domination. 
It also values the child not in itself but as ‘the father of the man’ – for what it can 
reveal about the adult mind. With this in mind, is the psychoanalytic child any less of 
a figure of the past or an object of knowledge than the Romantic child? I argue that 
both ‘The Iconoclasts’ and ‘Domini’ address these questions. Indeed, The Child is 
Father was one of Barker’s suggestions to Woolf in 1946 for the title of her first 
collection but he thought it ‘not quite right’.35 This suggests that in the 1940s Barker 
was thinking about ideas of the child as a figure through which the adult mind could 
be understood. The sections that follow aim to show how Barker’s fiction engages 
with, and questions the idea of, the child as an object of study in psychoanalysis. 
 
II. ‘The Iconoclasts’ 
Barker’s engagement with child-study is made particularly clear in the opening 
passage of ‘The Iconoclasts’. The story begins with a boy, five-year-old Marcus, 
playing in his back garden, building a castle out of mud. He is later joined by an older 
                                                          
34 Freud, ‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume X (1909), Two Case Histories: ‘Little Hans’ and the 
‘Rat Man’, trans. by James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 5-149, p. 6. 
35 Leonard Woolf, letter to Barker, 31st August 1946, box 8, folder 7, HRHRC.  
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boy, Neil, who ridicules his beliefs and habits. Marcus's project requires him to carry 
pails of earth from the bottom of the garden up to a paved area, a route that involves 
the ascent of a set of stone steps. But his journey is complicated by his obsessive 
belief that the top step is hallowed ground:  
 
The top step was sacred. To tread on it was not only a crime but a 
deliberate thumbing at fate. Of course a lot of people did – his parents, 
the occasional gardener [...] It worried Marcus to think what a lot of 
trouble they were storing up for themselves, until he decided that as 
they were adults, they had graduated out of the power of the step. 
One day, he too would be beyond it, he would be able to tread there 
without his footstep shaking loose some dreadful animus.36  
   
The foregrounding of Marcus’s ritualistic avoidance of the step immediately suggests 
a parallel between the mind of the child and the primitive mind. ‘The Iconoclasts’ 
actively engages with some of the assumptions of the child/primitive parallel. First, 
Marcus's avoidance of the step is presented as a ritual designed to appease both 
'fate' and the ‘dreadful animus’. This takes account of the theory that children's play 
echoes the beliefs and traditions of primitive culture, suggesting that children, like 
primitive people, fear punishment for breaking taboo by gods or impersonal powers. 
Second, Marcus has a golliwog named Boddy, which he talks to as he plays. After 
‘rescuing’ Boddy from a beetle, Marcus scolds him: “You'll have to be more careful.”37 
Early anthropologists suggested that a feature of the primitive world view is a lack of 
differentiation, so that the primitive individual, like a child, will speak to creatures 
and things as if they were people.38 Third, the tone of passages that describe Marcus 
playing in his garden feels like that of an anthropological or psychoanalytic case 
study, as though he is being observed like a specimen in his natural habitat. The story 
appears to be an examination of a day in the life of a five-year-old boy, an 
investigation of his habits and beliefs.  
                                                          
36 Barker, ‘The Iconoclasts’, in Innocents: Variations on a Theme, 1947 (London: Faber and Faber, 
2009), pp. 56-86, p. 56. 
37 Ibid., p. 57. 
38 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, 1966 (London: 
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I want to pursue this last point further. Marcus’s age, the sustained focus on 
the ritualistic detail of his play, and his relationship with Boddy suggest that ‘The 
Iconoclasts’ may be read in the light of psychoanalytic case studies, particularly 
Freud’s study of ‘Little Hans’. It is worth noting that Klein drew on ‘Little Hans’ when 
developing her play technique; later I will discuss the representation of Marcus in 
relation to Klein’s youngest patient, Rita. Little Hans ‘is afraid a horse will bite him in 
the street’, tries to avoid going out and becomes frightened when he is outside.39 
Freud argues that the horse represents Hans’s father and that Hans is afraid of his 
father because he harboured ‘jealous and hostile wishes against him’ and ‘wanted to 
have his father ‘out of the way’ […] so that he might be alone with his beautiful 
mother and sleep with her’.40 Freud classifies Hans’s phobia as ‘anxiety-hysteria’ and 
argues that in this state ‘the libido which has been liberated from the pathogenic 
material by repression is not converted […], but is set free in the shape of anxiety.41 
The idea of the libido being ‘set free’ is significant because, according to Freud, Hans’s 
fear of horses/his father results from the violence Hans wishes on his father. 
Marcus’s phobia is attached to the top step, which is ‘sacred’ because it may ‘shak[e] 
loose’ a ‘dreadful animus’. Because the word ‘animus’ may be defined as motivating 
a person to act with ‘animosity’ and ‘hostility’ and the step represents a fear or threat 
specific to childhood (adults have ‘graduated’ out of its power) I propose that the 
representation of Marcus’s phobia of the step in ‘The Iconoclasts’ stages Freud’s 
theory of the Oedipus complex.42 
Both Marcus and Hans are preoccupied with family hierarchies and wish to 
transgress the established order. Freud argues that desire for knowledge is 
‘inseparable from sexual curiosity’.43 He notes that Hans’s curiosity is particularly 
focused on his parents and the origins of babies (prompted by the birth of his sister), 
and that Hans likes to pretend to have his own children who were delivered by the 
stork.44 Marcus also imagines having a child-like ‘subordinate’: ‘Boddy did what no 
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one else did, he went in awe of Marcus. That made a full circle – Marcus’s father 
looked up to his superior at the office, Marcus’s mother looked up to Marcus’s father, 
Marcus’s grandmother looked up to them both, Marcus had to look up to everybody, 
and Boddy looked up to Marcus.’45 Marcus demonstrates his resistance to the family 
hierarchy by hiding when his grandmother tries to find him ‘because it was part of 
his policy to be elusive, not easily found – in fact not to be found at all. He preferred 
to turn the tables and seek the seeker’.46 ‘Turning the tables’ or inverting the 
established family hierarchy is what Hans wishes to do by supplanting his father’s 
position. Marcus’s father appears only once in the story, as a figure of authority who 
objects to and ridicules the ritual Marcus has developed in order to avoid the top 
step: ‘His father didn’t like him to go in under the bushes’ and ‘to Marcus’s father 
[the ritual] was just a source of humour’.47 Marcus’s flouting of his father’s 
instructions subverts parental authority.  
His treatment of Boddy also suggests his phantasy of being the parent. When 
Marcus talks to Boddy he imitates an adult register: “I haven't got time to turn around 
today.”48 Marcus also abuses Boddy, pushing the doll into a bush ‘for not looking 
impressed’ with his mud castle.49 This role play recalls Klein’s description of the play 
of a two-year-old neurotic girl called Rita in ‘The psychological principles of early 
analysis’ (1925). Rita, writes Klein, ‘would incessantly play ‘mother and child’ 
internally’: ‘Rita would be a strict mother and [Klein] would be a naughty child. She 
would reproach me with all manner of things […] The child was actually playing two 
roles here; similarly the role that she had assigned to me was a dual one – I was 
simultaneously the excessively strict mother and the child who suffered from this 
strictness.’50 Marcus’s chastisement of Boddy recalls Rita’s ‘strict mother’ role, again 
suggesting the ‘The Iconoclasts’ is staging psychoanalytic theory. Klein attributes 
Rita’s aggression in her rituals and role-play to her guilt about wishing violence on 
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her mother and father and her fear that the violence she had phantasised inflicting 
on her parents would be visited on her. This resembles little Han’s fear of horses, 
which Freud argues results from the violence he wishes on his father. If we accept 
that ‘The Iconoclasts’ stages psychoanalytic theory then Marcus’s violence towards 
Boddy represents his experience of similar aggressive phantasies and his subsequent 
guilt. Further, the duality of the roles Rita imagines is significant in light of Marcus’s 
abuse of Boddy, Neil’s violence towards the doll, and the status of Neil’s body as an 
object at the end of the story, which I discuss later. 
A second factor that suggests Marcus’s phobia of the step may be read as a 
staging of the Oedipus complex is the similarity between his and little Hans’s 
treatment of objects. Marcus uses ritual to deal with his fears about the 
summerhouse, which he thinks is inhabited by a ‘creature’: 
 
Whatever it was in the summerhouse, he believed it preferred him to 
hurry by and not stare too much. For dignity’s sake he could not run 
past; he always, however sober his pace, began to skip and hop when 
he came in sight of the hut, thus placating its creature without loss of 
prestige. So the skipping and hopping became a ritual and after the 
manner of ritual, had a definite form. Two hops, three skips and a 
short jump, took Marcus on a level with the summerhouse door. He 
was then entitled to assert himself and his command of the ritual by 
a deliberate stare. Two hops, three skips and a short jump took him 
well out of the creature's jurisdiction again.51 
 
The obsessive behaviour of both little Hans and Marcus is similar. Each attaches the 
anxiety that stems from his libido onto non-human objects. Marcus has a phobia 
about the ‘dreadful animus’ under the step and ‘the creature’ in the summerhouse; 
Hans fears the horse. I noted earlier the importance attached by Freud and Klein to 
the role of object relations in the development of the infant’s sense of self and 
sexuality through anxiety. The sexual nature of Marcus’s anxiety is suggested at 
several points in the story, most notably when Marcus shows Boddy a worm:  
  
  There was a worm in the pile of earth. Marcus showed it to Boddy. 
“That’s a snake. […] 
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   He thought he might keep the worm and let it swim in the moat of 
his castle, so he put it under a flower-pot. 
   “This is very important,” he said, making the earth into a tight pile 
and cutting it with his spade. “It’s a secret.”52 
 
The worm or ‘snake’ is an obvious phallic symbol, something the story registers when 
Marcus puts emphasis on the worm’s secrecy and, after displaying it, covers it with a 
flower-pot. When Marcus ‘shows’ the worm to Boddy, Barker’s story recalls Little 
Hans’s enjoyment of exhibiting his penis and attempting to see other people’s sexual 
organs.53 
In addition to the common elements of content in the two texts, there are 
similarities in the form and structure of ‘The Iconoclasts’ and ‘Little Hans’. The 
description of the ritual Marcus creates to ward off ‘the creature’ reads like a 
psychoanalytic explanation of his behaviour. Immediately of note is the combined 
third-person objectivity and close focus of the narrative voice. Also of interest is the 
formality of the language (‘entitled to assert himself and his command of the ritual’) 
which is used in subordinate clauses (‘thus placating its creature without loss of 
prestige’) to offer an explanation of Marcus’s behaviour. ‘The Iconoclasts’, like ‘Little 
Hans’, describes in detail Marcus and his routines, including specifics about his age 
and physical appearance (‘small for his five years’).54 The very precise set of physical 
movements he develops to appease the ‘creature’ is described to us by the narrator 
in minute detail. This is reminiscent of the encyclopaedic detail of a Freudian case 
study.  
Several other stories in Innocents resemble psychoanalytic case studies in 
terms of content and form, providing a psychological analysis of the behaviour of an 
individual character. The structure of “Here Comes a Candle…” is chronological, with 
three parts addressing three crucial points in protagonist, Haidee’s life: her early 
childhood; her experience at school aged twelve; and the day of her forty-eighth 
birthday.55 Haidee’s overbearing nature results in her rejection by her grown-up 
children and the story traces this back to a childhood incident in which she was 
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ignored and abandoned by the adults around her. Whether or not Barker was 
deliberately drawing on the ideas of Freud and Klein when she wrote Innocents, the 
similarities between her stories and psychoanalytic case studies were noted at the 
time, both directly, as in the above letter from Jonathan Cape, and in the sense that, 
like psychoanalysis, Barker’s stories were seen as revealing a previously hidden world 
of childhood.  
Writing in The Daily Mail, Peter Quennell observes that Innocents is 
‘concerned with the more ruthless, mysterious, and amoral side of childhood’.56 A 
New York Times reviewer agrees, writing that Barker’s stories ‘explor[e] with 
remarkable penetration the mysterious mental world of childhood’.57 A review in The 
Atlantic also notes that Barker ‘mov[es] with amazing penetration into [children’s] 
mysterious mental world’.58 The fact that all the reviews identify a concern with, and 
an exploration of, the mystery of childhood indicates that Innocents was seen as a 
psychoanalytically-informed work of fiction which, like psychoanalysis, revealed 
‘hidden’ knowledge about humankind through the ‘observation’ of children. 
Quennell’s review further suggests a psychoanalytic reading when he writes that, for 
Barker, the child is ‘an intensely self-centered being who gazes out at life through the 
semi-transparent walls of his or her own private universe, seeing the world peopled 
with gigantic adult shapes, sometimes impressive and beautiful, sometimes 
threatening and hideous’.59 These ‘gigantic adult shapes’ that are both pleasant and 
terrifying recall Klein’s descriptions of the parental couple phantasised by the infant 
during the oedipal stage. Barker’s publisher, John Wheelock recognised her debt to 
psychoanalysis in a letter which evaluates ‘Domini’ in terms of its psychological 
accuracy: ‘I do think that Domini, being merely a fiction in the child’s mind, strains 
credulity in the case of a story where the realistic detail is so accurately presented. 
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But schizophrenia is a very subtle thing and might well be present in the case of such 
a child with such a background, I suppose.’60 
Barker’s fiction was seen to have a similar aim to psychoanalytic case studies: 
to penetrate the surface of the ‘mysterious’ world of the child. But although Barker’s 
stories stage the theories of Freud and Klein, they also undermine the assumptions 
of psychoanalytic case studies. In Barker’s stories the impulse, found in discourses of 
child study such as psychoanalysis, to ‘master’ the child, to know it completely 
through observation and interpretation, is resisted. Instead, the unknowablity of the 
close/closed child is emphasised. Both ‘The Iconoclasts’ and ‘Domini’ appear to play 
with the reader, emphasising that she cannot ever really ‘know’ the child. For 
example, as I discuss later, the line ‘could I say I was possessed?’ in ‘Domini’ may be 
read as a joke or a challenge to our desire to settle on a ‘once and for all’ reading of 
a text. In addition, the sustained inconclusivity of Neil’s death, analysed below, resists 
the reader’s desire for resolution. 
The order of Marcus’s small world is disrupted by the arrival of ten-year-old 
Neil Farncombe. A sharp contrast between primitive infancy and maturity is created 
by the juxtaposition of Marcus's childish rituals and the appearance of Neil, who is 
‘casual and self-possessed’.61 Neil, the 'iconoclast' of the story's title, refuses to 
entertain Marcus's beliefs about the step and reveals that the ‘creature’ or 'gremlin' 
in the summerhouse is in fact a rat. This could suggest a mature, common-sense 
quashing of primitive infantile fears, the triumph of rationality over superstition. 
However, Barker's story goes on to reject oppositions between the ‘savage’ and the 
‘civilized’. While Marcus is portrayed as a primitive, the description of Neil has 
obvious fascist connotations: ‘Marcus was too young to know what fanaticism was, 
or he might have seen in Neil's face the fatal unity, feral and precipitate, and no more 
amenable than flame. The clear, freckled brow, gathered and jutting over those oddly 
empty blue eyes, the firm, intolerant mouth, so pitiless that it chilled and almost 
repelled.'62 This account of Neil as a 'fanatic' with 'oddly empty blue eyes' suggests a 
stereotypical 'fascist character’. Neil appears intolerant, devoid of pity – robotic, 
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even. But the description of Neil's wrinkled and protruding forehead is more 
reminiscent of atavistic descriptions of 'born criminals', depicting him as sub-human 
and savage. Neil is an ambiguous figure who combines two extremes of inhumanity: 
the mechanization of fascism and the savagery of a more animalistic type of 
criminality. His defining characteristic is his inhumanity and, suggests Barker, 
whether this inhumanity is ‘civilized’ or ‘savage’ does not matter. 
Neil’s ambiguous status is emphasised towards the end of the story when, 
after attempting to carry out a ‘four-point landing’ to ‘test his nerve’, he falls from 
the top sail of a windmill, presumably breaking his back: ‘He landed on his back. The 
ground shook him once, flinging up his arms and legs like a doll’s, then he lay still.’63 
The reader realises Neil is likely to die but is never certain if he has. At first Neil is still 
and silent and his eyes are closed; but later we are told that he ‘picked a stalk of grass 
and stuck it in the side of his mouth’.64 On the following page, in a clichéd image of 
death, Neil lets the chips of wood from the mill sail fall from his hand; but he is still 
not dead, as when Marcus tries to pull him up he ‘[bares] his teeth in another 
extreme of fear, both savage and agonized’.65 This sustained inconclusivity produces 
a chilling atmosphere; but the uncertainty about whether Neil is alive or dead does 
something more. First, it creates an uncanny effect and, second, it foregrounds ideas 
of object relations, objectification – and the child as an object of study. 
In The Uncanny (1919), Freud quotes Ernst Jentsch’s description of what 
makes E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story, ‘The Sand-Man’, an uncanny text.  Jentsch suggests 
that a sense of the uncanny is created when the reader is left in ‘doubt as to whether 
an apparently living being really is alive and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless 
object may not in fact be animate’.66 Freud argues that Jentsch’s observation is 
‘undoubtedly correct’ but that the uncertainty over whether Hoffmann’s character 
Olympia is human or automaton is neither the only, nor the most important, uncanny 
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effect in Hoffmann’s story.67 Freud protests several times against Jentsch’s argument 
that ‘intellectual uncertainty’ creates a sense of the uncanny, and later states that a 
doll that seemed to be alive would not excite fear because children ‘make no sharp 
distinction between the animate and the inanimate’.68 This proves at first to be the 
case for Marcus in ‘The Iconoclasts’. After Neil has fallen, Marcus performs a quick 
celebratory dance then waits patiently for a response. The repeated use of the word 
‘odd’ suggests Marcus is unsettled, but not scared, by the fact that Neil does not 
move. ‘It was odd’, Barker writes, and later: ‘An odd qualm chilled [Marcus] as he 
looked into Neil’s face.’69 Soon, however, Marcus’s mood alters from one of 
puzzlement to one of terror: 
 
[Neil] lay there staring at Marcus, and now the shadow had come back. 
He had a grey cloth face. He never looked away, and the terror in his 
eyes was so violent and so inexplicable that Marcus was frightened 
too. He glanced round about; there was only the bland empty sunshine 
and the stooping mill. There was nothing to be afraid of – that made 
Marcus more frightened than ever.70 
 
As far as Marcus is concerned there is nothing to be afraid of. Marcus is terrified not 
by Neil’s fear but by its inexplicability – the strangeness of such violent emotion. For 
the reader, inconclusivity generates an ‘odd qualm’ similar to that experienced by 
Marcus, but a real sense of the uncanny is produced as we experience Neil’s 
ambiguous state through Marcus’s uncomprehending eyes. The uncanny in Barker’s 
story is created by a sense of ‘intellectual uncertainty’, so that the reader’s lack of 
confidence over whether Neil is dead or alive mimics Marcus’s inability to understand 
Neil’s death, something seen as characteristic of the ‘primitive’ or childish mind. 
The sense of uncertainty foregrounds ideas of object relations and 
objectification. Throughout the story, Barker has highlighted Marcus’s relationship 
with his doll, Boddy. The staging of Marcus’s Oedipus complex is achieved through 
his fear of non-human objects (the ‘dreadful animus’ and the ‘creature’) and by his 
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aggressive behaviour towards Boddy, which in psychoanalytic terms represents the 
violence he wishes to inflict upon the body of his father. Confronted by a human 
object that is neither animate nor inanimate, Marcus compares Neil’s post-fall body 
to a series of objects. Through these comparisons the story dramatises the way in 
which a young child might make sense of death through objects. First, Neil is 
compared to a doll. When he falls the ground flings up ‘his arms and legs like a doll’s’. 
We find that his ‘[l]egs and arms were flung out just as Marcus had seen Boddy’s 
arms and legs spread wide when he was thrown on the floor’.71 Next, Neil is 
compared to a scarecrow with ‘a grey cloth face’ and, ‘flatten[ing] himself to the 
ground […] bearing his teeth’, to an animal under attack.72 Marcus’s comparison of 
Neil’s body to a doll, scarecrow and animal stages object relations theory and 
highlights Marcus’s lack of distinction between animate and inanimate objects. By 
drawing attention to a series of bodies, Barker draws attention to all these things as 
objects and suggests that, like ‘Boddy’, the body of the child is an object too. But the 
ambiguity of Neil’s body as corpse or living child actually resists objectification 
precisely because it cannot be intellectually classified. In this way, Barker’s uncanny 
characterisation of Neil engages with, and is critical of, twentieth-century discourses 
of child study. ‘The Iconoclasts’, first of all, undermines the opposition between the 
mind of the ‘savage’ child and the western adult mind and, second, resists the desire 
to objectify ‘the child’, pinning it down like some rare species under the microscope.  
 
III. ‘Domini’ 
‘The Iconoclasts’ stages psychoanalytic theories, representing Marcus’s Oedipal 
desires while also calling into question the idea of the child as an object of study in 
psychoanalysis. ‘Domini’ (1949) goes further by representing a child who carries out 
the violence that Marcus enacts only in his phantasies. In doing so, ‘Domini’ considers 
the question of a child’s responsibility for an aggressive act alongside the idea of 
childhood innocence. The story insists that we cannot discover whether Francesca is 
innocent or guilty. This in turn suggests that we cannot ever really ‘know’ the child, 
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despite the narratives created to explain childhood, which perhaps reveal more 
about adults than children. Through its staging of the Freudian uncanny, ‘Domini’ 
shows how the child is considered ‘other’ to the adult because it cannot be known. 
‘Domini’ concerns a seven-year-old girl, Francesca, growing up in a large 
house in the British countryside in the 1880s. The story is recounted by Francesca, 
now an old woman, to an unnamed narrator. After the death of Francesca's 
authoritarian father and during her mother's absence in London, Francesca is left 
alone with the servants for almost a year, during which time she reignites a friendship 
with Domini, her imaginary playmate from the days when her father was alive. When 
Francesca's mother finally returns, Domini becomes difficult to handle, constantly 
criticising Francesca's mother's low-cut ball dresses and her relationship with her 
new suitor, the dreadful Poultney St Austell. Domini persuades Francesca into 
considering a plan to burn her mother's dresses and, one night, after catching her 
mother with Poultney St Austell in the summerhouse, Francesca decides to do it. 
Domini appears and convinces Francesca to burn the dresses on the veranda of the 
summerhouse, arguing that because the lights are out, Francesca's mother and her 
lover are no longer inside – which, of course, they still are. After the fire, as she and 
Domini walk back through the snow, Francesca notices a strange thing: “Why, 
Domini,” she said, “you don't make any footprints!”73  
The dramatic revelation, the framed-narrative, the setting in the past in a 
large remote house: Barker's Jamesian ghost story deploys and, I would suggest, 
parodies Gothic conventions, in particular the idea of the uncanny double. But 
‘Domini’ is above all a serious meditation on the unknowability of the child and the 
dangers of ideas of innocence. As I suggested in chapter one, Barker is concerned not 
with the corrupting effect of experience on innocence, but with the impact of 
innocence on experience. This unusual focus disrupts established ideas about 
innocent children and, through an exploration of Francesca’s responsibility, exposes 
childhood innocence as a concept tied up with adult guilt. Similarly, ‘Domini’ 
destabilises other binary oppositions on which child study is based: 
conscious/unconscious, known/unknown, and adult/child. Barker’s use of the 
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homograph ‘close’ indicates her unwillingness to subscribe to dichotomous ideas of 
the child. 
The story makes it clear that we are to see Domini as Francesca's double. As 
Freud describes it in The Uncanny, the 'double' is: 'a creation dating back to a very 
early mental stage, long since left behind... [which] has become a vision of terror'.74 
In ‘Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’ or the ‘Rat Man’ (1909), Freud 
encourages his patient to consider the moral self as the conscious, and the evil self 
as the unconscious.75 He states: ‘The unconscious, I explained, was the infantile; it 
was that part of the self which had become separated off from it in infancy, which 
had not shared the later stages of its development, and which had in consequence 
become repressed.’76 Freud proposes an evil, infantile self, separated and repressed 
in infancy. In ‘Domini’, this infantile unconscious self returns as a monstrous double. 
When Domini, who has previously been Francesca's 'ideal companion', reappears 
after a year's absence, ‘to Francesca it seemed there was a terrifying change in him. 
He had grown, not as a boy grows – outstripping his clothes, shooting forth at neck 
and wrists, cracking his voice; he was not older by such frailties. He was incalculably 
older, he had a power far beyond the playmate, and a presence which she was 
learning to dread’.77  
The doubling of Francesca and Domini dramatises the Freudian uncanny. 
Domini is represented as Francesca’s unconscious ‘creation’ which has escaped her 
conscious control. The language of the description is significant. Phrases describing 
physical change such as ‘outstripping’ and ‘shooting forth at neck and wrists’ depict 
the fast-moving transitional qualities of adolescence, traditionally seen as the 
boundary between childhood and adulthood – the short phase in which a child 
becomes an adult. The ‘cracking’ or breaking of the voice reminds us that puberty is 
a time of rupture and irreversible change. Domini, however, does not change in a 
physical sense; he does not grow ‘as a boy grows’. Instead he develops in Francesca’s 
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mind, gaining ‘power’ and ‘presence’. Implicit in Domini’s adolescent growth is the 
idea of Francesca’s developing sexuality. Her witnessing of her mother’s sexual 
liaison in the summerhouse and the description of puberty above suggest her sexual 
awareness. Psychoanalysis might argue that Francesca’s aggressive behaviour is the 
result of her thwarted unconscious desire for sexual intimacy with her mother, and 
that Domini represents the uncontainable growth of Francesca’s repressed sexuality. 
In this case, Francesca is driven by her unconscious desires and is not responsible for 
her actions. 
 ‘Domini’ turns on and problematises the question of Francesca’s innocence. 
Looking back, Francesca questions the concept: ‘“Innocent?” said Francesca to me. 
“In the ways of the world, perhaps, or I would have guessed that my mother and her 
lover were still in the summerhouse. And even there,” she unfolded one blue and 
white hand from the other, “it is only ignorance given a softer name. Could I say I was 
possessed?”’
78
 The ‘unfolding’ of the hands and the question itself invite the reader 
to consider what is meant by innocence. But Francesca’s speech confuses the 
different meanings of the term. Francesca’s sexual innocence, her innocence ‘in the 
ways of the world’, is imbricated with her legal innocence, the question of whether 
or not she knew her mother was in the summerhouse or, in other words, if her 
actions were deliberate or accidental. Thus knowledge and sexual knowledge cannot 
be separated. Francesca’s question about possession further complicates the idea of 
her innocence. The question is surely intended to be sarcastic, especially because 
‘Domini’ parodies elements of the gothic ghost story, a genre that features ‘actual’ 
possession.  
Francesca’s legal innocence might be supported by the idea that children 
have an innate lack of knowledge. This originates from Locke’s sense of the 
inexperienced mind as ‘white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas’.
79
 As 
discussed in chapter one, in Locke’s formulation children are fundamentally lacking: 
in experience, awareness, intention and motivation. The argument might be, then, 
that children have no agency because they have not had enough experience to know 
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the implications of their actions. Certainly, in ‘Domini’, Francesca acts without 
knowing why: 'Why was it, when the dresses were all piled and ready, that Francesca 
suddenly lost sight not of what she intended to do, but of her reason for doing it?'80 
Perhaps we can argue that Francesca is possessed in the sense that she is not fully 
responsible for her actions? The ironic tone of Barker’s narrative resists any such 
conclusions. ‘Domini’ suggests that adults are so keen to see children as innocent 
that we would sooner believe a child to be schizophrenic, or even possessed by 
supernatural forces, than face up to the idea that a child might intentionally commit 
an act of violence. For Barker, the ‘innocent child’ conceals and simplifies a complex 
being, revealing more about adult desires than anything concerning children 
themselves. 
The question of Francesca's innocence is bound up with what she knows; and 
knowledge is not easy to judge, especially the knowledge of children, Barker 
suggests. When Domini is described as ‘incalculably older’ this implies that he is an 
unknown quantity and, by extension, that Francesca is too. The use of organic 
imagery in the same description calls to mind the metaphor of the 'close green bud' 
and, in doing so, puts emphasis on the unknowability of the child. Barker’s insistence 
on the child’s ambiguity may explain the numerous allusions in ‘Domini’ to Henry 
James’s The Turn of the Screw. I noted previously that in James’s novella the 
Governess is fixated on finding out the ‘truth’ about the (sexual) 
knowledge/innocence of the children in her care but that the text continually resists 
her, and the reader’s, attempts to find out ‘the truth’ about Miles and Flora. The 
obsessive desire to know what others know is what Freud calls the ‘epistemophilic 
instinct’ or ‘the sexual instinct of […] knowing’.81 Like The Turn of the Screw, Barker’s 
story stages the epistemophilic instinct, concentrating on what Francesca knows and 
by implication on what ‘the child’ knows. And, again like James’s novella, ‘Domini’ 
makes salient the idea that Francesca (like Miles and Flora) will never be ‘known’ but 
will remain ambiguous – a ‘close green bud’, at once familiar and strange, ‘other’ 
even to the adult she becomes.  
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The question of Francesca’s innocence or guilt is never resolved. It is 
significant that, at seven years old, she is on the cusp of the age of criminal 
responsibility. ‘Domini’ is set in the 1880s, before the age of criminal responsibility 
was raised to eight in 1933, but it is written in 1949.
82 This adds to the uncertainty 
over whether Francesca's childish irresponsibility was accepted as an extenuation of 
her crime. The same motif appears again and again in Barker's early writing: the child 
figure who, like Francesca, may be responsible for a crime but is never held to 
account because of adults’ misguided sense of children as 'innocent', which, after all, 
is only 'ignorance given a softer name.' We might expect ideas about criminal 
responsibility to be particularly significant in the late 1940s because of the crimes 
committed across Europe during the Second World War. However, as Lyndsey 
Stonebridge argues, although there was a recognition of general violence and 
barbarism in mid-century culture, the Nazi genocide against the Jewish people was 
not explicitly acknowledged in popular 1940s consciousness, and questions of 
responsibility and guilt were evaded. The moral panic about youth, in which concern 
about juvenile delinquency and criminal children intensifies, appears to be part of 
this evasion: ‘By the late 1940s and early 1950s’, writes Stonebridge, ‘the lawlessness 
of youth had become a metaphor for the largely unacknowledged lawlessness of the 
war that had just passed.’
83
 Why this concern about lawlessness and immorality is 
focused on children rather than on adults is a key question. It is as if the guilt and fear 
prompted by the war and by knowledge of war crimes is displaced onto the figure of 
the child. Child psychology during and after the war was in part an attempt to 
understand the violence of the twentieth century. But because psychoanalysis 
figures the aggressive, uncontrolled unconscious as infantile there is a sense in which 
the child is not only the origin of violent phantasies but of actual violence and ‘evil’.   
‘Domini’ represents the ambiguity of the child, staging the conflict between 
experience and innocence, what is known and unknown, and revealed and 
concealed. Freud is credited with dispelling the myth of childhood sexual innocence. 
His oeuvre shows that children are sexual, aggressive and far more complex than 
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adults had assumed (and still do assume). However, Freud’s writing makes 
assumptions about the knowability of the child: the complexity of the child may be 
observed and explained, the psychology of children may be ‘known’. In ‘Little Hans’ 
he suggests that the ‘first hand’ child is more easily accessible than the historic child 
figure. Freud’s description of observing the child ‘in all the freshness of life’ recalls 
the metaphor of the ‘close green bud’ and suggests that, for Freud, the child, like the 
bud, will open to reveal ‘truths’ about human psychology. ‘Domini’ resists the idea 
that the nature and motivations of the child may be so easily understood. The story 
shows how adults read in the child what they want to see. Freud’s ‘first-hand’ child 
is still mediated through the adult. The observer and the analyst do not simply 
‘observe’, they interpret and thus construct the child according to their own 
prejudices and desires. What the child knows, ‘Domini’ suggests, is something adults 
cannot ever really discover. 
In her book The Child in Question (1998), Diana Gittins observes that: ‘we have 
all been a child and we all therefore have a sense of having been something we no 
longer feel we are. At an individual level the child is thus always Other’.84 As the child 
each individual once was is other, so the category of ‘child’ is other to the category 
of ‘adult’. This sense of the child as other rests on the adult ‘having been something’ 
or, in other words, rests on the child as a figure of the past. Earlier I argued that the 
child of Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’ was taken up by the Victorians, who figured childhood 
as a stage of life long since lost, and that the writing of Dickens, among others, 
participated in ‘fixing’ the Victorian Romantic child as a figure associated with the 
past. Carolyn Steedman points out the importance of the role of Freudian 
psychoanalysis in developing this association by ‘summarizing and reformulating a 
great many nineteenth-century articulations of the idea that the core of an 
individual’s psychic identity was his or her own lost past, or childhood’.85 Freud’s 
theory of the unconscious, she suggests, allows us to understand how adult concerns, 
desires and fears are projected onto children. Steedman also notes that childhood is 
a symbol of our individual and collective past, which ‘grows up, and goes away, yet 
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also remains to haunt the present.’86 It is the doubling effect of this absence and 
presence that interests Barker, as well as a sense of the uncanny as a combination of 
the familiar and the unfamiliar. 
The way in which adult identity is constructed in relation to the child as ‘other’ 
is explored in ‘Domini’ through the doubling of Francesca the child and Francesca the 
old woman.87 The sense of old Francesca’s childhood as a ‘lost past’ is created by 
gothic elements in the story such as the historical setting and the framed narrative, 
where old Francesca relates the tale to an anonymous narrator who then tells it to 
us. The story is set in ‘1885, the year of Gordon’s death at Khartoum’ and old 
Francesca’s tale, states the narrator, ‘sounded remote as she told it; one could not 
feel about it any more than about the extremities of a fairy tale’.88 This figuring of 
her childhood as ‘remote’, like a fairy tale or the story of the death of some historical 
figure, allows old Francesca to distance herself from her childhood self. By staging 
the doubling of child Francesca and Domini, ‘Domini’ suggests that Francesca’s desire 
for and aggressive impulses towards her mother are projected onto her imaginary 
‘creation’, but also places this interpretation in doubt. Unable to overcome this 
ambiguity and to consign her childhood to the past, old Francesca figures her 
childhood self as other. The narrator states: 'She does not smile glibly at the sight of 
children. She watches them, her thoughts go deep and, if she is not roused, grow 
fathomless.'89 Francesca's child-watching, in which her attempts at self-
understanding become 'lost' in a bottomless void, is accompanied, as we have seen, 
by her repeated statements concerning the portrayal of the children as innocent. It 
is in this sense that Francesca is possessed; she is haunted by the actions of the child 
she once was – a child that is figured both as other and as a core part of her adult 
identity. There is a sense of looking back at the actions of herself as a child and not 
being able to claim them as hers; they become instead the actions of a being that is 
‘not-her’, an ‘other’. ‘Domini’’s dramatisation of the Freudian doublings between 
Francesca and Domini and old Francesca and child Francesca draw on, but also 
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problematise, ideas about the processes by which parts of the self are split off and 
separated, and about the ways in which these parts linger and persist. 
Despite the paradoxical and ambiguous status of the child there exists, as 
sociologist Chris Jenks observes, ‘a widespread tendency to routinize and ‘naturalize’ 
childhood, both in common sense and in theory, [which] serves to conceal its analytic 
importance behind a cloak of the mundane; its significance and ‘strangeness’ as a 
social phenomenon is obscured’.90 Using striking imagery, Steedman considers why 
the strangeness of the child is concealed in this way. She argues: ‘the strangest 
dislocation of them all… is that children are the bloody fragments of another body, 
little parcels of flesh and bone split off from another… [and] we are nervous when 
this aspect of our existence is articulated or explored.’91 In other words, we do not 
like to think about the strangeness of the child; it is something that we fear, and like 
other things we fear – the wild, the mad – we have set the child apart as ‘special, 
different, Other’.92  
In 1984, Barker read two stories and gave a talk to a group of creative writers 
at the Arvon Foundation. The following extract, quoted here at greater length than 
before, echoes the sense we get in Barker’s fiction of the child as ‘other’ to adult 
identity, an uncanny figure that lingers and persists: 
 
[T]here’s a theory that each writer has but one basic theme. Which 
he does over, and re-shapes, and re-submits and twists around – 
and tries to get away from – again and again in his work. I think 
it’s true in my case. […]  
  But you don’t choose. Not that, or any theme. At least I didn’t. 
Not deliberately, not consciously. The theme, whatever it is, 
chooses you. It creeps up on you, it’s there beside you, inside you 
[…]93 
 
Relationships between experience and innocence, adult and child, Barker states, 
must be done over, re-shaped, re-submitted and twisted around ‘again and again’. 
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Her writing of the child, I would argue, is therefore compulsive - it is uncontrollable 
and also, she insists, involuntary. Though she may try to get away from it, Barker’s 
theme (the theme of innocence and experience and the figure of the child) pursues 
her and, at the same time, in a characteristically uncanny turn of phrase, is also 
already ‘there […] inside’. Questions of possession, therefore, appear to apply as 
much to Barker herself as to Francesca in ‘Domini’. In Spectres of Marx (1993), 
Jacques Derrida extends Freud’s notion of the uncanny, arguing that it involves the 
sense of ‘a stranger who is already found within […] more intimate with one than one 
is with oneself, the absolute proximity of a stranger’.94 This description of intimacy 
with and proximity to a ‘stranger who is […] found within’ is strikingly similar to 
Barker’s way of thinking about children and the process involved in her writing of 
them. For Barker the child is both 'closed' (a stranger, a figure against which we 
define ourselves) and 'close' (an uncanny presence within, with which we are 
intimate). Perceiving the child as other involves seeing ourselves as strange and 
unfamiliar. The figure of the child is so compelling because of its undecidability: it is 
both ourselves and not ourselves; a symbol of something lost and past but also of the 
future. For Barker, the child is an unstable and ambiguous figure belonging to past, 
present and future. Barker writes the figure of the child again and again precisely 
because childhood cannot be pinned down, split off or consigned to the past.  
 
IV. The Gooseboy 
Barker’s description in her Arvon talk of being pursued and haunted by the theme of 
childhood innocence and experience prompted my choice of The Gooseboy as the 
subject of this final section. Whilst Barker’s preoccupation with the child marks her 
out as an author who started writing at mid-century, the majority of her books were 
published between 1971 and 1999, and she re-explores her favourite theme in many 
of them, including The Gooseboy. The novel’s titular character, the ‘oieboy’ is a lad 
of about sixteen who looks after a herd of Toulouse geese in return for his bed and 
board at a remote, dilapidated Provencal villa owned by a reclusive film star, Douglas 
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Bysshe (stage name, Rex Snowdon). The oieboy is partially deaf, mute, and has severe 
injuries to the left-hand side of his face. This ‘double’ face, one half ‘perfect’ and 
‘pure’, the other ‘crippled’ and ‘raw’, is the centre around which the novel turns.95 
As well as being a fascinating example of the way in which Barker’s fiction is haunted 
by the child, The Gooseboy stages quite literally in the oieboy’s double-face the ideas 
of the ambiguity and strangeness of the child I have been exploring in the thesis so 
far. 
Without an origin, living in a semi-wild state, and with limited communication 
skills, the oieboy evokes the figure of the wild or nature child. His physical injuries, 
which appear to have been inflicted by man, recall those of the ‘wild boy of Aveyron’, 
a mute child with a large scar on his neck found in the south of France in the late 
eighteenth century. The French setting also makes salient the novel’s evocation of 
the ideas in Rousseau’s Emile, which I discussed earlier. The ‘oieboy’ (bird/boy) is an 
example of a not-child: a child who does not conform to the ideal of childhood, and 
is perhaps not even wholly ‘human’. The adult attempts in the novel to make sense 
of the oieboy (he is voiceless so cannot ‘explain’ himself) stage the adult construction 
of childhood I have been discussing. The boy’s divided face represents the divided 
nature of the symbol of the child, a figure burdened with a huge variety of meanings. 
The oieboy embodies the contradictions that characterise the child and, like this 
figure, he is constantly under scrutiny from the adults in the novel: what does his face 
‘mean’? What is his origin? What has been done to him? What does he know? No 
fewer than six adult encounters with the oieboy’s face are described, and the novel 
makes it clear that the adults are to be judged by their reaction to the boy. 
The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ coexists in the oieboy’s double face.96 Bysshe and his 
twin sister, Dulcie observe the oieboy in the most detail. Both note the ageless, 
lifeless quality of the left-hand side of the boy’s face. For Dulcie, ‘the left side, was 
no age. It was no face. Just a piece of raw meat like the meat on butchers’ hooks, 
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purple over the bone and dried up’.97 Bysshe, too, observes the dried up quality of 
the left-hand side of the face: ‘[It] had been denaturized. What served as flesh was 
the colour of raw meat, an old rawness in which the blood had darkened and the 
living tissue had dried hard and rigid as wood.’98 The language of the siblings’ 
descriptions signals the ways in which the oieboy’s face is strange to them: it has an 
unnatural, inhuman quality, rawness combined with rigidity, both reminiscent of 
death. What is worse, though, is that these signs of mortality appear on the face of a 
child, and we are constantly reminded that he is a child by his title, ‘oieboy’. For both 
it is the juxtaposition between the two sides of the boy’s face that is at once 
disturbing and compelling. ‘[T]he two halves together really shook me’, Dulcie 
remembers. She observes that the injuries ‘stopped on a line from his forehead to 
his chin; no merging, no blending, one skin-cell dead and rotten, the next one to it 
living and sweating’.99 This is the crucial point: dead and rotten things have no place 
next to a living, sweating child, the combination is strange and unsettling. Dulcie 
concedes that contrasting the living and dead, good and bad ‘is the sort of thing 
Nature does all the time’ and decides that God allows it ‘to keep our ends in sight, so 
we remember where we come from as well as where we hope to go’, again 
connecting the child and origins.100 The doubleness of the oieboy’s face is what Dulcie 
finds particularly disturbing and, I argue, what others who have studied the child also 
find problematic. They want the child to be one or the other, good or bad, innocent 
or corrupt – but not both at the same time. 
Dulcie’s response chimes with the reactions of other adults in the sense that 
she feels that the oieboy’s face cannot be arbitrary, it must mean something. For 
Dulcie, it signals the divided nature of human beings, her language evoking the notion 
of original sin. The theme is reinforced by the figuring of the land around Bysshe’s 
house as a Garden of Eden (a place associated with lost childhood). Within this 
biblical landscape the oieboy is described as both angel and devil. In the following 
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extract he arrives carrying dead roses, evoking Caliban’s entrance carrying wood in 
William Shakespeare’s The Tempest (c.1610): 
 
The oieboy had come into the yard, his arms full of brown roses. He 
carried them carefully, his head bowed, solicitous, even tender. […] 
  Bysshe went to the window and whistled. The boy put up his face to 
the sky. Bysshe whistled again, a short blast such as he might use to 
alert an accomplice or summon an animal. The boy threw down the 
roses and came to the window. His jeans were soiled and too big for 
him, so that his body could be seen moving with grace inside the 
bloated cotton. For grace of movement he could be relied upon, and 
the sun, doing its bit, shot to blazes every wire-gold hair on his head.101 
 
The oieboy’s response to Bysshe’s whistles, his obedient manner, and his soiled and 
overlarge clothes encourage a reading of him as a ‘devilish’ primitive or savage. The 
Caliban connection suggests that the oieboy is base and animalistic, as do the 
frequent comparisons made between him and various animals or primitives, which I 
discuss later. However, the description in the extract above of the sun shining 
through the oieboy’s hair suggests something entirely different. The boy appears as 
an angel figure, with the light illuminating his head like a halo (‘wire-gold hair’). 
Furthermore, the oieboy’s ‘grace’ is emphasised and the suggestion is that this is a 
moral as well as a physical state. Elsewhere, Bysshe describes the boy’s face as an 
omen: ‘when he remembered it […] He had glimpses like flashes from a nerve end. 
As if he was being warned about something that was going to happen, or had 
happened, or ought to be stopped.’102  
I suggested earlier that Barker’s writing may be read as a response to, and a 
reaction against, the idea that some kind of ‘truth’ about human nature is located in 
the body of the child. These various figurings of the oieboy draw attention to the idea 
that, like the oieboy’s face, the child cannot be arbitrary and will offer up a meaning 
to adults who look hard enough. Child observation, and observation in general, are 
The Gooseboy’s main preoccupations. Earlier I discussed the objectification of the 
child subject in the study of childhood. In The Gooseboy, Barker’s preoccupation with 
discourses of child study is suggested through the novel’s comparison between the 
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oieboy and the eighteenth-century figure, Victor the ‘wild boy of Aveyron’. Michael 
Newton argues that the figure of the ‘wild child’ or ‘feral child’ has long fascinated 
those interested in what it means to be human: ‘These children raise the deepest and 
most insoluble of questions: what is human nature? Does such a thing exist? How do 
we differ from other animals? Where does our identity come from? And the 
inevitable silence of these children provokes a further mystery: what part does 
language play in creating our humanity?’103 Victor’s discovery addressed some of 
these questions. It also undermined Rousseau’s theory that the child, like the 
primitive or savage, lives within itself in harmony with nature and independently 
from society. Living in isolation, Victor had not developed in a way that was 
recognised as being human.104 This reinforced the argument that isolation was not 
desirable because society was necessary in the production of ‘humans’.105 
As well as raising questions about ‘what it means to be human’, wild children 
also provoke misunderstanding, violence and exploitation. In The Gooseboy, Dulcie’s 
husband, Pike compares the oieboy to ‘a wild animal’, reporting that the boy tried to 
get into his car but was ‘pulled […] out by the scruff of his neck’ and ‘was foaming at 
the mouth’.106 Pike’s reaction to the oieboy recalls the reaction to Victor, who had to 
contend with being chased, captured, shipped away from home, and displayed and 
examined.107 Barker’s novel draws on nineteenth-century ideas of wild children as 
‘savages’, making a link through the allusion to Caliban between the study of ‘wild’ 
children and the study of native peoples. The Gooseboy’s evocation of ideas of wild 
children as animals and the savagery of native peoples suggests the novel’s concern 
with the psychological and physical damage inflicted upon the objectified 
‘specimens’ of scientific, anthropological and psychological study. Through its 
characterisation of the American press team, Hilda Latouche and Nat Twoomey, 
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Barker’s novel relates this to the objectification and commercialisation of the child in 
popular culture.   
When Latouche and Twoomey, a journalist and a press photographer 
respectively, encounter the oieboy they want to narrate, explain, record, capture and 
display him in various ways. They question Bysshe about the oieboy: ‘How did he get 
that way?’ ‘I don’t know,’ said Bysshe. ‘Someone surely screwed him up.’ Hilda was 
taking notice. Those fine nostrils of hers were picking up a scent.108 Hilda, the 
journalist, follows the scent, constructing a sensational narrative to ‘explain’ the 
oieboy’s condition which involves him coming from ‘a remote mountain village’ with 
an old custom of human sacrifice, ‘to make a scapegoat carry their sins away. So they 
can start again with nice clean souls’: 
 
So he’s picked – a virgin child – to absolve the sins of his elders. They 
set fire to him and chase him away. After that his mind goes blank. 
Naturally.’  
    ‘And he’s never spoken since. It figures,’ said Twoomey. 
    ‘He’s all locked up. There’s dynamite inside him. One day he’ll break 
out and make mayhem. Have you thought about that?’ 
    Twoomey told Bysshe, ‘You’d be responsible.’  
    ‘He ought to be restrained. Does anyone know he’s here?’109 
 
The extract contains some of the worst stereotypical and sensational Western myths 
about ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ people. It also features an example of popularised 
psychoanalytic ideas: a traumatised child ‘goes blank’ and mute as a result of the 
trauma that is still contained within him, ‘locked up’ inside him like a bomb ticking 
down, ready to explode. The oieboy contains the secret of what has been done to 
him. Hilda insists: ‘He’s blocked. Someone should take him in hand, show him how 
to face up to himself.’110 The idea that the oieboy must ‘face up to’ or confront 
himself is again a popularised interpretation of psychoanalytic ideas. Note that it is 
Hilda, the journalist who adheres to this simplified, popularised version of 
psychoanalysis. Her reading of the oieboy constructs him as a mythical, primitive 
savage from a remote place like a child in a fairy tale. The oieboy, part child, part 
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savage, will be a spectacle whose imagined story incorporates the most popular 
narratives of childhood, often told in sensational media stories: the abused and 
disfigured child, the wolf child, the savage child, the Freudian sexual child, the 
traumatised child. All of these stories and myths of childhood draw attention to the 
myth of ‘the child’ in twentieth century society and culture. 
Twoomey, the photographer, wants to narrate the ‘Warboy’ (he can’t 
pronounce ‘oieboy’) and capture his face. His compulsive photography of the boy 
raises questions about the objectification of the child. Twoomey emphasises the 
monetary values of his photographs. He won’t need to sell the photos of the oieboy 
because, he anticipates, they will prove so fascinating to people that they will sell 
themselves: ‘They’re terrific. […] It’s best when he smiles, because then it’s worse. 
[…] I turned my hat upside down and fooled about to make him laugh and it was like 
a horror movie. I got every bit of that boy’s war.’111 The novel emphasises Twoomey’s 
intended exploitation of the oieboy as a curiosity, a child with a face from a ‘horror 
movie’, a boy who brings to mind stories from the bible and of war, who appears to 
represent a basic, popular, highly commercial narrative that will sell itself.112 Bysshe 
is concerned by both Twoomey’s and Hilda’s exploitation of the oieboy, worried by 
‘[t]he thought that [they are] planning to use the boy, make him into a freak show’: 
   
    ‘How would I do that?’ 
    ‘Simply by writing about him. Making people aware of his existence.’ 
    ‘He’s at least as remarkable as the white rhino. A lot of people will 
want to remark on him.’ 
    ‘Conservationists?’ suggested Twoomey. 
    ‘Psychophysicists, psychobiologists, physiognomists. Anyone who 
thinks your fate is in your face is going to be interested in his split 
level.’ 
    ‘He ought to be seen,’ said Twoomey.113 
 
The comparison of the oieboy with a white rhino and Twoomey’s mention of 
conservationists foregrounds the connection between the oieboy and the ‘primitive’, 
implied by the comparison to Caliban I noted earlier. Bysshe’s worry about the oieboy 
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becoming ‘a freak show’ and Hilda’s list of scientific disciplines recalls the treatment 
of not only of wild children but of native peoples. Individuals from both of these 
groups were often taken from their homes in order to be displayed to and studied by 
scientific institutions and, in the Victorian period especially, featured in freak 
shows.114 The Gooseboy is preoccupied with the fine line between sensationalism 
and scientific observation and display, not only in the Victorian period but in the 
twentieth century too.  
Twoomey not only wants to ‘record’ the oieboy’s face, he wants to construct 
his portrait. He states: ‘I’m a photo-journalist, I make pictures to tell how it is.’115 It is 
significant that, although Twoomey says his pictures ‘tell how it is’, he has already 
make a distinction between the act of taking the picture and the construction of the 
portrait: ‘I’ll take his picture – make his portrait.’116 For Twoomey, the photograph 
can reveal more than the original, and it captures something more through the 
participation of the person behind the lens. The photograph’s main aim, then, is not 
to objectively ‘record’ the oieboy but to construct him. Twoomey decides to create a 
‘perfect’ version of the oieboy’s face. He describes the process by which he created 
this ideal image: 
 
‘I took Warboy en face, in full sun, though I didn’t get both sides as 
evenly lit as I’d like. I processed the film, then printed the good side 
with the other side covered. Reversed the negative, and using a red 
filter on the enlarger arranged the negative to fit the other half, 
removed the red filter, printed the other half – holding back the side 
already exposed and then developed the complete print.’117 
 
The foregrounding here of the complexities involved in producing the image of this 
‘perfect’ child connects the creation of the child in photography with the 
construction of the child in scientific discourse. It is worth noting the historical links 
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between photography (and later cinema) and the child, explored by Vicky Lebeau in 
her book Childhood and Cinema.118 Just as neither journalism nor photography can 
make claims to objectivity, historical constructions of the child are not objective but 
deliver the idea of childhood that is necessary to a particular historical moment. 
When Bysshe is shown Twoomey’s photograph of the ‘good half’ of the 
oieboy’s face he doesn’t recognise him: 
 
It was a monochrome, head and shoulders of a virtual stranger. Bysshe 
could detect a teasing resemblance to someone often seen but not 
known. It made him realise how little he relied on the good half of the 
oieboy’s face. It had always been so composed, untouched by 
emotion, blush and sweat. The photograph gave the impression of a 
stone face, a funerary angel’s, without a granule of personality and just 
enough life to open the eyes but not to blink them. 
    ‘Classy,’ said Hilda. 
    ‘It’s all wrong.’ 
    Twoomey bridled. ‘How can it be wrong when it’s all right?’ 
    ‘It’s not him.’119 
 
The face is wrong because it is a copy produced by Twoomey which erases the 
oieboy’s individuality and personality in favour of perfection. Bysshe’s comparison of 
the ‘stone face’ of the oieboy without his ‘bad’ half to a ‘funerary angel’ recalls the 
connection I noted in chapter one between the Victorian fixing of the child as 
‘innocent’ and child death. This perfect child is not the ‘real’ oieboy whom Bysshe 
knows, it is an idea of him constructed by an adult, just as the conception of ‘the 
child’ is always constructed by adults. But this perfect child – with ‘two good sides 
and no gothic’120 – from which any trace of imperfection has been erased is, as Bysshe 
points out, ‘all wrong’. The photograph of the oieboy is ‘wrong’ not only because it 
doesn’t look like him, but also because it is an image that carries a trace of the 
violence that adults do to the idea of childhood by being unable to tolerate its 
ambiguity and always desiring to ‘fix’ it.  
Twoomey’s photograph, like child-study, tries to ‘know’ the child, to expose 
its mysterious secrets. But the ‘good’ half of the oieboy’s face was never the part by 
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which he could be known. Bysshe notes that it was always ‘so composed, untouched 
by emotion’ that he never relied on it to try to understand what the oieboy was 
thinking. Bysshe concedes that in any case he was never able to ‘know’ the oieboy: 
the boy is ‘someone often seen but not known’. Bysshe’s sense of the oieboy as 
unknown recalls the image of the child discussed the first two sections of the chapter: 
a child both familiar and uncanny, close and closed. As suggested earlier, the oieboy’s 
face acts as a centre for the novel around which ideas and action are constructed and 
framed. People cannot help looking at his face and looking for meaning in it. They are 
drawn to him, they want to know why and how he came to be, where he is from. 
They want to explain him, write his backstory, and make a spectacle out of him. The 
novel’s silence regarding the oieboy provokes this desire in the reader to ‘know’ the 
boy, staging Freud’s ‘epistemophillic instinct’. In The Gooseboy, people’s desire to 
know the oieboy is converted to a desire to look at and touch him, giving him a kind 
of power. Bysshe’s attraction to the oieboy is hinted by his ‘longing’ to touch the 
boy’s face: ‘to break and relieve the stricture of the boy’s cheek’.121 And when Dulcie 
visits Bysshe’s villa and encounters the oieboy, they kiss.122 Perhaps, though, the 
objectification of the oieboy undermines his power? After all, we never see things 
from his perspective, he has no name, and he never speaks. It is thus very difficult 
not to objectify him as ‘the oieboy’.  
I argue that it is the oieboy’s refusal to be known that gives him his power. 
The oieboy, Bysshe asserts, is ‘an unknown quantity, totally unpredictable. I never 
know what he’s thinking or what he will do when he’s upset’.123 What the oieboy 
does in response to Twoomey’s idealised photograph of him is to destroy the 
apparatus that created the image. Wanting revenge, Twoomey goes in search of the 
oieboy, pursued by Bysshe, and they discover the boy in his grotto, gazing into the 
mirror, wearing Twoomey’s hat: ‘He removed it, and holding it in both hands lowered 
it slowly on to his head. […] The boy adjusted the hat, tilting and tipping it ever lower. 
When he turned to face them, the brim was pulled down over his right side and raked 
high over the left. His calcined cheek twitched in the spasm which served him for a 
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smile.’124 The oieboy uses Twoomey’s hat to cover up the ‘good’ side of his face, 
leaving nothing visible but the ‘bad’ side, reversing the process that Twoomy used to 
make his ‘perfect’ photograph of the boy. The image of the oieboy with which we are 
left, his smiling admiration of the side of his face that is imperfect but which is 
unmistakeably him, is an image that resists the objectifying gaze of the adults and 
their desire to ‘know’ him once and for all. 
This chapter has attempted to explore some ways in which the body and mind 
of the child have been studied, classified and objectified by anthropology, psychology 
and psychoanalysis, and ways in which the child has been figured as a point of origin 
from which to understand human thought and behaviour. Going back to Riley’s text 
we find that: 'The child appears to present a life caught at its start in an unmuddied 
form, a pure object for study'.125 The key word here is appears because, as I have 
tried to argue, Barker's writing undermines the child/primitive parallel and the rigid 
oppositions between savage and civilized and innocence and experience that go with 
it. Gittins argues that in the twentieth century there was a shift ‘to a universal image 
of the child and a universal idea of a childhood – myths that eradicated difference, 
[and] denied history’.126 Barker’s fiction registers the dangers of this kind of 
universalization. Her writing suggests that adult attitudes towards the child are 
problematic, questions the assumptions of child-study, and insists that ‘the child’ is 
strange, complex and unknowable rather than ‘fresh’, ‘unmuddied’ and ‘pure’. 
Barker's obsessive writing and rewriting of the child in her early short fiction should 
therefore be seen as both reflecting and resisting anxious mid-twentieth-century 
attempts to possess and pin down the child, attempts which have persisted, and 
arguably intensified, through the latter half of that century and into our own. For 
Barker, the child is a contradictory and ambiguous figure that unsettles the stability 
of adult identity. Her writing explores the many different ways in which the figure of 
the child may be seen as unstable, unknowable and uncanny.  
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Chapter Three 
(Dis)articulations: Language, Power and ‘Age inversion’ 
in Barker’s Articulated Fiction of the 1960s 
 
    […] ‘everything has to connect. The knee-bone connecting to the 
thigh-bone, the thigh-bone connecting to the hip-bone, the hip-bone 
connected to the backbone. […]’ 
    ‘I don’t know what you mean.’ A.L. Barker, The Middling1 
 
An ‘articulated novel’ is the name given by Barker to a book that contains several 
linked short stories or novella that may feature the same characters, themes and 
events. This chapter argues that paying close attention to the different meanings of 
‘articulated’ allows for a deeper understanding of Barker’s 1960s fiction and her 
oeuvre as a whole. I begin by examining the twelve-year gap in Barker’s publication 
history between the collection containing ‘Domini’, Novelette: With Other Stories 
(1951) and her articulated novel, The Joy-Ride and After (1963).2 Following the 
commercial failure of her first novel, Apology for a Hero (1950) Barker appeared to 
withdraw from the literary scene; she did not publish, she received no reviews, and 
she stopped going to literary parties. Although Barker struggled in the 1950s under 
the twin pressures of lack of confidence in her writing and full-time work, she never 
stopped writing. In fact, she used the decade to develop a new kind of book, an 
articulated novel, which is different from both a short story collection and a novel. In 
its articulated form this new kind of text stages ideas of attachment and separation 
in adult and child relationships. These had preoccupied Barker since the late 1940s, 
when she was writing Apology for a Hero. 
The sections that follow argue that Barker’s 1960s fiction extends and 
develops the preoccupations of Apology for a Hero by making a connection between 
adult-child relationships in families and communities, relationships between colonial 
powers and subjects, and those between state and citizens. The prominence of the 
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language of articulation in The Joy-Ride and After and The Middling draws attention 
to the structural nature of human relationships in families and communities and thus 
to the balance of power within these relationships. Adult-child relationships are 
represented as being particularly significant in the constitution of familial and social 
structures. I read these in the light of Howard Garfinkel’s theory of 
‘ethnomethodology’, which puts emphasis on the ways in which society is 
constructed from the bottom up rather than the top down, thus highlighting the 
importance of day-to-day exchanges to the construction of social reality. A central 
element of Garfinkel’s theory was conversation analysis. With this in mind I turn to 
John Mepham’s work on ‘bad talk’ in 1940s fiction, extending his analysis into the 
post-war period by showing the concern in Barker’s 1960s fiction with non-
cooperative verbal exchanges and inappropriate verbal articulations. In The Joy-Ride 
and After characters who exhibit these behaviours are unable to articulate in both 
senses of the word – connection and expression – and this inability is shown to be 
driven by the trauma and violence of legacies of the war and colonialism. The 
behaviour of these dis-articulated characters destabilises and disrupts the collective 
construction of social reality. Finally, I draw on Claudia Nelson’s notion of age 
inversion in the Victorian period, extending it into the twentieth century. The reversal 
of child and adult roles in The Joy-Ride and After not only suggests familial and social 
instability but also signals the novel’s ambivalence about the power relationship 
between the British state and its citizens and the success of the ideals of Welfarism 
in 1960s Britain.  
Although Barker did not use the term ‘articulated novel’ until February 1989 
in a letter to Richard Cohen, it can be applied retrospectively to both The Joy Ride 
and After and The Middling. The word ‘articulated’ is used in two senses according 
to the Oxford English Dictionary: the first relates to connection, the second to verbal 
expression. In relation to connection, articulated means structures ‘[c]omposed of 
segments that are linked or united by joints’ and vehicles that consist of ‘flexibly 
connected sections’ which can move as a whole; or, in a figurative sense, ‘composed 
of connected parts’.3 In relation to verbal expression, the word means: ‘uttered, 
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pronounced, or expressed distinctly’ and carries an additional connotation, with the 
adjective ‘articulate’, of a person who can speak coherently.4 The term therefore 
conveys a sense of a functioning structure: separate articulated parts move as one; 
language articulated correctly may be understood. Barker’s use of articulated in her 
1989 letter to Cohen about her novel, The Woman Who Talked to Herself (1989) 
utilises both of these meanings: ‘May I keep my subtitle: ‘An articulated novel’? I 
think it doubly significant in relation to this book, ie. the jointing – ‘composed of 
distinct parts’, and the reference to being ‘able to express one’s thoughts’ […] which 
is what Winnie A tries to do.’5 It is clear, then, that Barker saw the articulated 
structure of her book as directly related to its content, and that she is interested in 
both articulation and in- or dis-articulation. Indeed, Barker’s articulated fiction of the 
1960s is preoccupied with the ways in which familial, societal, linguistic, and narrative 
structures may be dysfunctional and incoherent. For Barker, articulation is as much 
about holding apart and separation as linking together and connection, and as much 
about misunderstanding and incoherence as it is about communication.  
 
I. Silence 
The first question is how do we account for the gap or ‘silence’ in Barker’s publication 
history between 1951 and 1963? During these years she worked in various secretarial 
and assistant roles at the BBC, first in the News Division then in the Talks 
Department.6 These positions are unlikely to have been taxing for someone with 
Barker’s intelligence and experience but the daily grind of a full day at work, plus at 
least an hour’s commute each way from Carshalton Beeches to Central London, 
would have been tiring. The writer of Barker’s obituary in The Telegraph asserts that 
‘while the BBC was often undemanding, Pat Barker found little inclination to write in 
the evenings. Her output between hard covers during the 1950s was small’.7 Barker 
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was not as inactive as The Telegraph suggests but it is true she published no books. 
Instead she wrote a radio play, Pringle for the BBC, and continued to sell her stories 
to magazines, with a bias towards commercial ‘women’s’ titles such as Good 
Housekeeping, Modern Woman and Woman and Beauty rather than more literary 
publications. Although she appears to have assured Nora Smallwood in late 1951 that 
she was planning to, as Smallwood puts it, ‘give the magazines a rest’, in the period 
1951-57 Barker published twelve stories, mostly in Good Housekeeping.8 The 1950s 
also saw a number of rejections of Barker’s fiction and she became increasingly 
frustrated by the requirements and limitations of the magazines in which her writing 
was published.9  
It is likely that financial hardship limited Barker’s book publications during the 
1950s. She had to work full-time to support herself and her roles at the BBC were not 
well paid. For example, a letter dated January 1958 regarding Barker’s transfer from 
the position of secretary to chief assistant states that her salary will rise from £5.7.8d 
to £10.8.0d per week. A further letter in July confirms her status as a member of 
permanent staff and a further salary rise to £10.14.6d per week. According to Richard 
Hoggart in The Uses of Literacy (1957), the average weekly wage at 1954 rates for the 
main earner in most working-class households was £10 per week.10 It is clear that 
even though Barker was a single woman without a family to support and presumably 
shared her living costs with her housemate, Dorothy, she was certainly not well-off. 
Financial concerns might have contributed to Barker’s frustration about the rejection 
of her stories. In the 1950s she received on average £15 for a short story and £35 for 
first British serial rights, meaning that the sale of her fiction to magazines provided a 
considerable boost to her income. Barker wanted to write short stories, and she 
wanted to have these stories published and earn an income from them. This perhaps 
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drew her towards writing for mainstream commercial publications, for which she 
wrote the correct form as long as she could keep to their restrictions, and away from 
the world of literary fiction, which admired her prose but wanted a novel.  
The argument that it was lack of time and energy and financial necessity that 
prevented Barker publishing any books between 1951 and 1963 has some support. 
Barker took a year off work when she won the Cheltenham Festival of Literature prize 
of £500 in November 1962, after which she published five books in six years. At the 
end of her novel, A Case Examined (1965) Barker wrote a note of thanks ‘To the 
ANONYMOUS DONOR of the Cheltenham Award’: 
 
Seventy per cent of writers never earn more than £500 a year from 
their writing, and many always earn less. They must work to live to 
write. If working and living use a minimum of twelve hours a day, that 
leaves them eight to sleep and four to write – or four to sleep and eight 
to write – in theory […] They may try to write on buses and in trains, 
standing, sitting, while the dinner cooks, before the shopbell rings, in 
any and every moment which can be got. […] Time to write in peace is 
what seventy per cent of writers want and do not get.11 
 
Barker’s focus here on lack of time and money suggests that we may have solved the 
mystery of her silence between 1951 and 1963. But it is not quite that simple. 
Although Barker clearly lacked both the means and the time ‘to write in peace’ during 
the 1950s, the archive shows that she had already completed both The Joy-Ride and 
After, and many of the stories for her collection, Lost Upon the Roundabouts (1964), 
by the time she received the Cheltenham prize.12 
Another tempting argument is that Barker’s silence may be explained by the 
unfavourable reaction to her first novel, Apology for a Hero. In this case, the silence 
could be viewed as a period in which Barker is developing her ‘articulated’ fiction as 
a way of writing books of short stories that resemble novels because she has lost 
confidence in her ability to write a novel but nevertheless wants to be published. A 
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case may be made for this reading. In a letter dated August 1948 John Wheelock, 
senior editor at Barker’s American publisher, Scribner’s, delivers a damning verdict 
on Apology for a Hero declaring that ‘[it] is not, in my opinion, a successful novel. […] 
I should almost recommend setting it aside and going on to something else. Whether 
this book could be made into a complete and artistic whole by drastic rewriting is a 
question difficult to answer’.13 Wheelock’s emphasis on the incompleteness of 
Apology for a Hero is significant and I will discuss it later. Here, though, the argument 
for Barker’s loss of confidence in her abilities as a novel-writer might rest its case, 
concluding with the observation that, although Smallwood, Leonard Woolf and John 
Hayward all hastily wrote to contradict Wheelock’s statement, and Wheelock himself 
apologised for being ‘overly severe’, the damage had been done and Barker did not 
publish another novel until 1963.14 
It is clear from the letters of Smallwood, Woolf, and Hayward that Barker’s 
confidence was dented by Wheelock’s verdict on Apology for a Hero. But the 
impression gained from other sources is that Barker was never particularly keen on 
novel-writing and only undertook it under advice from her publishers. For example, 
on 21st May 1947, only a few weeks before Innocents was published on 30th June, 
Smallwood writes: ‘We all feel so strongly about your work’, adding: ‘Now you must 
go ahead with the novel’. Smallwood writes again on 24th July: ‘I am still looking 
forward to seeing that novel’.15 At the time, short story collections were not as 
popular as novels and this is one reason why Barker’s publishers kept pushing for the 
latter. John Wheelock’s 1951 letter concerning Novelette: With Other Stories 
provides evidence for this point. He informs Barker that Scribner’s would like to 
change the order of the stories, with ‘Novelette’ first, in order ‘to present it less as a 
collection of short stories than as a novelette in which the stories that follow are 
extra dividends, as it were. In this way we ought to get wider distribution and partially 
overcome the resistance, still prevalent over here, to a collection of short stories’.16 
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Despite the resistance Barker continued to write short stories, and Smallwood 
appeared to understand her preference, writing: ‘I don’t blame you for wanting to 
stick to that form’.17 
Barker’s preference for the short story over the novel is well documented. In 
a letter to Jean Chaudhuri in 1983, for example, Barker writes that she cannot give a 
talk ‘about the difference between writing short stories and writing novels […] for 
the simple reason that I have not written any novels. Those of my books which have 
been published under the guise of novels have been short stories stretched, 
disguised, tarted up and otherwise corrupted to fill the publisher’s bill’.18 Jane 
Gardam’s account of Barker’s career supports this: ‘as she grew older, [novels] 
became more difficult and less satisfying to her. She took to sliding short stories into 
the novels by stealth, what she called ‘articulated stories’ embedded in a ribbon 
narrative. ‘What’s needed now is a novel,’ she was told and wrote back, ‘But is it? 
Oh, the burden of a novel. The enormity of narrative’’.19 Both accounts describe 
Barker slipping short stories and novellas concealed as novels under the nose of her 
publishers, revealing her ambivalence towards the novel form but also her awareness 
of the need to adapt her writing to resemble it. Perhaps her solution to the mismatch 
she perceived between the way she wanted to write and the novel was a form she 
later called the ‘articulated novel’? Another explanation of Barker’s long silence and 
change of formal style, then, is that the articulated novel is a form that Barker 
develops to allow her to write books of short stories that resemble novels. 
This interpretation doesn’t quite work either. First of all, because the form of 
the articulated novel is related to its content and, second, because it is a distinct 
form. The book to which Gardam refers is almost certainly The Woman Who Talked 
to Herself (1989). This is the only novel Barker ever referred to as being ‘articulated’ 
and it is one of her later books (Gardam puts emphasis on the lateness of Barker’s 
articulated fiction). However, in the letter to Cohen about The Woman Who Talked 
to Herself quoted earlier, Barker does not conceal the fact that the book contains 
short stories and makes it clear that in her mind the form of the book represents its 
                                                          
17 Smallwood, letter to Barker (undated, c. 1951), box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
18 Barker, draft response to Jean Chaudhuri’s letter, 22nd June 1983, box 9, folder 3, HRHRC. 
19 Gardam, ‘Introduction’, in Barker, Submerged, p. viii.  
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content: her subtitle, ‘An Articulated Novel’ is ‘doubly significant in relation to this 
book’, she writes.20 So Barker’s motivation for choosing this form is not to publish 
short stories ‘under the guise of novels’ or ‘by stealth’. Rather, the articulated form 
of The Woman Who Talked to Herself represents its theme of not being able to 
communicate or, in other words, inarticulacy. Barker writes to Cohen that Winnie A. 
‘tries’ to articulate her thoughts, suggesting that she does not succeed. A 
preoccupation with people’s inability to effectively communicate with one another 
may be seen in much of Barker’s fiction. For example, she states that her book, A 
Heavy Feather was ‘about the impossibility of communicating’, ‘that everyone was 
an island’, and that: ‘I was sealed off inside my skin and so was everyone else. One 
could only signal waving and drowning.’21 For Barker, people are fundamentally alone 
and separate, ‘sealed off’ from one another, and can never really know each other. 
The form of the articulated novel stages this idea of people as separate parts that are 
nevertheless attached to one another. This is one way in which the form of the 
articulated novel is related to the ideas of articulation, dis-articulation and in-
articulation within it.  
The distinctiveness of the articulated novel is a second obstacle to the idea 
that the form is simply a short story collection in the guise of a novel. An articulated 
novel has an interrelation between its different parts in the form of shared, returning 
characters and/or shared events seen from different perspectives, and not just in 
terms of shared themes or ideas. A short story collection may also have this, of 
course. The stories might have shared characters or events as well as themes and 
ideas, but this is not an essential characteristic of the genre. An articulated novel is 
also distinct from a novel, defined as an ‘extended piece of prose fiction’.22 The 
different parts of an articulated novel have a wholeness of their own, a completeness 
that is separate from that of the entire piece of work. So an articulated novel is 
composed of several pieces of prose fiction rather than being one extended piece. 
The different parts are attached but they are also separate and could stand alone 
                                                          
20 Barker, letter to Richard Cohen, 28th February 1989, box 5, folder 8, HRHRC. 
21 Barker, Life Stories, p. 14. 
22 J.A. Cuddon, ed., Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, Third Edition (London: Penguin, 
1992), p. 599. 
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without the rest of the book. This is not usually the case for a novel. It is worth noting, 
too, that contemporary opinion did not think that The Joy-Ride and After resembled 
a novel. For example, in his 1964 review of Barker’s book in The Saturday Review, the 
writer and literary critic, Granville Hicks writes that Barker’s novel ‘isn’t really a novel 
but a collection of three loosely related stories’.23 So rather than resembling a novel, 
or indeed a short story collection, Barker’s articulated novel is a distinct type of book 
with an articulated structure that replicates on the level of form the ideas of 
separation and attachment with which it is concerned.  
Barker’s silence between 1951 and 1963 should be read as a period in which 
she is rethinking the form of her fiction. The archive shows that she was planning 
another novel as early as 1951. In November Smallwood writes: ‘You couldn’t give us 
better news than to say that your heart has been really stirred to write a book’.24 By 
1953, though, no novel has materialised and Smallwood writes to ask if the one 
Barker was working on has been abandoned.25 So Barker was either writing the The 
Joy-Ride and After throughout the 1950s or at least thinking about her new novel. It 
is during this period that she rethinks the form of her fiction in order to better 
communicate the ideas of attachment and separation with which she was already 
preoccupied in the late 1940s when writing Apology for a Hero. From the beginning 
these ideas are connected to adult-child relationships. The concern in Apology for a 
Hero and in Barker’s 1960s fiction with adult and child being, on the one hand, 
cleaved, hinged and latched together and, on the other hand, cut, broken and 
wrenched apart, speaks to the focus on mother-infant relationships in mid-century 
psychoanalysis. Barker continues to be preoccupied with the idea of adult and child 
articulation in her 1960s fiction. The importance of the move to articulated novels is 
that these texts stage the interdependency of constructions of adult and child, and 
thus speak to Barker’s dialectical understanding of innocence and experience. Barker 
focuses on the ways in which children and adults are ‘matched’ with and ‘hinged to’ 
one another, as well as being apart from, misunderstanding, disliking, and hurting 
                                                          
23 Granville Hicks, ‘Literary Horizons: How the Poor Live and the Rich Die’, in The Saturday Review 
(online edition), 8th February 1964, pp. 29-30, p. 29, http://www.unz.org/Pub/SaturdayRev-
1964feb08-00029 [accessed 9th August 2015]. 
24 Smallwood, letter to Barker, 1st November 1951, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
25 Smallwood, letter to Barker, 4th June 1953, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
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each other. Adults and children are articulated: linked together and dependent, but 
also separate.  
In Apology for a Hero, ex-clerk, Charles Candy is figured as an adult child.26 
Charles is utterly dependent on his wife, Wynne; she calms him down and acts as 'the 
source and mainstay of his reality'.27 On their marriage she adopts the mother-role, 
calming Charles down after 'one of his frights'.28 While Wynne reassures Charles she 
makes their bed: 'He had followed her movements; all she said was maintained by 
the action of her fingers. As a small child, he once woke from a nightmare to find his 
mother making an apple-pie. She spoke kindly to him, but it was her hands, floury 
and quick among the pastry, which comforted him.'29 The emphasis in this passage 
on the reassurance the child figure gains from watching his mother (or, rather, parts 
of his mother) recalls the importance Freud and Klein placed on the infant-mother 
bond in the development of the infant’s ego through object relationships. Klein 
argues that the infant must reconcile its love and hatred of the mother in order to 
avoid psychosis (the ‘splitting’ of people or parts of people into all ‘good’ or all ‘bad’). 
Charles is unable to do this, remaining dependent on his idealisation of Wynne (and 
later on that of his house, Concleave) for his sense of self, and at the same time 
obsessively hating Wynne’s sister, Perry who comes to stay with the couple after her 
marriage breaks down. (The novel implies that Charles’s hatred of Perry is coupled 
with violent sexual attraction; Freud and Klein emphasise that the mother is the 
infant’s first erotic object.) Apology for a Hero ends with a case of mistaken identity. 
Wynne dies after falling from a cliff but Charles mistakes the body for Perry and 
delays getting help. The death occurs after Charles argues with Wynne over Perry, 
and is filled with anger and an ‘appetite for violence’.30 Afterwards Perry confronts 
Charles about his delay getting help: ‘you hated me […] Enough, perhaps, to let me 
drown – to let her drown’.31 Thus, Apology for a Hero foregrounds the aggressive 
                                                          
26 The name Charles Candy is perhaps an allusion to Powell and Pressburger’s film, The Life and 
Death of Colonel Blimp (1943). The colonel of the title is named Clive Candy, later Clive Wynne 
Candy, a man who grows older but remains a child. (My thanks to Charles Jones for pointing out the 
resemblance.) 
27 Barker, Apology for a Hero (London: The Hogarth Press, 1950), p. 14. 
28 Ibid, p. 15. 
29 Ibid, p. 16. 
30 Ibid., p. 96. 
31 Ibid., p. 145. 
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impulses of the child figure emphasised by Klein. Its doubling of Wynne and Perry 
stages Klein’s idea that the infant ‘splits’ the mother by representing Charles’s 
psychotic inability to overcome his idealisation of the ‘good’ mother, Wynne and his 
hatred of the ‘bad’ mother, Perry, and realise ‘that the loved object is at the same 
time the hated one’.32 In the end his violent impulses towards the ‘bad’ mother lead 
to the annihilation of the ‘good’ mother. 
The preoccupation in Apology for a Hero with ideas of attachment and 
separation in the development of mental structures anticipates the interest in the 
disarticulation of familial and social structures in Barker’s fiction of the 1960s, 
particularly The Joy-Ride and After. Apology for a Hero also anticipates the language 
of articulation that we find in Barker’s 1960s fiction. In the final chapter of the novel, 
after Wynne is dead, Charles sails away from the Cornish coast on the Albuquerque, 
the ship he co-owns with Perry, leaving Concleave behind: 
 
All its solid virtues were there; […] What kind of a man was he to 
exchange any part of it – the porch of Bath stone, one window-joint of 
English oak – for this? For nosing, blind, through mist towards God 
knows what wastes and depths of water, where stone splintered like 
wood and wood shredded like dust? The ship was no better than a 
grain between the wheel of the sea and the blade of the wind. Where 
would it be when one was whetted on the other?33 
 
Ideas of jointing, splintering, shredding and cutting dominate, along with the contrast 
between the solidity of Candy’s English home and the unknown misty depths of the 
sea on which he is setting sail. The name of Candy’s house, ‘Concleave’ merits 
particular attention. The OED defines ‘cleave’ as follows: 
 
cleave, v.1 
1a. trans. To part or divide by a cutting blow; to hew asunder; to split. 
Properly used […] of dividing anything in the direction of its length, 
height, or depth; also, of dividing slate or crystals along their cleavage 
planes, and other things at their joints. […] 
d. To intersect, penetrate, or fissure, in position. 
2. To separate or sever by dividing or splitting. 
                                                          
32 Klein, ‘Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States’, in Mitchell, ed., Selected Melanie Klein p. 141. 
33 Barker, Apology for a Hero, pp. 235-236. 
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cleave, v.2 
1. To stick fast or adhere. […] 
3. […] To cling or hold fast to; to attach oneself (by grasping, etc.) to 
[…] 
4. To adhere or cling to (a person, party, principle, practice, etc.); to 
remain attached, devoted, or faithful to.34 
 
Thus ‘cleave’ means at the same time to separate and to attach. Further complication 
is provided by the prefix ‘con’, which according to the OED appears ‘in certain 
phrases, [such] as con amore’ meaning ‘with’, the same as the Latin prefix ‘cum’, and 
at the same time, as the adverb ‘con’, is defined as ‘[a]n abbreviation of the Latin 
prep[osition] contra [or] ‘against’’.35 Separate and attached, against and with: the 
word ‘Concleave’ holds two sets of opposites apart and at the same time connects 
them.36 Apology for a Hero ends with an image of complete disarticulation when ‘the 
Albuquerque’s mainsail split from top to bottom’, with the fracture and 
fragmentation of the ship representing Charles’s divided sense of self.37 In other 
words, Apology for a Hero and The Joy-Ride and After are connected, we might even 
say articulated, across the twelve-year gap in Barker’s publishing career through their 
mutual preoccupation with the ways in which mental, familial, or social structures 
are articulated and disarticulated. 
 
II. Articulation 
The Joy Ride and After is composed of three novellas. The first, ‘The Joy-Ride’ 
concerns sixteen-year-old garage apprentice, Joe Munn and his relationships with 
the people in his community. These include Evie from the café across the road, Joe’s 
                                                          
34 "cleave, v.1"; “cleave, v.2”. OED Online. December 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/34105 [accessed February 12, 2015]. 
35 "con, prep."; "con, adv. and n.1". In ibid. 
36 In addition ‘Concleave’ sounds like ‘conclave’, a word defined by the OED as ‘[a] private room, 
inner chamber, closet’ ("conclave, n.". In ibid.). Charles’s house Concleave represents the ‘inner 
chamber’ of his mind, his sense of self. When he leaves Concleave his ship the Albuquerque replaces 
the house. Much is made of the fragility of the ship; for example, laying awake during his first night 
on the ship, ‘[h]e tossed, alone, with a whirling lamp and a pair of restless boots, in a cube ten feet 
by twelve broken only by a saucer of darkness above his head’ (Barker, Apology for a Hero, p. 242). 
This idea is recalled at the beginning of The Joy-Ride and After when Rumbold sits in his office: ‘It 
was […] a two-by-four place with glass-topped walls like the wheelhouse of a ship’. (Barker, The Joy-
Ride, p. 11.) 
37 Barker, Apology for a Hero, p. 263. 
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boss, Bart Rumbold, Major Monty Brind (Rumbold’s sinister friend), Joe’s family, 
especially his fifteen-year-old cousin, Esther, and his elderly neighbour Mrs 
Martineau. The story ends after Joe and Esther take Brind’s car out of the workshop, 
driving it onto the bypass where they hit a woman, leaving her for dead. The woman 
is Alice Oram, the protagonist of the second novella, ‘The Narrow Boat’. Leaving her 
house suddenly one evening, following the discovery of her husband’s affair, and an 
upsetting conversation with her daughter, Alice ends up miles away and walks 
alongside the bypass looking for the stop for the bus home. After being hit by Joe 
driving Brind’s car, Alice loses her memory and is found by Garnett, a reclusive man 
who lives on a narrow boat. Joe’s passenger, Esther Munn reappears in the third 
novella, ‘A Likely Story’; she is now twenty years old and married to Arthur Bulow, a 
canteen manager.  
The Middling concerns the life of Ellalie (Ellie) Toms and each section takes 
the form of a short story. In the first section, eight-year-old Ellie constructs an 
elaborate lie, telling her parents and her uncle and aunt that her cousin, Lydie has 
been kidnapped by an unknown man. Her uncle Vince immediately suspects Colonel 
Gabbitas, a local upper-class man ‘invalided out of the army’ after the First World 
War and brings Ellie to the Colonel’s house so that she can identify the guilty party.38 
The Colonel realises the inconsistencies in Ellie’s story and sets a ‘trap’ which exposes 
her lie.39 Enraged by this, Ellie accuses The Colonel but at this point Ellie’s father, 
Archie appears with Lydie, who has been hiding in Ellie’s bedroom. By this point we 
know that although The Colonel did not take Lydie, he is a paedophile and has set his 
sights on Ellie. As she is led home by her father, The Colonel calls out: ‘Good-bye, 
Ellie, I hope you’ll come to tea when they’ve cut out your tongue.’40 The rest of The 
Middling is concerned with Ellie’s struggle to overcome the trauma of the sexual 
abuse she suffers at the hands of The Colonel, which occurs between the first and 
second parts of the book. She tries and fails to establish close relationships, in part 
two as a teenager with her friend Laura, and in part three as an adult with a man, 
Wooller. By the final part of the novel Ellie is married with two children. She is also 
                                                          
38 Barker, The Middling, p. 42. 
39 Ibid., pp. 44, 47. 
40 Ibid., p. 54.  
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an alcoholic, sent away by her husband to Sidlow Park, a detox-clinic, and then to a 
cottage in the country with a nurse, Hattie Straw. The whole book is in first-person 
but Ellie’s different life stories are articulated by a narrator who appears to be writing 
a book very like The Middling. 
The prominence of the language of articulation in The Joy-Ride and After and 
The Middling draws attention to family and community as structures and to the 
power relationships between adult and child that constitute those structures. Both 
novels are packed with references to articulation. In The Joy-Ride and After, for 
example, the language of car mechanics runs through the first part of the novel. 
Rumbold, a mechanic, thinks ‘[t]he axles, shafts, rods and bolts under the curded 
grease and the webs of mud – they had properness and purpose. All machines had 
that’.41 Significantly, the machines and systems are linked metaphorically to the 
human body, making it clear that mechanical articulation represents human 
articulation and putting emphasis on both as structures. Rumbold spends his time 
working with vehicle systems in which parts need to be properly articulated for the 
car to move. He describes his business in terms of the human body: ‘a place like this 
on the neck of nowhere needs new blood to keep it going’ and also makes a 
comparison between a human nerve and mechanic pipeline.42 A mechanical-human 
connection is also made by Arthur Barlow in the third part of The Joy-Ride and After: 
‘Let me tell you something, this factory […] it’s a business, the sum of its parts, and 
flesh or metal they’ve got to work together.’43 The idea of people working together 
in a system speaks to the historical moment of the book: the wartime effort was not 
long over; the introduction of the Welfare State after the war aimed to produce a 
system based on equality not hierarchy. In The Middling, the articulation of things 
again represents the articulation of people, who are represented as being or not 
being articulated to one another. For instance, Ellie says of her friend, Laura: ‘she was 
never […] latched to me’.44 Also, Ellie observes: ‘There we were, my father and me – 
latched, you might say’.45 And Ellie’s father remarks to Vince: ‘That’s the – hinge of 
                                                          
41 Barker, The Joy-Ride, p. 15. 
42 Ibid., p. 37. 
43 Ibid., p. 239.  
44 Barker, The Middling, p. 74. 
45 Ibid., p. 52. 
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it’.46 Note that in both sentences there is a dash followed by the joining word (‘hinge’, 
‘latched’) so that the articulation suggested by the words is replicated in the 
construction of the sentence itself. It is also worth noting that the word ‘latched’, 
with its connotations of breast-feeding, speaks to the conception of the mother-child 
relationship in mid-century psychoanalysis I addressed earlier. 
In The Joy-Ride and After and The Middling articulation is linked to control of 
human relationships; or, more precisely, in the novels the person who gets to 
perform or control articulation is shown to have power and dominance. Both Brind 
in The Joy-Ride and After and The Colonel in The Middling are represented as being 
dominant. Brind is a bully who engages Joe in ‘bad talk’ on their first meeting and has 
a history of cruelty. Rumbold tells Joe that Brind is ‘inhuman’ and has a lack of pity, 
and warns Joe that he should ‘watch his tongue’ when Brind is nearby.47 Similarly, 
The Colonel likes to control things and people. He has a fondness for games 
concerning articulation and construction; when Ellie asks Lydie what games the 
Colonel likes, ‘she said riddles and old bits of old wire’.48 He creates a puppet and 
thus makes something inanimate into an animate being that articulates or expresses. 
He puts emphasis on the fact that Ellie’s account of Lydie’s abduction must properly 
articulate, that things have to fit together: ‘The knee-bone connecting to the thigh-
bone, the thigh-bone connecting to the hip-bone, the hip-bone connected to the 
backbone.’49 Furthermore, The Colonel often appears mechanical himself: his face is 
like a ‘glass clock’.50 Significantly, both men are represented as seeking to control or 
articulate people by exerting control over talk, asserting power through language, 
and silencing people. Both novels contain references to tongues (a tongue being cut 
out and ‘hold your tongue’) and in both cases the action of cutting or holding renders 
the speaker mute.  
All this concern with articulation – mechanical, business and biological 
systems, latching, hinging – suggests a preoccupation with hierarchies and power. 
Norman Fairclough in his book Language and Power (1989) observes that power is 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 51. 
47 Barker, The Joy-Ride, pp. 36, 37, 38.  
48 Barker, The Middling, p. 42. 
49 Ibid., p. 46. 
50 Ibid., p. 47. 
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concerned with the ways in which domains are structured: ‘One aspect of power is 
the capacity to impose and maintain a particular structuring of some domain or other 
- a particular way of dividing it into parts, of keeping the parts demarcated from each 
other, and a particular ordering of those parts in terms of hierarchical relations of 
domination and subordination.’51 Parts of domains are separated from one another 
by being ordered in particular ways but are also held together in hierarchical 
relationships. There is a sense, then, in which parts of domains (and domains 
themselves) are articulated; that is, the parts are ordered so that they are at once 
separate and joined together to form a functioning structure. In Barker’s 1960s 
fiction the combination of the imagery of articulation, which represents human 
relationships in terms of mechanical systems, and the articulated structures of the 
books, creates an overall impression of a body of work that is fascinated by the ways 
in which power structures divide, demarcate, and order.  
 
III. Disarticulation 
Howard Garfinkel’s theory of ‘ethnomethodology’ is useful here. Garfinkel coined the 
term in the mid-1950s and elaborated his theory in Studies in Ethnomethodology 
(1967). Explaining the differences between sociology and ethnomethodology, Dirk 
vom Lehn states that traditional sociology ‘assume[s] that actors in social situations 
always encounter a pre-existing shared culture and align their action with rules and 
norms’.52 In other words, traditional sociology assumes that social actors are passive 
and order is imposed from above. Indeed, vom Lehn observes that ‘[t]he premise of 
such sociological theory […] is the presumption that the social world is principally 
unorganized and only gains order when the idea of an existing shared culture and a 
system of rules is deployed’.53 Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, puts emphasis 
on the interpreted and constructed nature of ‘society’. Unlike traditional sociologists 
who ‘started with the assumption that social order was a theoretical concept, made 
visible through sociological and statistical analysis,’ argues vom Lehn, ‘Garfinkel 
                                                          
51 Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (Harlow: Longman, 1989), p. 13. 
52 Dirk vom Lehn, Harold Garfinkel: The Creation and Development of Ethnomethodology (Walnut 
Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2014), p. 90. 
53 Ibid. 
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argued that organization and structure were a fundamental property of the everyday 
activities that participants ongoingly, observably, and intelligibly produced’.54 Thus 
ethnomethodology was critical of sociological grand narratives and abstractions and 
instead put emphasis on the role of human agency in the construction of social 
reality. 
Garfinkel used the term ‘organizations’ to designate ‘a set of mutually 
anticipated, expected, recollected events’ which form the basis of ‘a person’s 
perceived situation’.55 According to Garfinkel, ‘rules were not instructions that 
people followed, rather, rules were properties of situations people act in. 
Participants know what a situation is because it is accomplished in and through their 
actions and those of other participants. When participants encounter a situation, 
they design their actions to make them fit and align with the continuously produced 
context and to contribute to its production’.56 Garfinkel locates the production of 
social order, or the ordering of the social world, in the day-to-day actions of social 
actors, rather than social order being a set of norms and values imposed upon social 
actors by ‘society’. For Garfinkel, social actors do not passively respond to a set of 
norms and values imposed ‘from above’ but instead actively produce, with others, 
their social reality. Thus social order is not a theoretical problem but a practical one 
to be solved by cooperating social actors. Garfinkel tested this theory using 
conversation analysis. He argued that both parties in a conversation situation must 
build a structure of shared assumptions in order for them to understand one 
anothers’ references and intentions and thus engage in functional talk. It follows that 
if social actors refuse to cooperate by engaging in functional talk then the social order 
will be disrupted. And if this lack of cooperation is widespread enough, the social 
order will be destabilised. 
The destabilising properties of dysfunctional talk are explored by John 
Mepham in his essay on ‘bad talk’ in the writing of Patrick Hamilton and Elizabeth 
Bowen. Mepham argues that after the 1920s ‘writers developed an interest in using 
fiction as a way of analysing talk, and a particular interest in the ways in which talk 
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55 Garfinkel, ‘Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies’, 1956, quoted in ibid., pp. 81-82.  
56 Ibid., quoted in vom Lehn, Harold Garfinkel, p. 86. 
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can go wrong or be diverted from its presumed purposes’.57 He draws on the work 
of Garfinkel and the philosopher Paul Grice, outlining a model of functional talk in 
which speaker and listener must cooperate in order to communicate. Mepham’s 
analysis of bad talk gives several contextual factors that relate specifically to the 
1930s and 1940s: the threat and rise of fascism; the war; an increased interest in 
conversation; and a move in fiction after modernism from inner subjectivity to 
intersubjectivity (in part related to the rise of the ‘talkies’ from 1930 onwards).58 
Mepham states that in the novels of Hamilton and Bowen ‘there is a […] sense that 
fascism grows from or is complicit with common psychological impulses and 
pathologies of personality, and that the power-mad, dictatorial behaviour and cruel, 
sadistic and systematically humiliating relations typical of political fascism can also 
be found in apparently ordinary domestic situations’.59 Mepham’s sense of the 
presence of dictatorial, cruel, sadistic, and humiliating behaviour in day-to-day 
domestic situations is precisely what we find in The Joy-Ride And After. I want to 
extend Mepham’s analysis of bad talk and its implications into the postwar context, 
and will argue that Barker’s 1960s fiction connects the domestic fascism of the 1930s 
and 1940s with legacies of war and decolonisation and issues of class, race, age, and 
the welfare state that are specific to the post-war context. 
The Joy-Ride and After opens at Rumbold’s garage. He is absent and his 
apprentice Joe is in charge when a stranger arrives at the office asking to see 
Rumbold. Joe, quite correctly, assumes the role of garage attendant, asking the 
customer formal questions: “Anything I can get you?”; “Can I get you something, 
mister?”60 However, the stranger (later revealed to be Brind) refuses to answer Joe’s 
questions, instead forcing Joe to answer his: 
 
  “What’s your name?” 
  “Munn.” 
  “Is this your first job?” 
  “Second. If it’s urgent I could fetch him.” 
  He moved past Joe. So closely that their shoulders touched, and sat 
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58 Ibid., pp. 59, 64. 
59 Ibid., p. 63. 
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down by the desk, stretching his long legs in front of him. “I’m in no 
hurry.” 
  “You can’t sit there. This is the office, it’s private.” 
  The stranger blew two neat plumes of cigarette smoke. “How many 
work here?” 
  “Just me and Mr. Rumbold. This is his office.” Joe cast about and 
found the right phrase. “I’m sorry, but I’ll have to ask you to step 
outside.” 
  “You talk and I’ll listen.”61 
 
This exchange is a good example of Mepham’s idea of bad talk. In functional talk the 
speaker and listener must cooperate. In order for the listener to understand what 
the speaker is trying to say, the speaker must obey particular rules (‘maxims or 
principles’) and both parties must have or develop ‘a shared definition of the setting, 
the situation, and of what is going on’.62 They must also build a structure of shared 
assumptions, ‘so that they grasp one another’s references and get the drift of one 
another’s intentions’.63 Mepham argues that: ‘Only within such a framework of 
shared assumptions and good talk behaviour can the listener perform the cognitive 
work that is an essential element of all talk, the work of ‘filling in’, of silent inference 
and interpretation, that allows the listener to move on from the literal meaning of 
the speaker’s words to whatever it is that he or she has in mind.’64  
The exchange between Joe and Brind displays the opposite of good talk 
behaviour. Joe begins correctly, asking what the (supposed) customer requires. 
However, Brind almost immediately demands that Joe reveal personal information 
about himself, without explaining why he wants to know or what his relationship with 
Rumbold is. In addition, although he must perceive that he is creating a difficult 
situation for Joe who is a young, inexperienced employee, he deliberately ignores 
Joe’s protestations that he should not sit down in Rumbold’s office. Brind thus 
refuses to cooperate with Joe; instead ensuring that Joe does not know what is going 
on and is not able to grasp his intentions. The conversation reveals Brind’s wilful 
failure to obey the rules of functional talk. It shows how a speaker may withhold 
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information in order to block the cognitive work of inference and interpretation on 
the part of the listener, thereby securing his own, and undermining the listener’s, 
power and status. The exchange is a good example of talk that has been ‘diverted 
from its presumed purposes’. Brind does not engage with Joe in order to 
communicate with him; rather, his intention is to assert power over the boy. For Joe, 
the experience of Brind’s bad talk is disempowering: ‘Short of throwing the man out 
there was nothing he could do’.65 In The Joy-Ride and After bad talk and other non-
cooperative behaviours are widespread: people seem not to know, or to have 
forgotten, the ways in which to make their actions align and fit with a situation, and 
how to contribute to its production. And in Barker’s novel this non-cooperation is 
linked to the legacies of war and colonialism.  
It is suggested that Brind’s behaviour has been influenced by the war. As the 
conversation between him and Joe above suggests, Brind is a bully: overbearing, 
difficult and cruel. Rumbold makes a link between Brind’s behaviour and his wartime 
experience in a Burmese prisoner of war camp. Explaining why he is allowing Brind 
to stay on at the garage as his partner, Rumbold tells Joe that (Major Monty) Brind 
was his superior officer when they were in Burma. Rumbold describes how the British 
troops worked ‘[e]ighteen hours a day on a ration of bad rice and rubber nuts’ 
building an air-strip.66 Brind was ‘[f]ilthy and tattered and gaunt with fever, a toiling 
scarecrow […] like the rest of them’ but he ‘climbed back to the top of the pile’, 
presumably by selling information.67 Rumbold says of Brind:  
 
    “He’s a breed.” A far-flung breed, indigenous to a system rather 
than a soil. “The Monty Brinds are born with sand in their boots, they 
always land right way up.” 
[…] 
“Wherever there’s a string you’ll find Brind pulling it. He was an 
officer in my unit.”68 
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There is a sense here of Brind being part of a ‘system’ but not belonging to any 
particular country. Does Barker mean the military system, the colonial system, the 
prisoner of war system? Brind is part of a ‘breed’ of people different to Rumbold and 
Joe. Does Rumbold mean a different social breed? Brind was an officer which signals 
a certain social status but ‘breed’ suggests more than this. The extract also uses the 
language of articulation: Brind, who pulls strings to survive, is a manipulator, a 
puppet-master figure who articulates people. He is also represented as being 
dangerous and not to be trifled with. Rumbold warns Joe: ‘You’d better watch your 
tongue when he’s about’.69 So Brind is connected with the language of verbal 
articulation like The Colonel in The Middling, who also has a military background. 
Perhaps Brind and The Colonel, who have been traumatised and infantilised by war, 
aim to regain their adult sense of self by exhibiting dominant and bulling behaviours 
towards children. This reading speaks to the way in which adult identity is 
constructed in relation to the child. Putting the child ‘back in its place’, Brind and The 
Colonel try to reassert their sense of self and their adult place in the world. Also, in 
wartime high-ranking officers such as Brind and The Colonel are like parent figures in 
the sense that they are responsible for their troops’ safety and wellbeing. So Brind’s 
behaviour in Burma, where he sold information (about his men, his country?) in order 
to survive the camp and climb ‘back to the top of the pile’ figures him as an 
irresponsible parent who puts his own interests before those of this troops. 
Ten years after the war, Rumbold still remembers his time in Burma vividly, 
suggesting the continuing presence and influence of the war in the national memory 
and imagination.70 The implications of these examples of bad talk in The Joy-Ride and 
After, then, are that the savagery and barbarism of war continue to be present in 
post-war incidents of bullying and violence which disrupt social cooperation and 
cohesion through their intrusion into domestic life. And it is not only bad talk that is 
shown to be disruptive. For instance, Joe’s mother, Jessie often laughs 
inappropriately. Her laughter is described as an overwhelming and destructive force. 
When she is recounting a story to her family, for example, her ‘laughter rolled round 
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the room’.71 And later: ‘[Esther] flinched almost before Jessie’s laughter hit them.’72 
Also, in the third part of the book, ‘A Likely Story’, Esther’s husband, Arthur Burlow 
remembers ‘being swallowed alive by Jessie Munn’s laughter’.73 The 
inappropriateness of Jessie’s laughter is shown when she decides to drown the 
kittens of the family cat, beloved by her younger son, Christy: 
 
The cat began to wash her kitten. She broke into a crackling purr, her 
one eye winking and glowing at Christy, who leaned his head against 
the wall with a gesture of no less contentment. 
    The sight seemed to prick Jessie. Something, some faint irritation 
struggled up from lazy depths. “I must drown that kitten.” 
[…] 
    Smiling, Jessie spread one thick red hand on her knee […] With 
broad amusement Jessie filled a bucket and drowned two of the 
kittens. Christy screamed, sharp demented screams, and when, not 
ungently, she tried to prise the survivor from his grasp, he bit her. […] 
“You’re a nice one – ” but she couldn’t meet the stony glare of the 
child. “All right, keep it – for the present.” And she dropped the dead 
kittens in the ashcan.74 
 
Jessie’s smile and her ‘broad amusement’ are unsettling not just because they 
are cruel (even given mid-century austerity) but because they are completely ‘out of 
context’ (in Garfinkel’s sense of the word). Jessie’s response to the sight of the cat 
warmly cleaning its offspring and her son, Christy’s, gesture of contentment might 
reasonably be expected to be a smile. This would be, in Garfinkel’s terms, an action 
that would ‘fit and align’ with and contribute to the context of the situation: a 
domestic scene in which the family are all participating: she and Joe chatting, her 
husband, Alec, shaving, and her young child present. But Jessie’s smile is prompted 
by her intended violent action rather than the peaceful scene of the cat and Christy; 
in fact, the latter scene evokes a ‘prick’ of ‘faint irritation’. Therefore the smile and 
humour exhibited by Jessie are inappropriate to the context of the situation, and 
disruptive in a similar way to Brind’s bad talk. This reading of the scene is supported 
by its location in the book. Jessie’s drowning of the kittens occurs just before the 
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account Rumbold gives to Joe of his and Brind’s experience in the Burmese camp 
during the war. In the light of Rumbold’s account, the language of the above extract, 
which describes Christy’s ‘sharp demented screams’ and his attempts to rescue ‘the 
survivor’ from his mother’s grasp, appears to suggest that the barbarism of war has 
had a lasting impact on domestic life. 
In the post-war period there was also deep ambivalence about the legacies of 
colonialism. The process of decolonisation from the end of the war onwards entailed 
a dismantling of the notion that Britain is a ‘mother’ to her colonial ‘children’. In 
chapter one I linked the construction of the colonial subject and the construction of 
the child, arguing that in the nineteenth century the colonial subject is often placed 
in a childlike position in relation to European man and seen as a ‘child’ of the empire. 
Alan Sinfield’s characterisation of the colonial subject – as a figure whose 
stereotypical characteristics and qualities need to be reasserted over and over, who 
always has to be ‘savage’ so that the European man may be ‘civilized’ – speaks to the 
contradictory and unstable figure of the child that develops during the Victorian 
period. The connection between the colonial subject and the figure of the child 
persists into the twentieth century and the ‘mother country’ metaphor is still used in 
the post-war period, although this view is unpopular on both the left and the (anti-
immigration) right.75 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Griffin argue that ‘[t]he 
ambivalence of colonial discourse lies in the fact that […] the colonial subject [is] both 
a ‘child’ of empire and a primitive and degraded subject of imperial discourse’.76 This 
figuring of the colonial subject as both child and subject and thus in need of both 
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protection and control is strikingly similar to the way in which adolescents are 
represented in the 1940s as both vulnerable victims and primitive, aggressive 
subjects.  
The Joy-Ride and After addresses the presence of legacies of colonialism in 
British society in the 1960s. Joe’s neighbour, Mrs Martineau is an elderly Miss 
Havisham figure who has not left her flat since her husband abandoned her sixteen 
years before. The book never makes it clear why Joe’s parents or other neighbours 
have not taken charge of the situation, but we do find out that Joe is the only person 
Mrs Martineau will admit into her home. The book suggests that Mrs. Martineau and 
her absent husband, Victor, have been involved in the colonial enterprise. The trunks 
and boxes that litter her flat still have the stamps of the cities that the couple 
travelled through, including Delhi, Calcutta and Srinagar.77 Joe finds an address label: 
‘Mr and Mrs V. Martineau, Southampton via Bombay’.78 Mrs Martineau is mad: she 
has never unpacked the boxes because she is waiting for Victor to return; instead she 
has fashioned ‘lanes’ in between them and the furniture and she travels about using 
these, hiding in between pieces of furniture. She is paranoid about people trying to 
get into her house and obsessed with the idea that the cockroaches in the flat will 
‘eat [her] alive’.79 Mrs Martineau’s madness does not result in ‘bad talk’ but it does 
inhibit her ability to engage in functional talk because her madness blocks her own 
inference and interpretation and prevents other people from properly grasping her 
intentions. 
It is important to note that Mrs Martineau’s madness is not caused only by 
the inexplicable disappearance of her husband, an action that is completely ‘out of 
context’. Her participation in the colonial enterprise is shown to be a significant cause 
of her madness and thus of her inability to engage in functional talk. For example, 
when she is ill and therefore more confused and confusing than ever, her 
preoccupation with the invasion of her space focuses in particular on the figure of an 
‘Indian’. 
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“That Indian,” she said, “he’s got a knife. He watched the bungalow all 
day Sunday. Why did he do that on his day off?” 
[…] 
All at once she started screaming, short and sharp like a rubber doll 
that was being squeezed. She flung herself at Joe, her hands beat at his 
chest, clawed up towards his throat. She kept crying, “The knife, Victor, 
the knife!” […]80 
 
Mrs Martineau’s hallucination of the knife-wielding ‘Indian’ recalls Thomas De 
Quincey’s description of the ‘Malay’ in Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821). 
Writing about De Quincey’s text, Nigel Leask argues that the Malay represents the 
haunting, infecting presence of the oriental other, a figure who invades the European 
domestic sphere by arriving at De Quincey’s Grasmere cottage and refusing to be 
killed.81 A similar sense of infection appears to be taking place in The Joy-Ride and 
After, especially because Mrs Martineau is unwell and has just been speaking to Joe 
about medicine when she has her hallucination (this is perhaps an allusion to De 
Quincey’s opium consumption). From Mrs Martineau’s point of view, the ‘Indian’ is 
the invading, infecting other. But the novel suggests that Mrs Martineau’s madness 
has been caused by the infectious racism of the colonial enterprise with which she 
was involved. 
More than this, Mrs Martineau’s vision is framed by an episode that concerns 
Joe’s and Esther’s visit to the unnamed black doctor to collect her medicine, and a 
scene in which Joe runs away from Mrs. Martineau and encounters Jamaican 
immigrants sitting outside the ‘corner house’.82 The implications of this framing 
become clearer if we accept that Mrs Martineau’s hallucination, like the racist 
orientalist visions of De Quincey, figures the ‘Indian’ as an invasive, infecting Eastern 
other. If this is the case, then attention is drawn to the status of the Jamaicans and 
the black doctor as representatives of a modern, twentieth century post-colonial 
other; a category of people, in fact, that in 1963 had just been officially defined as 
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non-British.83 The racism encountered by black immigrants in mid-century Britain is 
summed up by Lise, the doctor’s wife: 
 
“[W]e’ve had some experience. They come here when they can’t pay 
for their medicine, because he’s kind and gives it them for nothing. My 
husband’s very kind.” 
[…] 
“Tramps and street women,” said the doctor’s wife. “And you don’t 
ever forget that smell.” She was laughing again, fixedly, at Esther. “But 
they wipe themselves where he’s touched them, they wipe their dirt 
clean.” 
[…] 
“You want his blood and his sweat to be that colour, you want him that 
all through, and you want him to feel it because then you feel so white, 
don’t you, you feel like gold – ” Her whole body was laughing, gusting 
with it […]84 
 
The imagery of smell and touch, blood and sweat, dirt and wiping clean echoes the 
language of infection found in orientalist texts about ‘the East’. Lise’s description of 
white people’s reaction to the black doctor also highlights the way in which white 
Europeans have defined themselves against the colonial subject. Again recalling 
Sinfield’s characterisation of the colonial subject, who must always be ‘savage’ so 
that European man may be ‘civilized’, the doctor must be and feel black ‘all through’ 
so that white people can ‘feel so white’ and maintain their feeling of superiority (‘feel 
like gold’).  
The most curious aspect of the passage, though, is Lise’s compulsive laughter. 
It is inappropriate to the content of her talk, which describes experiences and ideas 
that one would expect to evoke sadness and anger rather than laughter. As in the 
case of Jessie Munn, Lise’s verbal articulation here is entirely ‘out of context’. Lise 
asks Joe why Mrs Martineau won’t open the door to her husband; is it, she asks, 
“because he’s a black man?”:  
 
She leaned towards Joe and Esther, laughing, as if they were children 
and she was sharing a joke with them.  
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  “Lise,” said the doctor, and he was smiling too, and so was Esther, 
they were all smiling.85 
 
The passage makes it clear that Lise’s laughter is a disruptive and inappropriate 
articulation, which unsettles everyone else in the room and leaves them uncertain 
about how to act in this social situation. But the novel does not condemn Lise’s 
behaviour. Rather, her inappropriate verbal articulation is shown to be caused by the 
impact of the racism experienced by her husband, and indeed the The Joy-Ride and 
After seems to ask: what is the correct verbal response to racism? Like Brind’s bad 
talk or Jessie’s laughter, which are influenced by the barbarism of the war, and Mrs 
Martineau’s madness, which is represented as a disease she contracted from the 
colonial enterprise, Lise’s inappropriate laughter is shown to be the result of the 
racism in 1950s and 1960s Britain following the immigration of non-white colonial 
subjects as part of decolonisation. The implication is that the British Empire, which 
by the mid-twentieth-century had undergone rapid and irreversible decline, is 
continuing to exert a destructive, damaging legacy for all those involved in it: 
whether they are colonisers like Mrs Martineau and Victor, [ex-]colonial subjects like 
the doctor or, like Lise, British people witnessing first-hand the racism directed 
towards the people they know and love. This damage manifests itself in the 
disruption of verbal articulation and causes people to exhibit behaviour that is 
inappropriate or ‘out of content’ for the situations in which they find themselves.  
Legacies of war and those of Empire, then, still have a strong influence on 
familial and societal relationships in the early-1960s. MacKay and Stonebridge note 
‘the continuities between the pervasive mid-century atmosphere of domestic 
fascism and the anxieties about race, nation, gender and class that dominated the 
second half of the century’.86 What The Joy-Ride and After suggests is that the post-
war period is characterised by continuities of instability expressed in adult cruelty, 
violence and madness and through bad talk and inappropriate verbal articulations. 
Both The Joy-Ride and After and The Middling are full of the language of articulation; 
conversations about talk and the meanings of words; exchanges in which characters 
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misunderstand one another, accidentally or deliberately, or in which neither party 
says what they really mean; relationships that are underpinned by habit, convention, 
loneliness or obsession, and in which information is told, or held back, to secure or 
undermine power. Barker’s articulated fiction speaks to the atmosphere of violence 
and anxiety that continued after the war. Mepham argues that talk ‘filled with 
anxiety and suspicion and doubt because something is going wrong’ can lead to 
madness.87 It is not just bad talk but any inappropriate, ‘out of context’ social 
response that can lead to madness. Barker’s fiction suggests that these inappropriate 
articulations (connections, utterances) not only cause individual instability and 
breakdown but also result in the instability of society through the breaking of familial 
and social bonds. Barker’s articulated fiction is thus concerned with the 
disarticulation of citizenship in 1960s Britain.88  
 
IV. Age Inversion  
An important way in which the disarticulation of citizenship is represented in The Joy-
Ride and After is through age inversion. In her book on age inversion in Victorian 
literature, Claudia Nelson notes the ‘rhetorical tendency of that era, especially 
evident in fiction, to liken adults to children and children to adults’.89 Considering ‘the 
possible motivations and meanings of such generational border crossings’, Nelson 
argues that ‘the dismantling of chronological age is frequently a way of tracking 
power or its loss’.90 She observes that the anxiety over the instability of age 
categories in the Victorian period recalls the uneasiness provoked by inversions of 
sexual and gender roles. Her proposal is that ‘the queering of age has much in 
common with the queering of gender and sexuality’ and she emphasises ‘the doubt 
and social questioning necessarily involved in any inversion of a norm’.91 So age 
inversion in adult-child relationships, as well as having psychological implications, is 
                                                          
87 Mepham, ‘Varieties of Modernism’, p. 68. 
88 My thanks to Lyndsey Stonebridge for this phrase. 
89 Nelson, Precocious Children and Childish Adults, p. 3.  
90 Ibid., pp. 3, 4. 
91 Ibid., pp. 7, 11. 
140 
 
a metaphor for the instability, disorder or disintegration of social and political 
structures.  
Barker’s 1960s articulated fiction suggests that Nelson’s reading of age 
inversion in the nineteenth century may be adapted to the context of the current 
discussion. In the mid-twentieth-century a belief that the stability of society was 
related to children and adults staying in their proper places and roles was coupled 
with worry that this was not happening. This anxiety was partly expressed in the 
moral panic about youth and juvenile delinquency I described in chapter two. Nelson 
argues that, due to Victorian child labour and prostitution, age inversion ‘was already 
readily apparent to the Victorian observer, who had ample opportunity to note that 
traffic between the supposedly separate spheres inhabited by children and adults 
was an everyday matter’.92 While the mid-twentieth-century observer did not 
regularly encounter such literal age inversions, the child as 'father of the man' and 
the war-damaged ‘adult as child’ were familiar figures in the mid-century 
imagination. In the pages that follow I will show that age inversion in Barker’s 1960s 
fiction is linked to or exacerbated by factors specific to the mid-twentieth-century, 
such as the newly-established ‘parental’ Welfare State and the precocity of the post-
war generation. Although the age inversions I note in Barker’s fiction are not always 
as explicit as those observed by Nelson, who refers to ‘comments within a narrative 
that make the [adult-child] parallel explicit and inescapable’, they are nevertheless 
examples of the roles of adult and child being reversed in order to represent 
dysfunction within social systems.93 The inversion of age in The Joy Ride and After 
suggests wider instability and disorder and the disarticulation of state and citizen in 
mid-twentieth-century society. 
For example, Joe is figured as the adult in his relationship with Mrs Martineau. 
He brings her supplies, tea, sugar, and medicine, and he is concerned about her 
welfare, worrying when she doesn’t open the door one day, and going to the doctor 
on her behalf when she is ill. By contrast, Mrs Martineau, in her layers of clothing and 
knitted balaclava, is figured as a helpless and dependent baby: ‘She rocked herself 
gently. In the balaclava bonnet and the swaddling clothes she looked like a dingy 
                                                          
92 Ibid., p. 6. 
93 Ibid., p. 3. 
141 
 
baby.’94 The infant-parent bond between them is also implied when, after Mrs 
Martineau is taken away, Joe is described as being ‘broken wide open’.95 As well as 
suggesting childbirth through the idea that Mrs Martineau has been wrenched from 
inside Joe’s body, the language here also suggests that a familial bond between them 
has been disarticulated. The age-inverted relationship between Joe and Mrs 
Martineau points to social dysfunction because the mentally-ill Mrs Martineau has 
been left on her own with only Joe to care for her, and with no help from the state. 
The child, Joe, has had to take on social responsibilities usually carried out by the 
state or an adult. Further state dysfunction is shown when the ambulance does come 
to take her away, as I discuss later. 
Another age inversion in The Joy Ride and After occurs between Alice Oram, 
a middle-class suburban housewife and her daughter, Grace. The second part of the 
novel begins just as Alice discovers that her husband, Frank is having an affair with a 
woman called Lilly Warren. Alice wants to express her anger violently but cannot:  
 
She fell back on words. They came off her tongue, breathy at first, 
then like a flock of dirty birds – words decent women find they know 
when put to it. It was some relief to utter them until they started 
dropping back – slut and harlot and whore came plumping all round 
her. In the thick of it she caught sight of her daughter.96  
 
The emphasis here is on Alice’s use of words she had forgotten she knew, words that 
are unknown, strange, and alien. At first the words freed from inside her are light and 
fly away, an image which speaks to the idea that talking is cathartic and releases 
negative emotion. But Alice’s relief is undermined when the words she has expelled 
suddenly gain substance and return to attack and overwhelm her. The sense of return 
is important because when the ‘flock’ of dirty words she has used to describe Lilly 
Warren return, Alice is surrounded by these strange and alien forms. 
After being interrupted by her daughter, Alice immediately switches back into 
her role of the ‘decent woman’ and ideal mother, expressing concern about Grace’s 
                                                          
94 Barker, The Joy-Ride, p. 50. 
95 Ibid., p. 81. 
96 Ibid., p. 138. 
142 
 
safety when riding on her boyfriend’s scooter. When Grace asks, “What do you mean 
by safety?” Alice replies: 
 
  “There’s only one meaning that I know of.” 
  “Having things stay the same? They can’t. Even while you think 
they’re the same they’ve started to change. There’s no such thing as 
safety, it’s a word without a meaning.” 
  “Meanings came first, I thought, and the words after.” Alice picked up 
the poker and broke the embers into flame.97 
 
The conversation between Grace and her mother emphasises Alice’s lack of 
knowledge. Indeed, the story as a whole puts emphasis on the fact that Alice did not 
know about her husband’s affair but her daughter did. Grace says: “I wanted to shout 
it at you. I got over it, of course. Someone had to be sensible. I decided not to say 
anything and I made the boys promise not to either.’98 This reverses the formula in 
which children are innocent and adults have knowledge. Alice feels that her 
ignorance makes her culpable, that she has failed in her role as an adult by not 
protecting her children from knowledge that she should have had: ‘Not knowing was 
worse than foolish, it was a crime […] She was to blame, she had no right not to 
know’.99 The age inversion here disrupts and disorders the traditional family 
structure to such an extent that the adult who does not know becomes a criminal, 
somehow worse that the adult who commits adultery. 
Alice’s lack of knowledge is not just about the affair, however. Both of the 
above passages emphasise her ignorance and innocence about words: the unknown 
dirty words which are strange and alien; her unquestioning belief in the stability of 
language when she says that the word ‘safety’ has ‘only one meaning’. This linguistic 
innocence anticipates the consequences of Alice’s memory loss after she is struck by 
the car. The first words she hears after the accident are ones that she does not 
understand: ‘She would have liked to make something of it, these were words and it 
was so long since she had heard any.’100 And again: ‘She tried to moisten her lips, 
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words might have saved her if she could find the right ones. […] They weren’t the 
right words’.101 Following the accident, Alice is like a new-born child, without 
memory, language, or identity (she has no I.D. and loses her wedding ring). 
Conversely, Grace assumes the adult role: in the way she speaks to Alice; in the sense 
that she possesses knowledge her mother lacks and is the one being ‘sensible’; and 
because after Alice’s departure it is likely that Grace, and not her absent father, will 
assume responsibility for her brothers.  
In The Joy Ride and After, then, Alice, an ideal middle-class mother and 
housewife, is represented as a child. It is important to note that this representation 
begins before the accident, suggesting that her safe, suburban lifestyle has made her 
child-like. She has lived all her married life on ‘a pleasant road with grass verges,’ 
where: ‘almond and laburnum trees would soon come into bud. Nobody gossiped or 
kept watch through the curtains, the tradesmen came early. […] [There was] no sign 
of life in the street’.102 Barker’s sense here is of Alice being cocooned in a ‘pleasant’ 
place, far removed from poverty, crime, and the social change that Grace hints at in 
the passage above, and with a kind of static and deliberate innocence that is 
‘criminal’. The social disorder that is addressed by the mother-daughter age inversion 
in The Joy Ride and After is the infantilisation of middle-class women like Alice. 
Nelson suggests that age inversions in Victorian literature illustrate 
dysfunctional family relationships and thus dysfunctions of the state as a large 
malfunctioning family. The age inversions in Barker’s 1960s fiction do something 
similar. The child-like adults in the book force children into roles of adult 
responsibility in which they know more than the adults around them. In The Joy-Ride 
and After, age inversion in community and familial relations is a metaphor for 
dysfunction in the structures of early-1960s society. Through the age inversion in 
Joe’s and Mrs Martineau’s relationship in particular, the novel ties this social 
dysfunction to the failure of the adults in the community, such as Joe’s parents, and 
to the failure of the state as parent. Joe thinks of his parents that: ‘If they 
remembered [Mrs Martineau], it was always on Sundays and about this time.’103 
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Jessie says of Mrs Martineau’s flat: “I bet it’s high in there. Mrs Stogumber wants to 
get the Sanitary.”104 His mother’s mention of the state-controlled ‘Sanitary’ makes 
clear her view that Mrs Martineau is the responsibility of the state. Joe’s father, Alec 
reinforces this view, saying: “This is the Welfare State, Joe. That means everyone’s 
welfare. How do you think mine feels with that crazy old bird underneath us?”105 For 
Joe’s parents, Mrs Martineau is not their responsibility but that of the state, which is 
responsible for ‘everyone’s welfare’. The sense that the state should take the 
parental role is clear. But Joe is wary of state interference, thinking that ‘[i]f they took 
[Mrs Martineau] out of her burrow and locked her in some clean tidy place she’d die 
of fright and the right-thinkers could take the rap for that’.106 Joe’s use of the phrase 
‘right-thinkers’ suggests his reservations (and Barker’s?) about the idea of the 
Welfare State as a responsible, benevolent and caring parent. Indeed, the 
circumstances of Mrs Martineau’s eventual removal from her flat vindicates Joe’s 
anxiety about state interference, as I discuss later.   
During the war it was necessary for the state to play a more dominant role in 
the domestic lives of its citizens. There was a greater degree of control over people’s 
behaviour, whether they were fighting in Europe or on the Home Front. Not everyone 
was happy about this. Sinfield notes that the 1944 Mass Observation surveys 
‘showed a steady, unsurprised cynicism about the powers that be’, especially among 
the working-class.107 He concludes: ‘So already, before the blitz, popular 
commitment to the British state was uneven.’108 Sinfield argues that in Britain since 
the war ‘[t]he idea has been that we will all, or almost all, be persuaded to acquiesce 
in the prevailing order because we see that it is working generally to our benefit’.109 
‘To win the war,’ he observes, ‘people were encouraged to believe that there would 
not be a return to widespread injustice and poverty. The war exemplified (though 
not without contest) a pattern of state intervention and popular co-operation to 
organize production for a common purpose.’110  
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But after the war there was still poverty and austerity because of rationing, 
and a sense of dissatisfaction that the wartime promises had not been kept. Susan 
Kingsley Kent observes that there was a ‘discrepancy between an ideology that 
promised social equality and a reality of substandard housing, overcrowding, and 
dead-end jobs for a large percentage of Britons’.111 State control became tighter with 
the introduction of the Welfare State. Of course, there were good intentions behind 
this and it had many positive consequences, but it still meant that the state continued 
to have a greater impact on people’s domestic lives than before the war. Sinfield 
notes the sense of post-war dissatisfaction, arguing that ‘in many ways the 1950s 
were an anxious, reactionary time’ and ‘from the middle of the decade fundamental 
economic and political challenge began’.112 David Kynaston concurs, stating that 
‘1950s Britain was […] an authoritarian, illiberal, puritanical society. Not entirely, of 
course, but the cumulative evidence is overwhelming’.113 Kynaston describes the 
rigid, ‘almost militaristic’ nature of state Education, including the use of corporal 
punishment; the moral panic about youth and working women; the complete lack of 
sex education and high rate of illegal abortion; and the widespread silence about and 
prosecution of homosexuals.114 Kynaston’s characterisation of post-war Britain as 
authoritarian and illiberal suggests the tensions that existed between the Welfare 
State and more conservative elements of society. Alongside the traditional idea of 
the British state as a benevolent, caring parental figure sits an image of British society 
as being like an authoritarian Victorian father.  
In The Joy-Ride and After the authoritarian, bullying nature of British society 
is suggested not only in the behaviour of the individuals discussed above, but also in 
the conduct of employees of the British state, who are shown to have bullying 
tendencies. After Mrs Martineau has her hallucination about the ‘Indian’, she 
assaults Joe and he refuses to look after her anymore. Her care is taken over by 
another neighbour who soon calls the authorities. An ambulance arrives with two 
ambulance men and a nurse who tries to coax Mrs Martineau out of the flat: ‘“Come 
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along now, dear,” said the nurse. “Not going to give any more trouble, are we?”’115 
There is a disparity between the nurse’s reassuring language and what she and the 
ambulance men are actually doing, chasing Mrs Martineau around the tunnels in her 
home to try to extract her from the flat so that she may be taken to hospital. In the 
final stages of her ‘capture’, Mrs Martineau is pursued around the house by the 
nurse, the ambulance men and, eventually, by boys and men from other houses, who 
‘had swarmed down the steps’.116 The bullying nature of employees of the state is 
also seen in the final section of The Middling in the relationship between recovering 
alcoholic Ellie and her nurse, Hattie Straw, who puts sleeping powder in Ellie’s milk 
and constantly monitors her.117 Like the nurse in The Joy Ride and After, Hattie uses 
the pronoun ‘we’: “We’re tired, aren’t we?”118 This euphemistic expression is part of 
a register of aggressive pleasantness, which Barker suggests is not only disingenuous 
but also highly invasive and depersonalising. The patronising and infantilising 
language used by the state-employed nurses in Barker’s novels not only makes 
salient the idea of the state as a ‘parent’ and subjects or citizens as ‘children’ but also 
suggest that the state is a ‘bad’ parent because there is a disparity between its 
intentions and how state policy is being implemented at grass roots level.119 Further, 
the nurses’ use of the collective pronoun ‘we’ raises the issue of the state speaking 
on behalf of people as though they are children, thus undermining their personal 
agency. And because the Welfare State was introduced mainly to improve the living 
conditions of working-class people, the suggestion is that the people who are being 
‘spoken for’ are mainly of that class.120 
In Now the War Is Over (1985), Paul Addison notes the continued inequalities 
in British society post war, drawing attention to ‘the divergence of working-class 
reality from the ideals of citizenship conceived by social reformers’.121 ‘Then as now,’ 
he argues, ‘it was a fiction that governments make society. Society makes 
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governments, and unmakes them too’.122 Addison’s argument speaks to two of the 
main proposals I have made in this chapter. First of all, his argument that the ‘reality’ 
of working-class lives differed from the ‘ideals’ of social reformers is suggested by 
Barker’s fiction when it undermines the ideal of post-war equality for all by drawing 
attention to people like Mrs Martineau and the unnamed black doctor who are, 
respectively, victims of social neglect and racist attitudes. A second way that my 
argument chimes with Addison’s is in the idea that ‘society makes governments’ 
rather than vice versa. This takes account both of Garfinkel’s theory that a 
functioning society is created by the cooperation of individuals and of the suggestion 
in Barker’s articulated fiction that society may be disrupted by individuals’ lack of 
cooperation. The Joy-Ride and After suggests that working-class society is not 
functioning according to the ideals of Welfarism because of the psychological 
damage inflicted on its individual members by the violence of colonialism and the 
barbarism of the war. The motivation behind the creation of the Welfare State may 
be viewed as a desire to articulate the different areas of society, to make things work 
as one. If we accept this characterisation then Barker’s 1960s fiction appears to 
represent the failure of the ideals of the Welfare State due to the disarticulation of 
its members as a result of the legacies of colonialism, war and poverty, and due to 
social reformers’ own disarticulation from the ‘reality’ of working-class lives.   
This last point is particularly significant for a study of Barker’s writing and life. 
I suggested earlier that one reason for the gap in Barker’s publication history 
between 1951 and 1963 was her need to work full-time to live because she came 
from a working-class background and had no other means of support. The sense that 
Barker was a working-class author, writing about the people she knew and the 
background she came from, is seen in Hicks’s 1964 review of The Joy-Ride and After. 
He reads Barker’s novel alongside Jane Hervey’s Vain Shadow (1963) and writes that: 
‘The juxtaposition of the two books suggests that there are greater inequalities in 
contemporary England than might be expected in a welfare state. Miss Hervey’s 
Winthorpes live in considerable luxury, with servants, cars, and […] considerable 
financial resources. Miss Barker’s Munns, on the other hand, live in squalor, if not in 
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downright poverty.’123 This contemporary observation draws attention to the fact 
that in more recent years Barker’s writing has often been mis-characterised. In my 
introduction, for example, I quoted A.S. Byatt’s claim that Barker ‘attacks no large 
social issues’ and Robert McCrum’s argument that writers such as Barker made ‘the 
house of English fiction [look] like a shabby, suburban Edwardian rectory’ and 
produced work that lacked ‘energy or originality’.124 Put simply, these claims are 
incorrect. On the contrary, as I have tried to show in this chapter, Barker’s 1960s 
fiction is driven by her anger about the inequalities of British life, and her sense that 
a new articulated form could convey these in a different way to the novel or the short 
story. 
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Chapter Four 
The Old Woman, The Adolescent Girl and Masculinity in Barker’s ‘Ghost Stories’ 
 
Dear Miss Winant, 
Thank you very much for sending us your invoice for FETCHED by A. L. 
Barker.  
After many reads and much discussion, we have come to the 
conclusion that VIEW IN A LONG MIRROR is rather too macabre for us 
or for MODERN WOMAN, so I am returning it to you herewith. 
  Barbara Beauchamp, letter to Ursula Winant, 4th March 19521 
 
In March 1952, Barker’s agent received this letter from Barbara Beauchamp, fiction 
editor at Modern Woman and Woman’s Own. This was not the only time that ‘View 
in a Long Mirror’ was rejected. Though Barker’s agents were relatively successful in 
selling her stories to popular magazines, ‘View in a Long Mirror’ proved impossible 
to place and was returned unsold in the United States in December 1953 and in 
Britain in July 1954.2 It was finally published as part of a short story collection, Lost 
upon the Roundabouts (1964). Why the story is rejected so emphatically, not just by 
Modern Woman but by other popular magazines, is the question that frames this 
chapter. One answer to this question is that the representation of aged female 
sexuality in ‘View in a Long Mirror’ places the story on the wrong side of the limits of 
social acceptability. Another answer is that Barker’s ‘ghost story’ deconstructs the 
genre, thwarting the conventions and requirements of popular publications. Both of 
these explanations read ‘View in a Long Mirror’ as a transgressive, liminal text, a story 
that addresses taboo subjects and is itself taboo, and a narrative that addresses ideas 
of classification while itself resisting definition. 
                                                          
1 Barbara Beauchamp, letter to Ursula Winant, 4th March 1952, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
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Barker left Richmond Towers Ltd (sometime after 14th June 1954) she continued without an agent 
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only three stories published. See box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
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With this in mind, I begin by bringing theories of liminality and Julia Kristeva’s 
notion of abjection to bear on ‘View in a Long Mirror’. I argue that these ideas are 
essential to our understanding of the story’s representation of the threat young 
reporter, Griff Palmer, associates with aged female sexuality. A contrast is 
established between the liminality of eighty-year-old Delie Rivers and Griff’s youth 
and ‘masculine’ ambition, which I contextualise historically with a discussion of 
masculinity in 1950s Britain. However, oppositions between female/male and 
innocence/experience are later problematised, most obviously in the final image of 
the story, which reverses the gender roles in the well-known image of ‘death and the 
maiden’, staging abject female sexuality and threatening masculine subjectivity. This 
image, I go on to argue, invites a comparison between ‘View in a Long Mirror’ and a 
scene from The Joy-Ride and After in which Joe walks in on Esther masturbating. The 
latter text is also concerned with the perceived threat to masculinity posed by female 
sexuality and the female body as abject. In this case, however, the threat is from an 
adolescent girl rather than an old woman. Ideas of innocence and experience, of who 
should and shouldn’t know, are key to the representation of female old age and 
adolescence as abject. Esther threatens Joe because she has precocious sexual 
knowledge, just as Delie’s sexuality challenges Griff’s masculinity. I propose that both 
women may be read in relation to the femme fatale, a figure through which questions 
of sexuality and knowledge become intertwined. Delie and Esther challenge the 
attempts made by Griff and Joe to find out the ‘true’ story and reveal their true 
identities. The threat posed by these women of marginal age is tied to their 
resistance to definition. 
As my example from The Joy-Ride and After shows, Barker’s representation 
of the liminal and abject female adolescent is not confined to her supernatural 
fiction, but from the 1970s onwards this figure appears repeatedly in Barker’s ‘ghost 
stories’. In sections three and four I turn my attention to these ghostly adolescent 
girls, reading Barker’s ‘Dark Fantasy’ story, ‘Charley’ (1989) in the light of ideas of 
adolescence in the work of Freud and G. Stanley Hall, and in theories of liminality. 
These accounts describe the adolescent as a transgressive, powerful and potentially 
dangerous figure that evades classification. The female adolescent, unformed, 
‘plastic’ and always in the process of becoming a subject, is represented as a 
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particularly problematic figure. For Geoffrey, the male academic narrator of 
‘Charley’, the adolescent girl’s resistance to classification poses a threat. Barker’s 
preoccupation with the relationship between an academic male narrator and an 
adolescent girl suggests a reading of ‘Charley’ in relation to Freud’s famous case 
study, ‘Fragment of an Analysis of Hysteria (Dora)’ (1905). This comparison sheds 
light on the tension between the male narrator’s perception of the adolescent girl as 
unformed and incomplete and the idea that the masculine subject requires the 
female adolescent to be fragmentary in order to stabilise his own identity. Further, 
my examination of ‘Element of Doubt’ (1987) considers the representation of female 
adolescence as ghostly in Barker’s fiction. Both of these ‘ghost stories’, I argue, 
illuminate the challenge posed by female adolescence to the stability of male adult 
identity, and to psychoanalysis. 
My argument in the first four sections is that there is something haunting, 
unsettling, liminal, and abject about both aged and adolescent female sexuality as 
they are experienced by the male protagonists in Barker’s ‘ghost stories’, and in her 
other fiction. The final section draws on these arguments in order to propose that 
‘View in a Long Mirror’ deconstructs the ghost story form. I argue that the story is 
significant not only because it helps us to think about how Barker uses the ghostly in 
her work but also because it requires us to consider our expectations of a ghost story. 
For Barker, the ghostly is not about conventional ‘ghosts’ but about inability to 
classify, define and interpret. This is why old women and adolescent girls so often 
feature in her ghost stories. These female characters’ resistance to interpretation 
stages the deferral of meaning in the ghost story. Further, the pervasive quality of 
the ghostliness of age is demonstrated by the fact that it is not contained by the ghost 
story genre and spills over into Barker’s other fiction. Perhaps this is why her writing 
has so often been mis-read, mis-placed and rejected.   
 
I.  The Old Woman and Masculinity 
‘View in a Long Mirror’ opens on a wet Tuesday morning in a suburban cul-de-sac as 
veteran reporter, Leslie Kinch and his apprentice, Griff, make their way to the home 
of Magdala, a long-forgotten actress, celebrated in the 1890s. Magdala is to be 
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featured in what Kinch calls ‘[a] little fillup on the Woman’s Page – ‘Twilight of a 
Goddess’ or ‘What was Naughty about the Nineties’.3 The men arrive at Magdala’s 
address to find the house in disrepair. The door is opened by an elderly, fragile-
looking woman who is obviously alarmed by the intrusion. She insists: “I’m not 
Magdala – Magdala’s ill.”4 Nevertheless, Kinch manages to secure an interview with 
the woman, who introduces herself as Delie Rivers, Magdala’s understudy. Although 
he gathers some press-worthy gossip, Kinch is not persuaded by Delie and once 
outside he declares: “That was Magdala you saw.”5 Griff, too, is unconvinced – but 
by the woman’s statement rather than her identity. Unlike Kinch, who leaves to write 
up his article in the pub, Griff is not satisfied. Returning to the house via its overgrown 
garden, he encounters what he thinks is a grave. Determined to capture the truth, he 
enters the loggia at the back of the house and finds himself face to face with Delie. 
Griff confronts her about the grave and, losing his temper, shouts: “Magdala’s dead! 
She’s buried out there in the garden!”6 Finally, Delie agrees that Magdala is indeed 
dead, and buried in the grave Griff saw. At the end of the story Griff is elated, 
crowing: “I knew all along” […] “Kinch was on the wrong track altogether. He thought 
you were Magdala”.7  
‘View in a Long Mirror’ emphasises the marginality of Delie’s position. She 
lives alone, on a cul-de-sac, in a dilapidated house that is ‘thickly furred with oilgreen 
ivy’.8 Griff thinks that: ‘Whoever lived here […] had pulled the bricks over their heads, 
shut their eyes and never looked out. […] The house had a dead look; mealy-grey, 
paintless the wood; nothing livelier than a damp patch […] could be creeping behind 
those windows.’9 The language here suggests something more than marginality. The 
image of a person ‘pull[ing] the bricks over [her head]’ imagines Delie as a liminal 
figure encased or even entombed in her home and thus separated from the rest of 
society. Arnold Van Gennep argues that liminality is a phase of transition during a rite 
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of passage that is experienced by a person who is rendered ambiguous. Those in the 
liminal stage may be segregated from the community, Van Gennep argues.10 Victor 
Turner develops this, asserting that ‘liminality is frequently likened to death, to being 
in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness’.11 Delie’s confinement in her home 
resembles a liminal stage, not just because of her segregation but also due to the 
imagery of death in the passage, and the fact that Griff’s image of Delie figures her 
as absent from the house and imagines her shutting her eyes and not looking out, 
suggesting both invisibility and darkness. 
Turner defines a liminal or ‘threshold person’ as someone who ‘elude[s] or 
slip[s] through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions 
in cultural space’.12 In ‘View in a Long Mirror’ Delie is represented as a ghostly 
‘threshold person’ who eludes classification: ‘She wore a burgundy dress and a bright 
pink shawl, badly knitted on big needles. At first glance that was all you saw. The 
wool and velvet eclipsed her. […] she was half-shadow already. A tall flimsy woman 
with a cloud of stained grey hair – it was a long time since she’d been flesh and blood. 
She was the stuff, now, that moths are made of.’13 As well as emphasising Delie’s old 
age, weakness and lack of substance, this passage complicates her classification as 
human: she is ‘eclipsed’ by her clothes, ‘half shadow’ (and thus only half human?), 
no longer ‘flesh and blood’ but insect. The woman called ‘Delie’ also resists 
classification in the sense that she does not have a fixed identity as either Delie or 
Magdala. Although Griff calls her Delie, Kinch believes she is Magdala; it is never clear 
which is the case. Either way, this woman has been stripped of her role as 
understudy/actor/companion by old age and her friend’s death and is in transition. 
According to Turner, a threshold person also evades temporal classification, 
appearing to be ‘in and out of time’, in-between the future and the past.14 Delie is 
cut-off from the living world and the future and inhabits the past. Not only is her 
house ‘redolent of the past’, she is reanimated by telling stories about the past and, 
when she is interrupted by the demands of the present, Griff notes that ‘[i]t was a 
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long way back from where she had been’.15 Delie’s elision of both spatial and 
temporal classification figures her as a liminal figure who, like a ghost, is located in-
between human and not-human, life and death, present and past.  
Haim Hazan notes the equivalence between the elderly and initiates 
experiencing a rite of passage but argues that, due to ‘the absence of a socially 
defined destination for [the elderly in] this transformative process’, the parallel 
‘cannot be sustained’.16 Instead, Hazan argues, for the elderly ‘a state of limbo 
becomes permanent, and transition is superseded by stagnation. Furthermore, while 
sometimes the blurring of category boundaries receives social legitimation, ageing 
remains associated with the untouchable and abominable’.17 Ageing, he concludes, 
‘is out of bounds, associated with demonic power’.18 Hazan’s language suggests that 
the old are not just liminal but abject. In Powers of Horror (1982) Julia Kristeva argues 
that abjection is caused by ‘what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’.19 
According to this definition Delie is a figure of abjection: she disturbs system and 
order by eluding classification, and disturbs identity because hers is not fixed. 
Initiates going through a rite of passage are liminal for a set period of time, after 
which they are re-incorporated into society. But the elderly, as Hazan suggests, 
remain suspended in transition and thus become abject: in ‘a state of limbo’, 
‘untouchable and abominable’, ‘out of bounds’. 
In contrast to the arrested, ambiguous figure of Delie, Griff is represented as 
being certain about his place in the world and his future. Aged seventeen, he is keen 
to establish his place at the centre of things as an ‘ace reporter’.20 As he ventures 
into Delie’s garden Griff constructs a narrative of masculine success:  
 
   His ambition was to be the busy newspaper-man. So he would, one 
day. ‘Send Palmer,’ they’d say, ‘Palmer can handle it.’ ‘Griffith Palmer, 
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our special correspondent –’ ‘Palmer’s dispatch from Moscow.’ 
‘Palmer’s in Tibet, in Wagga-Wagga, in Timbuctoo.’ 
[…] 
   He struck aside into the shrubbery. Take a look round, he decided, 
that’s the first thing. His heart was thudding. Palmer’s first job. 
‘Initiative, daring, and a brilliant piece of reportage put Palmer on the 
map at the very outset of his career…’21 
 
The sentence ‘[h]e struck aside into the shrubbery’ suggests the idea of an explorer 
hacking through the jungle, an image which carries masculine connotations through 
its association with adventure stories and Colonial narratives.22 The commentary 
Griff imagines reinforces this reading, with its mention of far away, exotic locations. 
It figures him as a successful male figure, not just a busy newspaper-man but ‘the 
busy newspaper-man’, and therefore an idealised masculine type. Griff imagines 
himself having a clear, socially-recognised male identity with stereotypically 
‘masculine’ attributes such as action (‘busy newspaper-man’), strength and ability to 
cope with adversity (‘Palmer can handle it.’), bravery (‘daring’), and career success 
(‘on the map’, which also alludes to Colonial conquest).  
However, Griff’s sense of his masculinity is threatened and eventually 
undermined by Delie. Griff observes Kinch’s interview with Delie, in which she tells 
stories about Malgdala’s lover, Frank Fargo. It is implied that the stories contain a 
sexual element as they bring about a sexual awakening in Delie; she is described as 
‘agitated’, ‘eager’, ‘all alive’, with a ‘loosened’ tongue – all signs of sexual arousal.23 
Later, Griff thinks that ‘Kinch had known how to touch her on the quick’, a phrase 
which also has sexual connotations.24 Griff finds ‘the sight of this grey ghost whipped 
up’ to be ‘distasteful’.25 The use of the word distasteful is significant because it relates 
to the senses and therefore to the abject. Kristeva argues that ‘[f]ood loathing is 
perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection.’26 Griff’s ‘distaste’ 
suggests that he finds Delie’s aged sexuality abject, and therefore threatening.  
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Delie’s story-telling also makes Griff feel child-like and, by implication, 
‘unmanly’: ‘Griff stood first on one foot, then on the other. It took years off him. He 
was back again at his mother’s street-corner gossips, waiting, waiting, while the talk 
bubbled and rustled and laughter neighed out and pins crept up from his heels. He 
resented being made uncomfortable, made young again.’27 As well as feeling 
physically uncomfortable, Griff is made uncomfortable in the sense that he is 
embarrassed by Delie’s sexual excitement. More than this, Griff experiences 
discomfort because he is ‘made’ to feel something other than a man: a powerless 
child who must wait for his mother. His resentment is made clear in the negative 
representation of the women’s ‘gossip’ he experienced as a child. The word gossip 
downgrades the status of the women’s talk and the phrase ‘laughter neighed out’ 
suggests that it is animalistic and incomprehensible. This draws on gender 
stereotypes about female gossip being futile and insignificant in comparison to male 
talk. Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet argue that male denigration of 
female ‘gossip’, a term that originates in the Old English term ‘god sib’ or godparent, 
is linked to the practice of women gathering together for a child’s birth and ‘men’s 
fears of what unsupervised women might be saying to one another on such 
occasions’.28 Griff’s criticism of his mother’s talk appears motivated by his dislike of 
being subject to female power (‘waiting, waiting’) and by the threat of the women’s 
talk which ‘rustled’ like something alive but unseen. 
Female power over men is again emphasised in Delie’s description of her and 
Magdala’s ‘heyday’ as actresses in the 1890s: 
 
She leaned towards him, exultant. “You’ve seen creatures come round 
a lamp at night, furry important creatures, come in out of their own 
dark and bumble round and bat their wings and fry on the glass – ” Her 
lips were moist now, and eager. “I’ve seen men do that. I’ve seen them 
coming round her, not wanting to, some of them, but drawn in each on 
his own string, ready to be led by it, tied by it, dangled on the end of 
it.29 
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Delie’s speech represents men as ‘creatures’ whose self-importance is undermined 
by her description of them as ‘furry’ and ‘bumbl[ing]’. Men are figured as passive, 
helpless, lacking in agency, and easily controlled and manipulated, like dogs on leads 
or puppets ‘dangled’ on strings. The memory of male helplessness and the 
implication that some men were harmed (‘fr[ied] on the glass’) excites Delie: she is 
described as ‘eager’ and her lips are ‘moist’, again suggesting sexual arousal. It is 
significant that this narrative of late-Victorian female power occupies the same text 
as Griff’s memories and experiences of female power in mid-twentieth-century 
Britain. I propose that ‘View in a Long Mirror’ makes a connection between these two 
historical moments and draws on their mutual concern about the weakening and 
‘feminisation’ of masculinity. I want to read Griff’s identification with ‘the busy 
newspaper-man’ and his response to female power and sexuality in relation to ideas 
of masculinity in 1950s Britain. Later I will explore the connection between the 1950s 
and the 1890s in relation to the figure of the femme fatale.  
Brian Baker proposes that: ‘The postwar generation of men, with no war to 
fight (unlike their fathers), brought their ‘tough’ masculinity back into the realm of 
the social and domestic.’30 This kind of assertion of masculinity is what is represented 
in ‘View in a Long Mirror’ when Griff imagines his self-appointed task to get the ‘truth’ 
from Delie in the language of masculine Colonial conquest. An anti-feminine rhetoric 
existed in male discourse in the 1950s. Susan Kingsley Kent argues that male writers 
in 1950s expressed their anger ‘over the state of things’ through gender’.31 Susan 
Brook concurs, arguing that the ‘Angry Young Men’, were not united by their angry 
class resistance but by their anger towards women, and by their ‘representation of 
masculinity as a mode of rebellion and authenticity’.32 Male authenticity is 
constructed against female inauthenticity so that the ‘feminine’ establishment is 
seen as hypocritical and thus two-faced and deceptive. Baker agrees with Brook’s 
assessment of the ‘Angry’ novels, arguing that they were characterised by a 
                                                          
30 Brian Baker, Masculinity in Fiction and Film: Representing Men in Popular Genres, 1945-2000, 
2006 (London and New York: Continuum Books, 2008), p. 31. 
31 Kingsley Kent, Gender and Power, p. 324. 
32 Susan Brook, ‘Engendering Rebellion: The Angry Young Man, Class and Masculinity’, in Daniel Lea 
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masculinity ‘which defin[ed] its own independence and ‘toughness’ in relationship to 
a feminizing (or emasculating) authority – in the shape of the boss, the government, 
or the wife/girlfriend’.33 Baker describes this process as ‘Othering the 
feminine/feminizing the Other to define the masculine’.34 I propose that this process 
of ‘othering the feminine’ is precisely what is dramatised in ‘View in a Long Mirror’. 
Griff’s experience of Delie’s aged female sexuality as abject, and his comparison of 
waiting for her to waiting for his mother, represents Delie as a threatening figure of 
female authority, and other to Griff’s masculine identity. 
After eliciting a rambling confession from Delie, Griff tries to pin-point the 
facts of the story, attempting to reassert masculine control: ‘Manfully he tried to get 
his thumb on the situation. “You just tell me how [Magdala] died – and why you 
buried her out there.”’35 He challenges Delie: “I knew you weren’t telling the truth. I 
knew all along. You can’t fool newspaper-men.”36 Griff’s ‘manful’ attempt to master 
the situation and his emphasis on Delie not being able to fool newpaper-men is 
significant. The gendered language opposes Griff’s male desire for the facts of the 
story to Delie’s concealment of the ‘truth’, which is figured as feminine. Griff, the 
male storyteller, wishes to assert control by uncovering the ‘true’ story but his 
version of events is undermined by Delie’s insistence on ambiguity. She has the last 
word, the final assertion of control. ‘View in a Long Mirror’ builds up to a ghostly 
dénouement in which Delie describes to Griff the experience of looking at Magdala: 
 
She looked up at him with a smouldering slyness. “You know, it was 
like seeing myself in a long mirror. That’s what it was like. But not now. 
Not any more.” And she laughed – the thin echo, off-key, of that glib 
stage-laugh which rings out to the last row of the gallery. “There was 
no coffin, you see, and the grave’s a busy place.” 
    Slowly, sweepingly, she stretched her arms above her head. All the 
slumberous invitation of the odalisque was in the gesture. The loose 
sleeves fell away from the yellow twigs of her bones, her smile was 
wide – too wide – and lipless. Shadows brimmed the deep eye sockets, 
there looked out the hollow lantern of a skull. 
  “I fancy there’s a lot to choose between us now,” she said.37 
                                                          
33 Baker, Masculinity in Fiction and Film, p. 31. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Barker, ‘View in a Long Mirror’, p. 26. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., pp. 26-7.  
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Delie’s balletic gesture and the image of the skull in this bizarre passage evoke 
the ‘Danse Macabre’, a late medieval allegory for the universality of death in which 
the person about to die dances with death before being carried off to the afterlife. 
One of the most well-known variants of the Danse Macabre is the often-sexualised 
‘death and the maiden’ image of a masculine death figure carrying away and/or 
seducing an adolescent girl or young woman. The comparison between Delie’s 
gesture and the ‘invitation of the odalisque’ (a female slave or concubine) 
emphasises her sexuality. The description of her deep skull-like eye sockets and her 
bones as ‘yellow twigs’ suggests death. This combination of sex and death evokes the 
‘death and the maiden’ motif in particular, rather than a more general Danse 
Macabre image.  
The crucial aspect of Barker’s image of an old woman performing a sexualised 
dance to a young man is that it calls to mind, but reverses, the motif of death and the 
maiden, presenting death as female and ‘the maiden’ as male. The image also inverts 
the opposition between sexual innocence and experience. Griff takes on the role of 
the ‘innocent’ maiden and Delie becomes death, a figure of experience and evil. This 
reverses traditional assumptions about the sexual knowledge of men and women, 
where the woman is sexually innocent in comparison to the man’s sexual experience. 
The inversion is even more notable because of Delie’s old age. Her sexual 
knowingness subverts the idea that old people, particularly old women, are not 
sexual. Aged female sexuality, like that of adolescent girls (as I discuss later), may be 
seen as illicit or transgressive because these age categories are ‘other’ to the adult, 
and are not seen as possessing adult sexual desires and functions. Sally Chivers 
argues that ‘[e]lderly bodies do not usually exercise sexual desire for the socially 
sanctioned end of procreation, so any discussion of sexuality and the elderly forces 
recognition of sexual desire for its own sake’.38 The inversion of innocence and 
experience in ‘View in a Long Mirror’ is likely to have shocked the average reader of 
Modern Woman in 1950s Britain, a society that was particularly conservative about 
any sexuality that differed from the norm (homosexuality, for example). Further, like 
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many ‘death and the maiden’ images, Barker’s image implies that Delie will seduce 
and carry away Griff. Thus the threat posed to Griff’s masculinity by Delie’s aged 
female sexuality is potentially psychical as well as psychological. The image at the 
end of ‘View in a Long Mirror’ is a metaphor for the way that female power and 
sexuality threatens masculine identity, which in turn figures women as ‘other’.  
In addition to putting emphasis on gender-inversion, the reversal of 
innocence and experience, and the threat of female sexuality, the passage from 
‘View in a Long Mirror’ makes a direct comparison between the aged female 
sexualised body and a corpse, thus staging its abjection. For Kristeva, the corpse is 
the most abject, ‘the most sickening of wastes’ because it eradicates the border 
between self and other, life and death: ‘[i]t is death infecting life’.39 Barker’s story 
dramatises this abject disruption of order. Delie’s smile is ‘too wide – and lipless’ and 
shadows brim her eye sockets. The language of excess and overflow in ‘too wide’, 
‘lipless’ and ‘brimmed’ suggests a lack of containment, where what is inside the body 
or the grave breaks out. Inversely, the phrase ‘the grave’s a busy place’ suggests a 
breakdown in the materiality of the body, with elements that should remain outside 
getting in. The corpse and the aged female body appear as one when death, here 
figured as shadows and a hollow skull, ‘look[s] out’ at Griff from inside Delie’s living 
body. This unity recalls Delie’s role as Magdala’s understudy, her mirror-image or 
‘view in the mirror’, emphasising the uncertainty about which woman is alive and 
which is dead. Barker’s image stages abjection because it troubles distinctions 
between inside and outside, living and dead and self and other. The image is also 
ghostly according to Hélène Cixous’s description of the ghost as a figure that ‘erases 
the limit which exists between two states, neither alive nor dead’.40 Perhaps this 
abject, ghostly representation of aged female sexuality is what rendered Barker’s 
story ‘too macabre for us or for MODERN WOMAN’? In the following section I build 
on my discussions of ‘the othering of the feminine in order to define the masculine’ 
and Barker’s gendered reversal of the innocence/experience opposition, arguing that 
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The Joy-Ride and After stages a gender-inversion that is similar to the one in ‘View in 
a Long Mirror’.  
 
II. Knowing 
In The Joy Ride and After Joe’s perception of Esther Munn’s adolescent sexuality is 
also represented in terms of abjection and as a threat to male subjectivity. While 
searching for his little brother’s missing kitten, Joe walks in on Esther masturbating: 
 
  He hadn’t been expecting that and he got quite a shock. That mimm 
neatness of hers was gone, she was sprawled like a rag doll, half rubbed 
out under the tousled bedclothes. […] 
  “The kid’s lost his kitten.” If he could have stopped looking at her, 
stopped seeing her all broken down into something soft and dirty and 
knowing – that was the worst of it, the knowing – she and the raddled 
bed and the smelling room, they knew.41 
 
Like Delie in the final image of ‘View in the Long Mirror’, Esther is represented as 
abject when perceived through male eyes. She disturbs identity, becoming ‘like a rag 
doll’, ‘something soft and dirty’, a thing rather than a person. The passage describes 
a breakdown of corporality that is strikingly similar to Delie’s disintegration. Esther is 
‘half rubbed out’ and ‘all broken down’, phrases that imply a breaching of the borders 
of her body so that it merges with the bed, becoming composite and ambiguous. 
Joe’s reaction to Esther further suggests a reading in terms of abjection. He feels 
nausea: ‘Joe felt the curdling in his stomach, he needed to run to the back of the 
workshop and spit’.42 Faced with the abject, Kristeva writes: ‘I experience a gagging 
sensation and […] spasms in the stomach, the belly’.43 But Joe also feels that ‘[h]e 
wanted to watch’, ‘he had to see’.44 Joe’s dual reaction speaks to Kristeva’s idea of 
‘jouissance’, the notion that while the subject finds the abject repugnant, (s)he is at 
the same time drawn to it by fascination and desire.45 Kristeva argues that the subject 
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is ‘in perpetual danger’ from the abject, which is ‘something rejected from which one 
does not part’.46 I want to keep in mind this sense of the subject’s constant desire 
for/threat from the abject as I turn to the question of Esther’s sexual knowledge. 
‘Knowing’ is an important word in the passage. For Joe, ‘the worst of it’ is ‘the 
knowing’. In Joe’s mind Esther has merged with ‘the raddled bed and the smelling 
room’ so that all three have a shared consciousness, they ‘know’. This implies a 
threat. Esther’s sexual knowledge threatens Joe and gives her power over him: ‘it 
was her stint small body that dominated his. He thought of it, bird-boned and puffy 
[…] with a shudder of abject longing.’47 The passage also suggests that Joe is 
somehow implicated in what he has seen. (I discuss this further below.) As in ‘View 
in a Long Mirror’, there is a gender-inversion here: the female is sexually 
knowing/experienced and the male is sexually innocent/inexperienced. Joe departs 
from the stereotype of the highly-sexed adolescent boy. He is afraid of sex, and 
appears to have no sexual knowledge until he sees Esther masturbating, after which 
he is ‘sick cold and furious […] insulted with the truth’.48 In contrast to Joe’s 
‘innocence’, Esther is represented as sexually ‘knowing’. Before coming to live with 
Joe’s family, she lived with Flo Keppel, a former actress turned prostitute, and was 
involved with the men who came to the house. Esther blackmailed one of Keppel’s 
customers and bought a red coat with the proceeds: “[Keppel] called them all ‘Peter’ 
– she liked to think there’d only been the one – but I found out who he was and 
where he lived.” She touched the red coat with affection. “That’s how I bought 
this.”49 It is never clear whether Esther blackmailed the man with the information 
that he visited a prostitute, or with the knowledge that she and he had had sex. Either 
way, Esther’s sexual knowledge is implied, and is symbolised by the red coat, which 
marks her out as a girl to follow in the street.50  
After Joe sees Esther masturbating she becomes ghostly, possessing his mind: 
‘[w]hat he couldn’t forget that night was Esther. Not that he thought about her, she 
                                                          
46 Ibid., pp. 9, 4. 
47 Barker, The Joy-Ride, p. 91 (my italics). 
48 Ibid., p. 63 
49 Ibid., p. 93. 
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just moved into his mind and stayed. She knew about everything he did’.51 Her 
presence in his mind is one over which he has no control: ‘[h]e couldn’t get away […], 
wherever he went she would be there first’.52 One evening, he finds himself following 
a girl in a red coat: ‘[t]hat bright crackerjack daub was a far shout from Esther Munn’, 
he thinks.53 He follows her through the streets, up a fire escape and onto the roof of 
the Khedive Cinema. Just before he encounters the girl face-to-face, Joe hesitates:  
 
Joe remembered his excitement and hope and longing for something 
the red coat had seemed to promise. He couldn’t even be sure now 
what that was. All his dread of her kind had come back, of the faceless 
girls against the park railings, of the things that asked to be done, of 
the sweet itch and crawl of his skin at the nightmare of doing them. 
Drymouthed, he stood staring at the red coat. The girl sighed, shifting 
into the angle of the doorway. A faint light fell across her cheek – she 
was Esther Munn.54  
 
Joe’s pursuit of the red-coated girl through the streets, Esther’s ‘unmasking’ in the 
light of the doorway: The Joy-Ride and After deploys the conventions of classic Film 
Noir and, in doing so, evokes the figure of the ‘femme fatale’. I want to read Esther 
as a femme fatale figure. She is sexually knowing and ‘knows’ Joe in an almost 
supernatural way, drawing him towards her by eliciting ‘his excitement and hope and 
longing’. She is also unknown: Joe follows her without realising her identity, and 
figures her as a representative of ‘her kind’ like ‘the faceless girls’. It is this 
combination of sexual knowingness, supernatural powers, and mystery that suggests 
a reading of Esther in the light of the archetypal figure of the femme fatale.  
For Mary Ann Doane, the femme fatale is a ‘figure of a certain discursive 
unease, a potential epistemological trauma’ because ‘she never really is what she 
seems to be’ and thus ‘harbors a threat which is not entirely legible, predictable, or 
manageable’.55 The femme fatale, it seems, is an abject figure that disturbs identity 
and evades definition. In The Joy-Ride and After, Joe’s pursuit of Esther draws 
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attention to the difference between what she seems to be and what she is. The 
question of who she is and what she knows is always in doubt; she lies throughout 
the book and delights in concealing as well as revealing knowledge. Earlier I noted 
that when Esther merges with the bed and the room she presents an undefined 
threat in which Joe is implicated. Joe’s sense of entanglement derives from the 
instability of Esther’s identity. Because she cannot be known she appears 
uncontained. Esther also disturbs Joe’s identity in the sense that she ‘move[s] into 
his mind’ and diminishes his autonomy. As in Kristeva’s notion of ‘jouissance’, Joe is 
drawn to Esther with ‘excitement and hope and longing’ but at the same time 
repelled by what she stands for: ‘the things that asked to be done’ and ‘the sweet 
itch and crawl of his skin at the nightmare of doing them’. Esther’s power over Joe 
stages the ‘perpetual danger' to the subject from the ‘sweet itch’ of the abject.56 This 
enticing and unsettling grasp resembles the power attributed to the figure of the 
femme fatale, a power gained by her resistance to male attempts to define and 
‘know’ her. 
Doane’s description of the femme fatale also speaks to the characterisation 
of Delie Rivers, another woman who ‘never really is what she seems to be’ and poses 
an uncontainable threat to male subjectivity. Earlier I noted that the gendered 
language in ‘View in a Long Mirror’ suggests an opposition between Delie’s ‘feminine’ 
ambiguity and concealment and Griff’s ‘male’ desire to track down and reveal the 
‘truth’. Doane argues that by ‘transforming the threat of the woman into a secret, 
something which must be aggressively revealed, unmasked, discovered, the [femme 
fatale] is fully compatible with the epistemological drive of narrative, the 
hermeneutic structuration of the classical text’.57 The ‘imbrication of knowledge and 
sexuality’ noted by Doane in relation to the femme fatale may be seen in Barker’s 
fiction.58 Female knowledge, secret and threatening, becomes sexualised and men’s 
attempts to find out what women know are characterised by Freud’s ‘epistemophilic 
instinct’.59 Griff’s pursuit of the ‘true’ story recalls Joe’s stalking of Esther. Both locate 
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the object of their desire in the body of a woman, and both are excited by the idea 
of revealing the story or unmasking the identity of the women they chase.  
The sense that women are ‘secret’ and must be ‘unmasked’ speaks to notions 
of female inauthenticity in 1950s British society and culture, and to the power to 
deceive possessed by the performing woman in the 1890s. Through its comparison 
of female power in the Victorian theatre to the power of Griff’s mother at mid-
century, ‘View in a Long Mirror’ makes a connection between the 1890s and the 
1950s, drawing on their mutual concern about the weakening and ‘feminisation’ of 
masculinity. The Joy-Ride and After also registers mid-century ideas of the deceptive 
woman through its allusions to Film Noir and the femme fatale. In the 1950s the 
‘feminine’ establishment is seen as hypocritical, two-faced and deceptive. According 
to Doane, a similar sense of female inauthenticity is present in discourses of 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the cinema, which ‘ally women with deception, 
secretiveness, a kind of anti-knowledge or, on the other hand, situate them as 
privileged conduits to a – necessarily complex and even devious – truth.’60 It is 
significant that the femme fatale emerges in the late-nineteenth century and, 
according to Doane, ‘is a clear indication of the extent of the fears and anxieties 
prompted by shifts in the understanding of sexual difference’ in this period.61 This 
historical placing calls to mind Delie’s involvement in the theatre of the 1890s. Kerry 
Powell argues that Victorian masculinity was threatened by the female actress and 
that, in order to dilute this threat, she was reconstructed ‘as a renegade female, one 
fundamentally different from normative wives and mothers, marginally “feminine” if 
feminine at all, quite possibly inhuman’.62 This construction of the ‘inhuman’ 
performing woman has striking similarities to the characterisation of the femme 
fatale, or ‘fatal woman’, a figure often aligned with ghosts, vampires, witches and 
other supernatural figures.63 It calls to mind the representation of Delie as ‘half 
shadow’ and no longer ‘flesh and blood’, and her description of Magdala’s almost 
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supernatural power to draw men around her like flies, also evoking Esther’s ghostly 
inhabitation of Joe’s mind. Delie and Esther are both associated with performance. 
Esther performs the identity of the girl in the red coat; Delie built a career on being 
Magdala. In the minds of the men who observe them both women are associated 
with deception and are elusive because of the doubt about their identities.  
I propose that the age of Barker’s sexually-knowing and unknowable female 
characters is one cause of their ghostliness. Delie’s old age is certainly significant in 
‘View in a Long Mirror’. It contributes to her liminality and Griff’s sense of her as 
abject. But the fact that the language of the passage that describes Delie’s sexualised 
dance is so similar to that of the description of Esther masturbating in The Joy-Ride 
and After, and that both images of female sexuality are witnessed by men, suggests 
that Delie’s old age may not be the story’s primary concern. Instead, Barker is 
preoccupied with the ghostliness of marginal age categories: adolescence as well as 
old age. Part of what makes a ghost terrifying is its knowledge and inhabitation of 
‘the other side’, its disregard for the border between known and unknown worlds. 
The liminal categories of female old age and adolescence are represented as being 
abject and ghostly because they resist male definition, and also because the idea of 
aged and adolescent women being sexually ‘knowing’ rather than sexually innocent 
is especially threatening to masculine identity. In ‘View in a Long Mirror’ and The Joy-
Ride and After, then, both aged and adolescent female sexuality are ghostly. But, as 
I show in the pages that follow, it is the adolescent girl in particular who continues to 
be represented as a problematic and haunting figure in Barker’s later ghost stories. 
 
III. The Ghostly Adolescent Girl 
The girl, or whatever it was we had stopped for – I did wonder – 
materialized, and I continued to wonder. She was not immediately 
definable as human.  
[…] Her features were a blur, indeed she was blurred from head to foot. 
Barker, ‘Charley’64 
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Things are or become spectral, haunted and haunting when there is an inability to 
identify, define and interpret them, when they exist or appear at a limit, in transition, 
or without clear definition as one thing or another. Ghosts haunt. Texts haunt. And, 
in Barker’s fiction, female adolescence haunts. Coming face to face with an 
adolescent girl is represented as an encounter with something that can’t quite be 
identified, something blurred, neither wholly adult nor wholly child. Theories of 
haunting emphasise the ghost as an ambiguous, transient figure, neither dead nor 
alive but moving between states and passing through boundaries. These conceptions 
of the ghostly speak to adolescence, the period in a person’s life when she crosses 
from childhood into adulthood, existing between one state and the other. 
Adolescence is also the point at which a person’s body quite literally becomes 
unfamiliar or uncanny as it grows, develops and changes. As such, adolescence is a 
discrete developmental category, different to both adulthood and childhood, which 
challenges the limits of identification and interpretation. Female adolescence 
provides a particular challenge in Barker’s fiction. In her ‘ghost stories’ of the 1970s 
and 1980s the adolescent girl viewed from a male perspective is represented as 
liminal and abject, and associated with the supernatural. In this section I read 
Barker’s ‘dark fantasy’ story, ‘Charley’ (1989) alongside anthropological and 
psychoanalytical accounts of adolescence, arguing that the ghostly instability of 
female adolescence troubles the rational desire to classify and define exhibited by 
Barker’s male academic narrator.65  
Catherine Driscoll argues that ‘adolescence is not a clear denotation of any 
age, body, behaviour, or identity, because it has always meant the process of 
developing a self […] rather than any definition of that self’.66 In addition to pointing 
out the instability of the term, she also emphasises that the experience of being 
adolescent is figured as unstable: 
 
Despite changes in understanding childhood and youth and the 
distinctions between them, adolescence continues to be conceived as 
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a disruption of childhood and prior to a projected adulthood. 
Adolescence also functions as an explanation of the indispensable 
difficulty of becoming a subject, agent, or independent or self-aware 
person, as well as a periodization that constructs both childhood and 
adulthood as relative stabilities. Understanding this difficult 
adolescence as universal trauma is a twentieth-century Western idea 
that retrospectively constructs childhood as a period of stability, 
heightening both the crucial intensity of adolescence as transformative 
passage and the distance between childhood and maturity.67 
 
Driscoll’s observation that in the twentieth century adolescence was seen to 
represent the trials of becoming a modern subject recalls the connections between 
adolescent experience and modernist experience that I proposed in chapter one. 
Neubauer argues that the modern age discovered in adolescence ‘a mirror of its own 
uneasiness with its heritage, its crisis of identity, and its groping for a new one’.68 
Following Neubauer, I likened the rapid, forceful change of modernist experience to 
the instability of adolescence. Driscoll’s description of the adolescent stage as a 
‘transformative passage’ speaks to the idea of adolescence as a liminal state between 
childhood and adulthood. She observes that the category is characterised by a lack 
of definition and that adolescence has historically been associated with states of 
disorder, transition, and trauma. I want to explore further Driscoll’s characterisation 
of adolescence, first, with reference to the work of Freud and Hall and, second, in 
relation to the theories of liminality outlined earlier in the chapter. 
Both Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality and Hall’s 1904 study of adolescence 
figure adolescence as a stage akin to a ‘universal trauma’ or identity crisis. For Hall, 
‘[a]dolescence is a new birth’, a period of rapid development ‘suggestive of some 
ancient period of storm and stress when old moorings were broken’, and a stage at 
which ‘[c]haracter and personality are taking form, but everything is plastic’.69 Hall 
argues that the turn of the century was mankind’s adolescence, writing that ‘man is 
rapidly changing. […] all that we call progress is more and more rapid. Old moorings 
are constantly broken; adaptive plasticity to new environments […] was never so 
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great’.70 For mankind as for the adolescent the transition from childhood entails rapid 
growth, the breaking of ‘old moorings’, and malleability. Hall’s account of subject 
formation in the individual and in mankind has similarities to Freud’s, particularly in 
the sense that the ‘childhood’ of an individual or society is characterised by a relative 
stability which is then is ruptured by the onset of puberty and the ‘storm and stress’ 
of adolescence. 
In ‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis’ (1940), Freud argues that the psychical 
phenomena associated with sexual activity in early childhood reach a peak when the 
child is about five and then takes a break, not returning until the onset of puberty. 
‘During this break’, he argues, ‘everything stands still: much is unlearnt and recedes 
again. Once this so-called latency period has run its course, sexual life advances into 
puberty – we could say it comes into bloom again’.71 Freud clearly states that the 
move into puberty involves the reactivation of the psychical phenomena of early 
childhood. For example, discussing the castration complex, he argues that ‘all the 
competing emotional impulses and reactions that were activated [in infancy] then 
remain preserved in the unconscious, ready to disrupt the later development of the 
ego after puberty’.72 Freud’s understanding of the period after puberty as a phase of 
disruption is noted by Driscoll, who observes that he saw adolescence as ‘a 
complicated clash between new sexual capacity, already conflicting and often 
inexpressible fears, ideals, and desires built up and elaborated in childhood’.73 Hall’s 
account of adolescence as a period of ‘storm and stress’ recalls Freud’s 
characterisation of the stage as disruptive and marked by conflict. Both Hall and 
Freud see the adolescent experience as one of disorder, instability and transition – 
and potential trauma and crisis.  
Hall’s sense of adolescence as ‘plastic’ speaks to Barker’s representation of 
the adolescent girl in ‘Charley’. The story concerns a middle-aged married couple, 
Geoffrey and Adele, who encounter a female adolescent hitchhiker named Charley 
while driving across Bodmin Moor in Cornwall. Although it is June, the weather is 
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awful; the wind-screen-wipers can barely keep up with the torrential rain and the 
road is enveloped in thick fog:  
 
Suddenly an object which was not a sheep nor anything which might 
be anticipated on the moor appeared within our restricted range of 
vision. It looked like a stray balloon and I had no time for speculation, 
being occupied with the car which was picking up speed down an 
unseen gradient. I braked and changed gear. A second glance informed 
me that the balloon was inscribed with the rudiments of a face. I realize 
now how unformed and in every sense ready to conform to any shape 
the features were. […] I was undecided as to whether this 
manifestation was human or human artefact.74  
 
The language of the passage, narrated in Geoffrey’s academic register, sets up a 
comparison between Charley and an apparition or ghost. Much is made of her 
immateriality and shapelessness or, to use Hall’s terminology, her ‘plasticity’. The 
first time she is spotted she is simply ‘an object’. Soon afterwards Geoffrey describes 
her as ‘a stray balloon’, and then notes that: ‘the balloon was inscribed with the 
rudiments of a face’. Geoffrey’s comparison of Charley to a balloon evokes a ghostly 
floating object.75 Charley has only ‘the rudiments of a face’, with features both 
‘unformed’ and ‘ready to conform’, suggesting an inanimate being, a pliable object 
rather than a human. Geoffrey’s perception of Charley associates the adolescent girl 
with the supernatural and signals that she is in a liminal state, between one defined 
stage and the next.  
When we first encounter Charley her liminality is signalled by her emergence 
from the mists of Bodmin Moor, itself a liminal location. Moorland is a liminal space, 
a border between two towns or regions, a space one crosses to get from one place 
to the next. It is deserted, wild and rugged, not a place to inhabit or to linger, and is 
often associated in myth and literature with supernatural and dangerous elements.76 
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As well as being encountered in a liminal place, Charley is encountered in state of 
liminality, having left one place but not yet arrived at another. She has run away from 
a dysfunctional home in London, where she lived with a woman whom she suggests 
is a prostitute: ‘she takes in lodgers. Men. That’s how she makes her living. Know 
what I mean?’77 She travelled to Cornwall, she says, to see her grandmother in 
Dawlish, who was dead when Charley arrived.78 So when Geoffrey and Adele 
encounter Charley she is homeless and in a state of transition. Throughout the story 
she is constantly on the move. 
For Van Gennep, Turner, and Douglas, the adolescent is characterised by 
ambiguity and evades classification. Adolescence is disruptive both to the adolescent 
herself and to her society. Adolescents in the liminal phase may be seen as being 
situated between worlds, in a death-like state. Douglas, in Purity and Danger, 
recognises the ‘dangerous, criminal’ characteristics of the ‘outcast’ in what she calls 
‘the marginal period’.79 ‘We recognise’, Douglas argues, ‘that [disorder] is destructive 
to existing patterns; also that it has potentiality. It symbolises both danger and 
power.’80 She builds on this, arguing that those in an ambiguous state of being are 
perceived as ‘out of place’, and thus polluting and dangerous. Initiates in the 
postliminal phase ‘have been in contact with danger… have been at a source of 
power’ and may be treated ‘as if they were themselves charged with power, hot, 
dangerous’.81 Adolescence is a time when the usual sanctions are lifted; initiates may 
be subject to harsh treatment, or permitted to carry out criminal acts, after which 
may be seen to have special powers or a sacred status. Thus, adolescence is 
conceived as being a stage of life in which people are out of time and place, disrupted 
and disruptive, and powerful and dangerous. ‘Charley’ explores the dangers and 
powers of female adolescence, representing the adolescent girl as a liminal, ghostly 
figure associated with the supernatural and with danger. I noted earlier that ghosts 
are ambiguous, transient figures, neither dead nor alive but moving between states 
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and passing through boundaries. Read in this way, the ghost and the adolescent 
share many of the same liminal characteristics, and this may explain the connection 
Barker makes between female adolescents and the supernatural.  
A good deal is made of the fact that Charley is unformed and in transition. 
Geoffrey observes that: 
  
She was not immediately definable as human. The permeating drizzle 
and the vaporous air would have metamorphosed anyone exposed to 
it for more than a few moments and this unfortunate had obviously 
been exposed to it for hours. 
  She was not equipped for the moor, even in clement weather. So far 
as I could judge, she wore a robe of unenlivened cheesecloth, caught 
up by a string around her neck and hanging to her ankles. Her hair was 
long, the colour of wet straw. Her features were a blur, indeed she was 
blurred from head to foot.82 
 
Van Gennep argues that during the liminal phase the ritual subject or ‘passenger’ is 
characterised by ambiguity.83 For Turner, ‘[t]he neophyte in liminality must be a 
tabula rasa, a blank slate’ and must be ‘clay or dust’, a being ‘whose form is 
impressed upon them by society’.84 The idea of the liminal figure as a ‘passenger’ is 
important to my analysis of Charley because she is literally a passenger in Geoffrey 
and Adele’s car. In addition, Turner’s notion that the liminal figure is ‘clay’ chimes 
with Hall’s notion of adolescent ‘plasticity’ and with Geoffrey’s interpretation of 
Charley as ‘unformed’. For Geoffrey, Charley is ‘not immediately definable as 
human’. Her exposure is emphasised and the passage suggests that the ‘permeating 
drizzle’ and ‘vaporous air’ have acted upon her, with words such as ‘materialized’ and 
‘metamorphosed’ suggesting a change of state. In a white ‘robe’, with her long 
blonde hair, Charley resembles a ghost.  
She is also a stranger. Charley’s status as a hitchhiker exploits the horror film 
trope of the dangerous stranger, suggesting the possibility that she harbours 
malevolent intentions. Van Gennep and Turner note that both initiates and strangers 
are thought to have special powers. Van Gennep notes the similarities between 
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ceremonial patterns relating to the stranger and those concerning adolescence, 
observing that: ‘For a great many peoples a stranger is sacred, endowed with magico-
religious powers, and supernaturally benevolent or malevolent.’85 Arriving strangers 
are often initially separated from the society that they are visiting, Van Gennep 
observes, and he compares this to the segregation of an adolescent undergoing 
initiation, arguing that, like the stranger, the initiate who has passed ‘through the 
sacred world […] retains a special magico-religious quality’.86  
In ‘Charley’ Adele insists that Charley must stay with them at their rented 
house, and this ‘homecoming’ (Geoffrey and Adele have rented the house on 
previous occasions) is figured as a stage of incorporation for Charley: ‘She waited on 
the threshold, steaming slightly.’87 Crossing the ‘threshold’ and leaving her liminal 
state, Charley is ‘hustled’ upstairs by Adele, bathed, and clothed in Adele’s dressing 
gown.88 The bathing and clothing resemble a ritual practice, suggesting that Charley 
has been fully incorporated into the house, and into the couple’s life. But the story 
emphasises the fact that Charley is never entirely incorporated and remains liminal. 
Charley expresses her intention to leave, asking Geoffrey: ‘What will you do after I’ve 
gone?’89 
Charley’s lack of incorporation is significant because it means that she 
remains liminal, in a permanent state of transition, qualities associated with the 
adolescent girl. I noted earlier that the adolescent experience represents that of 
becoming a modern subject. By contrast, argues Driscoll, the adolescent girl is 
conceived as a figure that fails to become a subject: ‘the principle characteristic of 
[the modern] girl was her failure at a dominant model of individual subjectivity – this 
is not to say that young men actually achieved the coherence desired by that model 
but that the modern girl was positioned as delineating what was excluded from that 
movement toward maturity’.90 The crucial point here is that the adolescent girl, by 
‘failing’ to become, is always in the process of becoming. She is transitory rather than 
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stable, formed, or coherent. For Freud and Hall, Driscoll suggests, the adolescent 
girl’s identity is somehow ahistorical, portrayed as ‘in transition’ and ‘unfinished’ in 
relation to the process of personal development.91 Indeed, Hall argues that ‘woman 
at her best never outgrows adolescence like a man does’.92 Thus the adolescent girl 
is in stasis, ‘await[ing] moments of transformation from girl to Woman’.93 This 
appears to be very like being stuck in limbo – or being a threshold person in the 
liminal phase of a rite of passage, described by Turner as out of time, in-between the 
future and the past. Earlier I noted that according to Hazan the parallel between the 
old and initiates undergoing a rite of passage ‘cannot be sustained’ because while 
adolescents are reincorporated after the transitional period, old people remain in 
limbo and ‘out of bounds’. I propose that Hazan’s parallel may be sustained in the 
case of female adolescents, who are always in the process of becoming and remain 
‘out of time’. In the following section I read the adolescent girl in Barker’s ‘ghost 
story’, ‘Charley’ alongside Freud’s ‘Fragment of an Analysis of Hysteria (Dora)’ (1905), 
another narrative that figures an adolescent girl as transitional, unstable, incoherent 
and unfinished. A comparison of these texts helps to shed light on the preoccupation 
in Barker’s fiction with the relationship between the adolescent girl and the male 
academic. Further, ‘Element of Doubt’ illuminates the representation of female 
adolescence as ghostly in Barker’s fiction. 
 
IV. ‘Charley’ and ‘Dora’ 
In his Foreword to ‘Dora’ Freud emphasises the incompleteness of his case study. He 
explains that the results of the case history:  
 
remained incomplete in more than one respect. The treatment was not 
continued to its planned goal, but interrupted at the wishes of the 
patient once a certain point had been reached. By that time some 
mysteries in the patient’s illness had still not been dealt with, and 
others illuminated only very imperfectly, while the continuation of the 
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work would certainly have advanced in all areas to the final elucidation. 
So here I can offer only the fragment of an analysis.94 
 
The language of Freud’s account recalls the ambiguity of Geoffrey’s descriptions of 
Charley. Dora’s case history, Freud states, is ‘incomplete’, ‘interrupted’, imperfect, 
only partially elucidated and thus fragmentary. Elsewhere in ‘Dora’ Freud suggests 
the incompleteness of the case study is due to the incompleteness of the patient. He 
represents Dora herself as unfinished in the sense that she is stuck in adolescence. 
For neurotics such as Dora, Freud argues, ‘accidental influences of life’, such as the 
incident with Herr K., ‘disturb the development of normal sexuality’ so that, like 
water, it ‘is driven back into older courses previously destined to be abandoned’.95 
Driscoll argues that: ‘Freud’s neurotic and hysterical girls are […] people who have 
failed to accomplish the repressions and cathexes necessary for maturity (thus 
remaining adolescent)’.96 And, for Freud, because Dora ends her analysis early rather 
than continuing it ‘to its planned goal’ she remains unfinished. 
Following Toril Moi’s work on ‘Dora’, Lis Mǿller suggests that Freud’s case 
study is a struggle between ‘Freud’s (male) desire for closure and totality, […] for the 
answers Dora supposedly withholds’ and Dora’s model, which is ‘unfinished, diffuse, 
and fragmentary’.97 Mǿller’s argument is supported by the fact that, while Freud puts 
emphasis on the incompleteness of ‘Dora’, he maintains that ‘the continuation of the 
work would certainly have advanced in all areas to the final elucidation’. Elsewhere 
suggests that he has, in fact, succeeded in producing something whole: ‘I have 
completed that which was incomplete’.98 At the same time, the incomplete and 
unfinished quality of Dora the female adolescent is emphasised. She is represented 
by Freud as a subject who needs to be explained to herself and to others by Freud, 
the male ‘narrator’. Driscoll argues that psychoanalytic narratives have an interest in 
presenting the adolescent girl as unfinished and in need of completion. She proposes 
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that the critical observation of women such as Dora was aimed at ‘maintaining a 
manageable (scrutinizable) girl/Woman identity. This self-fulfilling agenda required 
the instability of feminine adolescence’.99 Driscoll’s idea that the male narrators of 
psychoanalytic narratives require the adolescent girl to be unstable speaks to the 
representation of female adolescence in ‘Charley’ and ‘Element of Doubt’. As I have 
tried to show, female adolescence seen from a male perspective in Barker’s fiction is 
represented as transitional, incoherent, and changeable, and this emphasises the 
male character’s role in and motivation for constructing this particular account of 
female adolescence.  
In ‘Charley’, the motivation for Geoffrey’s attempts to decipher, define and 
classify the female adolescent is assigned to his role as an academic researcher. The 
first impulse of his wife, Adele is to help Charley but Geoffrey is sceptical about the 
stranger, disbelieving her story and seeing her as ‘an opportunist’.100 Barker’s story 
sets up a contrast between Adele’s reaction to Charley and Geoffrey’s absolute lack 
of empathy, which is represented by his overly formal language and his use of facts. 
For example: ‘[i]n weather like this it is inadvisable to stop on the road. Visibility is 
less than five yards’, and again: ‘[a]nyone who chooses her mode of travel must 
expect disagreeable repercussions’.101 Geoffrey’s disbelief of Charley’s story recalls 
Freud’s refusal to believe Dora’s account of being kissed by her father’s friend, Herr 
K.in ‘Dora’. Famously, Freud asserts that this encounter ‘should have produced a 
clear sensation of sexual excitement in a fourteen-year-old girl’.102 Feminist critics 
have argued that Freud lets his assumptions about female sexuality prejudice his 
reading of Dora, and have compared Freud’s imposition of his interpretation on Dora 
to Herr K.’s unwanted sexual advances.103 Geoffrey’s sexual attraction to Charley, 
which is made apparent later in the story, is shown to affect his judgement and lead 
him to interpret her in sexual terms. For example, referring to ‘the business’ of 
Charley’s name, he states:  
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She was not to know that it has been applied as a vulgarism for 
woman’s breasts and sexual organs. It has had a variety of meanings, 
has been taken to refer to the small pointed beard as worn by Charles 
the First, to describe a state of fear and apprehension, a credulous fool, 
and conversely – deriving from ‘charlatan’ – a deceiver, mountebank 
and country quack, […]. However she had acquired it, the name suits 
her.104 
 
Geoffrey’s analysis of Charley’s name calls to mind Freud’s well-known 
interpretation of the symbolism of Dora’s mother’s jewellery box in her first dream. 
In Dora’s dream ‘A house is on fire’ and ‘Mama wants to rescue her jewellery box, but 
Papa says: I don’t want me and my two children to burn to death because of your 
jewellery box’.105 Freud puts his interpretation to Dora as follows:  
 
  […] You may not know that ‘jewellery box’ is a popular expression 
used to refer to something you recently alluded to when you talked 
about the handbag, that is to say, the female genitals. 
  ‘I knew you’d say that.’ 
  That means you knew it.106  
 
The resemblance in the language of Geoffrey and Freud is significant: Geoffrey states 
that ‘[Charley] was not to know that [her name] has been applied as a vulgarism for 
woman’s breasts and sexual organs’; Freud says to Dora: ‘You may not know that 
‘jewellery box’ is a popular expression used to refer to […] the female genitals’. In 
both cases the male narrator suggests that the adolescent girl is not likely to have 
the sexual knowledge required to interpret the symbolism but he actually thinks that 
she does possess this knowledge: Freud has noted Dora’s sexual knowledge; Charley 
has told Geoffrey that she lived in London with a prostitute.107 Each male narrator 
asserts what he thinks he knows over what the adolescent girl does ‘not know’, 
insisting that his is the correct interpretation. Freud takes Dora’s denial of his 
interpretation (‘I knew you’d say that’) as further confirmation that his reading of her 
dream is indeed correct, writing in a footnote that Dora’s protest is ‘[a] very common 
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way of rejecting an item of knowledge arising from the repressed’.108 Geoffrey 
continually interrogates Charley’s story and is determined to catch her out in a lie: ‘It 
occurred to me that she had spun this tissue of lies to obscure and defend some grain 
of truth’.109 Geoffrey’s sense of Charley’s ‘tissue of lies’ is not unlike Freud’s 
statement that Dora is ‘deliberately holding back’ some parts of her story.110 
The similarity between Freud’s reading of Dora and the representation of 
Geoffrey’s interpretation of Charley suggests that Barker’s story engages with 
Freudian psychoanalysis. As I noted in chapter two, although the archive does not 
confirm that Barker read Freud it is likely that this was the case. Considering her 
particular interest in female adolescence it is probable that Barker had either read 
Freud’s ‘Dora’ or, at the very least, was aware of some of the content of the case 
history. If we agree that ‘Charley’ engages with Freud’s ‘Dora’ then it is clear that 
Barker makes a critical engagement. Her interest seems to be in the conflict between 
what the male academic narrator desires (a coherent and complete story) and what 
the adolescent girl provides (something fragmentary and incomplete). In this sense 
‘Charley’ recalls earlier representations of female adolescence in texts such as The 
Joy-Ride and After that emphasise the gendered aspects of the way in which narrative 
is constructed. But Barker goes further than this in ‘Charley’ and, as I discuss below, 
in ‘Element of Doubt’ by explicitly connecting the adolescent girl with the 
supernatural. On the one hand, the representation of female adolescence as ghostly 
in Barker’s fiction suggests that there is something about the complex, fragmentary 
and unfinished nature of female adolescence that cannot be understood from the 
‘rational’ academic male perspective. Psychoanalysis is not able to provide a 
satisfactory account of the female adolescent, representing this figure as ‘in 
transition’ and ‘unfinished’ and a ‘failed’ subject. Barker’s male academic narrators 
are similarly unable to rationally define and interpret the female adolescent. On the 
other hand, reflecting on Driscoll’s idea that the adolescent girl is required to be 
unstable by the male narrators of psychoanalytic narratives, the representation of 
female adolescence as ghostly in Barker’s fiction may be seen as a staging of the 
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process Brian Baker calls ‘Othering the feminine/feminizing the Other to define the 
masculine’.111 In other words, the adolescent girl is figured as ghostly not because 
she cannot be understood rationally but because she is required to be irrational, 
indeterminate, fragmentary and unfinished in order for the masculine to be rational, 
definite, complete and whole. Further, the ghostly is figured as female because the 
connection of supernatural elements to the feminine ‘other’ allows the ghostly to be 
distanced from masculine identity. 
Both ‘Element of Doubt’ and Barker’s final novel, The Haunt are preoccupied 
with the ghostliness of female adolescence. In ‘Element of Doubt’ Irving, an 
academic, has been invited to give a prestigious lecture on behalf of his University 
and is writing his talk. His colleague, Midgeley has recently died, leaving Irving in 
possession of his final paper. For Irving, there is ‘something unsafe’ about Midgeley’s 
paper, ‘a veiled general threat which Irving felt he should analyse. If analysis was 
possible’.112 Strangely, Irving begins to associate the threat he perceives in 
Midgeley’s paper with his children’s ‘nursegirl’, Alice: ‘[they] were mingled in his 
thoughts’.113 Soon afterwards, poltergeistic activity begins to occur in Irving’s house: 
his lecture notes fly around the kitchen ‘like seagulls – circling’; a pan misses his wife’s 
head by inches; and a carving knife flies at his daughter.114 These events are 
associated with female adolescence: ‘‘There’s a belief – a superstition – that certain 
happenings – disturbances – are activated by the physical presence of someone your 
age. Someone who is growing up.’ […] ‘It’s considered to be a difficult time.’115 In The 
Haunt the same comparison between female adolescence and the supernatural is 
made (in response to another pan flying across another kitchen) by the aptly-named 
Mrs Soulsby: ‘The girl’s pubescent, it sounds as if there’s a poltergeist at work’ and 
‘A teenager undergoing physical disturbance’.116 Both passages emphasise that the 
ghostly happenings are triggered by the disturbance of the physical changes of 
adolescence, the difficulties of growing up. What makes adolescents ghostly is their 
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transitional position at the limit between childhood and adulthood. Like ghosts, they 
move between states and pass through boundaries, resisting identification and 
challenging adult attempts to define them. 
Understood in these terms, female adolescence appears to be very close to 
Kristeva’s definition of abjection. Indeed, expressing her surprise that Kristeva does 
not link adolescence and abjection herself – Kristeva wrote an essay on adolescence 
only a few years after Powers of Horror117 – Karen Coats argues that the concepts 
‘are structurally and logically compatible for several reasons’:  
 
At the level of the social, we think of adolescence in terms of the way 
it, like abjection, breaches and challenges boundaries. It is an in-
between time, a time where what we know and believe about children 
is challenged, and where what we hope and value about maturity is 
also challenged. Adolescents are both more and less sophisticated and 
knowing than we want them to be. They challenge the borders of 
identity, trying to become adult without becoming adulterated.118 
 
Coats’s formulation of adolescence is significant because of its emphasis on the 
challenge that adolescence poses to adult identity. Adolescents disrupt our ideas of 
childhood, maturity, and knowledge. They push against the boundaries of adulthood, 
destabilising this category of age. It is therefore apt that Barker’s ‘ghost stories’ of 
the 1970s and 1980s are preoccupied with female adolescence. In Barker’s fiction the 
adolescent girl challenges not only adulthood but masculinity and, as ‘Charley’ shows 
through its engagement with ‘Dora’, proves challenging for Freudian psychoanalysis. 
In the final section I return to ‘View in a Long Mirror’, arguing that Barker’s ‘ghost 
story’ troubles the limits of the genre, first, through its focus on the ghostliness of 
telling stories and, second, by way of the challenge to interpretation posed by Delie 
Rivers. 
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V. The Ghostliness of Age 
[T]he question of spectres is a question of speaking of that which 
presents itself or touches upon itself at and in excess of the limits of 
definition. To speak of the spectral, the ghostly, of haunting in general 
is to come face to face with that which plays on the very question of 
interpretation and identification, which appears, as it were, at the very 
limit to which interpretation can go.’ 
Julian Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings 119  
 
Female old age and adolescence are liminal and abject categories of age which, as I 
have tried to show, resist definition, evade classification, and are connected with 
disorder, instability, fragmentation and contamination. The lack of demarcation 
associated with these age categories in Barker’s fiction renders them ghostly. The 
ghost story is an appropriate genre for the representation of elderly and adolescent 
females because it tends to deal with what resists reason and rational taxonomy and 
is often used to challenge the impulse to interpret and define. Writing about the 
position of the ghost story in the nineteenth century, Patricia Coughlan notes ‘the 
role of non-realist narrative forms [including the ghost story] in interrogating the 
status quo by tacitly rejecting its claims to full rationality’.120 Ghost story criticism has 
tended to be particularly preoccupied with questions of definition and classification, 
separating ‘classic’ ghost stories from ‘psychological’ examples in which ghosts, as 
Virginia Woolf puts it, ‘have their origins within us’.121 The desire to classify reflects 
what Julia Briggs calls ‘the many difficulties encountered in studying an area at once 
vast, amorphous, and notoriously difficult to define. […] one hardly knows where to 
start, or – even more essentially – where to stop’.122 This suggests that ghost story 
criticism is itself caught up in the expansiveness of the ghostly and, indeed, attempts 
to read the ghost story often extend to enquiries into practices of interpretation, as 
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Shoshana Felman notes when she argues that critical debate is subject to a kind of 
haunting.123 There has also been a problematising of terminology used to describe 
the genre. Srdjan Smajić points out ‘the semantic instability of terms indispensable 
to the study of ghost stories’.124 After Derrida, the words spectre and haunt apply not 
just to ghost stories but to all texts. As Wolfreys puts it: ‘all stories are, more or less, 
ghost stories. […] all forms of narrative are, in one way or another, haunted’.125 So 
there is a sense in which, whenever one tries to read the ghost story, or indeed any 
story, one gets caught up in the pervasiveness of the ghostly. 
‘View in a Long Mirror’ registers the uncontainability of the ghostly by staging 
the way in which story-telling and reading invoke ghosts. Barker’s text is concerned 
with the telling and reading of story as ghostly activities. When Kinch interviews 
Delie, her story has a reanimating effect: ‘And she told. The past went to her head 
like wine. It loosened her tongue, she began to nod and rustle and priss her lips. She 
was all alive – with the small inimical life of a wire spider.’126 Delie is like a spirit 
medium, the conduit through which stories of the past return. But though story-
telling intoxicates and animates her body, makes her ‘all alive’, the story it produces 
is a ghostly copy, cold, hostile and malignant, a ‘wire spider’ rather a live one. As I 
discussed earlier, Griff’s aversion to this ghostliness is clear: ‘to Griff it was 
distasteful, the sight of this grey ghost whipped up by scandals that were dead and 
spites which should have been buried.’127 But Griff’s distaste is in conflict with his 
desire to know Magdala’s story, to unearth her secret.  
Griff’s search for the story is figured as a hunt for the truth: ‘he smelt a story. 
[…] Griff would no more ignore a whiff of story than a young hound a whiff of fox’.128 
Kinch tells Griff he should “learn to smell out news”.129 Narrative truth is conceived 
as something tangible that can be tracked down and seized hold of, provided one 
                                                          
123 Felman, ‘Turning the Screw of Interpretation’, p. 99. Felman calls this process a ‘ghost effect’ in 
which, she argues: ‘peculiar echoes of the text […] reemerge in the very language of the critics’. 
(Ibid., p. 100.) 
124 Srdjan Smajić, Ghost-Seers, Detectives, and Spiritualists: Theories of Vision in Victorian Literature 
and Science (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 14. 
125 Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings, p. 3. 
126 Barker, ‘View in a Long Mirror’, p. 16.  
127 Ibid., p. 16. 
128 Ibid., p. 19. 
129 Ibid., p. 10. 
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‘reads’ things, via sensory perception, in the right way. Kinch, although he uses words 
associated with the senses such as ‘evoke’ and ‘redolent’, cannot read Delie – his 
ability to spot clues and ‘smell out news’ is shown to be compromised.130 Griff feels 
he is a better reader: “Griff didn’t read [Delie] the way Kinch did’.131 But Griff, too, is 
unable to read Delie. His comparison to a young hound is fitting; over-excited and 
eager, he rushes into confrontation and attempts to pin down the ‘truth’ of the story, 
the meaning of the grave. When he accuses Delie of burying Magdala in the garden, 
she looks at Griff with ‘no fear in her eyes, only a blank level stare’.132 Griff reads 
Delie’s blankness as defeat in response to the truth of his accusations, but blankness 
rather signals his inability as a reader to hunt down and grasp hold of any one ‘true’ 
meaning. His reading instead reveals the ambiguity and ghostliness of Delie’s 
narrative: ‘[Delie’s] mouth had fallen open, so had her hands, palms out, the fingers 
a little curled like empty claws. That was how she looked – empty’.133 The repeated 
images of emptiness in this description, the open mouth, the open hands, the empty 
claws, suggest that meaning always escapes just as it is being grasped.134 Barker’s 
ghost story, like Griff’s hunt, does not end with a moment of revelation. Instead, 
‘View in a Long Mirror’ stages the way in which meaning in the ghost story is 
continually deferred and finally slips away.  
Like ‘Domini’, ‘View in a Long Mirror’ uses all the motifs of the ghost story to 
excess: a haunted house, a ghostly woman, spiritualism, possession, a secret grave, 
live burial. This excessive quality extends from the content of the story to its language 
as shown by Barker’s description of a room in Delie’s house: 
 
Fifty years ago, when the desire was for knobbed and fringed and 
potted things, this room left nothing to be desired. The chairs were 
bowlegged and poker-backed, the walls bristled with art reproductions 
in fretwork frames, and seaweed fronds in shell surrounds. There was 
wax fruit and Japanese paper fans and a palm. Nothing that could be 
teased and frilled or bobbled and fluted was left plain – nothing that 
                                                          
130 Ibid., pp. 12, 14.   
131 Ibid., p. 19. 
132 Ibid, p. 23. 
133 Ibid. 
134 ‘Claws’, of course, also suggest the fox, the cunning object of the hunt. 
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could be inlaid or fretted out or painted over. The lily was gilded, so 
were the fire-tongs. And on them all was the bloom of disuse.’135 
 
The story is excessive in that it fails to contain its effects. The number and variety of 
devices used in this passage make it very hard to read. Every sub-clause bar two 
features assonance on the letter ‘o’ and this, in addition to the alliteration of ‘f’ and 
‘s’ and repetition of the word ‘nothing’ combine to produce an effect of euphony 
which, though it appeals to hearing, conveys a lack of meaning – the metaphorical 
emptiness of the room. The lack of containment in this passage and in others like it 
suggests that the narrative Barker wants to tell is not, in fact, a ghost story but a story 
about the search for a story, telling stories and interpretation. My suggestion is that 
in her attempt to tell this story Barker deconstructs the ghost story as she writes it. 
The ending of ‘View in a Long Mirror’ emphasises the story’s concern with the 
uncontainability of meaning and the limit of interpretation and definition. I proposed 
earlier that in the ‘death and the maiden’ passage the phrase ‘the grave’s a busy 
place’ as well as the language of overflow (‘brimmed’, ‘lipless’) signal the erasure of 
distinctions between inside and outside. Further, I suggested that the image of 
Delie’s face as a ‘hollow skull’ figures her living body as both containing and being 
contained by death. Thus she is likened to a ghost, a figure which, in Cixous’s words, 
‘erases the limit which exists between two states, neither alive nor dead’.136 The 
unsettling of distinctions between inside and outside and living and dead is what 
makes the image at the end of the story ‘macabre’. The image is ghostly, too, because 
it provokes and at the same time refuses interpretation. Describing Derrida’s concept 
of the spectral, Wolfreys writes that to talk of haunting is to encounter that which 
‘plays on the very question of interpretation and identification’ and emerges ‘at the 
very limit to which interpretation can go.’137 The final scene of ‘View in a Long Mirror’ 
can be read as just such a play on the question and limit of interpretation. Delie’s last 
statement, “I fancy there’s a lot to choose between us now”, may be reduced to the 
command ‘choose between us’. But this identification is impossible for the reader to 
make because we do not know if the woman is Delie or Magdala, if Magdala even 
                                                          
135 Barker, ‘View in a Long Mirror’, p. 14, my italics. 
136 Cixous, ‘Fiction and its Phantoms’, in Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings, p. 18. 
137 Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings, pp. x-xi. 
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had an understudy, nor if the grave is filled or empty. Instead, the story ends with a 
moment of ambiguity, a call for further interpretation. 
‘View in a Long Mirror’, then, ends with an image that troubles the limits of 
interpretation and unsettles distinctions between binary oppositions. This image 
could be the reason for the story’s rejection. Beauchamp writes, we recall, that the 
story ‘is rather too macabre for us or for MODERN WOMAN’. Her use of ‘macabre’, a 
word that the Oxford English Dictionary defines as ‘disturbing because concerned 
with or causing a fear of death’, suggests she is indeed referring to the image at the 
end of the story.138 But surely this would not be enough to justify rejection? Events 
that defy interpretation are essential to the ghost story; the genre concerns the limit 
between life and death. Furthermore, ‘macabre’ ghost stories were in demand in 
mainstream markets during this period: the first Pan Book of Horror, for example, 
was published in 1959. I suggest that the reason for rejection is not that Barker’s text 
is macabre, but that it is excessive: ‘too macabre’, too ghostly, too much. ‘View in a 
Long Mirror’ thwarts the conventions of the ghost story, and certainly would have 
challenged the expectations of the genre held by the editor of a 1950s popular 
magazine. What is haunting about this text is not just the content, as we expect, but 
the language. The story disturbs our understanding of the ghost story by haunting 
the wrong things. It therefore cannot be contained within the boundaries of what we 
call ‘the ghost story’ and becomes unplaceable – and unable to be placed in any 
magazine. 
The unplaceability of ‘View in a Long Mirror’ speaks to the difficulties critics 
have encountered while trying to ‘place’ Barker’s fiction. The lack of containment 
suggested by the imagery of ‘View in a Long Mirror’ is matched by the story’s 
troubling of generic classification. In my introduction I proposed that ideas of 
liminality are useful for thinking about Barker’s position in relation to the London 
literary scene at mid-century. Like the ghost story, Barker occupies a contradictory 
position: she is both mainstream and marginal. On the one hand, she understands 
completely the conventions of the ghost story genre and the reader’s expectations. 
This is shown most obviously in her ability to adapt her writing for mainstream 
                                                          
138 "macabre". Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University 
Press. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/macabre [accessed September 22, 2012]. 
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publications; she could always write a story that fitted into the theme of a particular 
anthology or responded to a new trend. On the other hand, Barker’s ghost stories 
frequently challenge expectations of what the ghost story should be and a sense of 
the ghostly pervades her other fiction. As I have suggested, the ghostliness of aged 
and adolescent female sexuality cannot be contained within the limits of Barker’s 
‘ghost stories’ but expands into texts such as The Joy-Ride and After, contaminating 
Barker’s oeuvre. As a result, her work has been misclassified, rejected and pushed to 
the margins. The rejection of Barker’s story thus speaks to her position as a liminal 
writer. Barker is a figure, perhaps, who haunts the margins of the mainstream.
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Chapter Five 
Age, Place, Past time and Form in The Haunt 
 
Growing older is this: coming down to earth, your own bit of it and 
running round it in narrower and narrower circles, sniffing, checking, 
keeping hold, like a dog on a quicksand, a rat on a sinking log. 
You are not the same person, not so soon pleased – yet sooner content. 
You have begun to trace the sources and now work back to them – a 
sign of failure. The world can be felt shrinking, you don’t want to know 
about the periphery. Finally there’ll be the ring from a candle to 
accommodate you – easily snuffed out in the end.    
Barker, ‘Commonplace Book’ (black loose leaf memo notebook), c. 1964-731 
  
This passage from Barker’s commonplace book contains several negative 
stereotypical images of ageing. The phrase ‘you don’t want to know about the 
periphery’ suggests self-absorption and detachment from the world. There is a 
suggestion in the word ‘content’, placed in opposition to ‘pleased’ of an increasing 
preoccupation with day-to-day comforts rather than new experience or a complex 
emotional life. The phrase ‘[y]ou are not the same person’ confirms this change of 
identity. Ownership of place is suggested by ‘your own bit of’ earth, but this is 
undermined by the idea of ‘coming down to’ this territory and the ever-narrowing 
circles, which suggest restriction rather than empowerment. Concern about loss of 
freedom is certainly evident. The paralysis implicit in the similes of the dog and the 
rat and the image of the world ‘shrinking’ portray old age as a restrictive, frightening 
experience. It appears to be a stage in life during which one exists in suspension 
between life and death, not progressing forwards but engaged in repetitive, futile 
action. Lack of progression is also suggested by genealogical ideas of tracing and 
working back to ‘the sources’. And because Barker uses a definite article (‘the’) rather 
than continuing in second person (‘your’) it is not clear whether the sources being 
traced belong to an individual or a collective history. For Barker, then, ideas of ageing 
                                                          
1 Barker, ‘Commonplace Book’ (black loose leaf memo notebook), c. 1964-73, p. 10, box 6, folder 7, 
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intersect with concerns about place and past time. These concerns are particularly 
important to Barker’s final book, The Haunt (1999), which is the focus of this chapter.  
Barker was about fifty when she wrote this passage in her commonplace 
book.2 Despite her rather cynical take on getting older, she lived for another thirty 
years and wrote twelve more books before dying on the 21st February 2002, aged 
eighty-four. Written when she was in her late seventies, The Haunt sketches a 
nuanced and complex picture of ageing, partly derived from Barker’s own 
experiences in later life. This chapter is informed by a distinction between ideas of 
‘getting’ old and ‘growing’ old, notions which, according to William L. Randall and 
Elizabeth McKim, respectively carry associations of passivity and action. They argue 
that ageing, when conceived as passively ‘getting’ old, ‘is a tragedy of accumulating 
deficits, diminishing reserves, and deteriorating attractiveness and strength: nothing 
more than denouement’.3 By contrast, narratives of ‘growing’ older emphasise 
movement and progress rather than decline and resolution. The passage Barker 
wrote in middle-age, though it begins with the phrase ‘growing older’, is primarily a 
narrative of passive ageing and decline, ‘getting old’. By contrast, The Haunt tells 
stories of growing old as well as getting old, portraying ageing as a process of 
development and a process of decline, and suggesting that although new stages of 
life may offer novel experiences and ways of thinking, the idealisation of retirement 
or the notion of an ideal old age are as superficial as the conception of the ideal child. 
With its suggestion of the potential for growth in ageing, The Haunt may be read as 
an example of what Margaret Morganroth Gullette calls ‘progress narrative’, a genre 
‘in which the implicit meanings of aging [include] survival, resilience, recovery, and 
development’.4 On the other hand, The Haunt is preoccupied with the way in which 
history loops back on itself and the ways in which the experiences of one generation 
may ‘live on’ in the next. With this in mind, ideas of ‘growing’ old and ‘progress 
                                                          
2 Barker wrote the passage in the commonplace book she used between 1964 and 1973, meaning 
that it is likely she wrote it when aged between 46 and 55.  
3 William L. Randall and Elizabeth McKim, Reading Our Lives: The Poetics of Growing Old (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 4. 
4 Margaret Morganroth Gullette, Aged By Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 17. 
Gullette acknowledges the limitations of the term ‘progress narrative’, conceding that ‘the life-
course opposition of progress and decline constrains narrative options in our culture’ but argues 
that until the binary is dismantled ‘progress narrative’ is ‘the only apparent alternative to decline’. 
(Ibid., p. 19.)  
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narrative’ must be used with caution because, as well as running the risk of idealising 
old age, they carry the sense of a teleological progressive history which seems ill-
suited to the preoccupations of The Haunt.  
I begin with Barker’s response to ageing, first, because of the associations she 
makes between age and place and space and, second, because her view of ageing is 
typical of the way in which many adults think about getting older. In the first section 
of what follows I consider why old age and childhood are so often conceived of using 
spatial language, proposing that this figuring reveals an anxiety about the borders 
between different categories of age. The ‘country’ of old age, I argue, is often figured 
as ‘foreign’, other to adult identity; as Barker puts it, ‘[y]ou are no longer the same 
person’. This othering of old age mirrors the constructions of the child as ‘other’ 
examined previously, and therefore develops earlier arguments about the way in 
which the child is constructed in relation to, and against, adult identity. I go on to 
address concepts of age, place and space in The Haunt, arguing that the novel is 
concerned with the ways in which the spaces of adult and child are delineated and 
maintained. These ideas are explored through the pairing of newly-retired Owen 
Grierson and his next-door neighbour, six-year-old James Hartop. The role reversal 
in this relationship troubles the boundaries of categories of age: the space of 
childhood is invaded by the adult and vice versa. Thus, the relationship between 
Owen and James explores oppositions of young and old by rendering the spatial 
barriers of age unstable. 
Just as age and ageing are conceived of in terms of place, so place is 
understood in relation to human ageing and relationships between past and present. 
The second section considers the ways in which places and people may be haunted 
by their historical past. The Haunt contains a number of stories that gradually 
overlap, episodes in the lives of an assortment of characters of various ages.5 
Connecting these human life stories, a narrative of Cornwall as an ancient place of 
                                                          
5 A few of these characters are native to Cornwall: a young boy, James Hartop and his mother, 
Angela; Bettony, a teenage hotel maid; and, in the central story, the elderly Miss Pendennis, 
encountered by hotelier Ernie Clapham during a boyhood holiday. Most are guests at the 
Bellechasse hotel: painter Charlie Olssen; Senga, a journalist from London; Maurice Piper, an agony 
uncle; paranormal investigator Felicia Soulsby and her husband, George; holiday-makers, Antony 
and Pam Wallington; and disabled antiquarian, Gilbert Eashing. 
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‘primordial forests’ runs through the novel. Barker’s epigraph for The Haunt reads: 
‘At the heart of our woods still lies the germ of the great forest’, an image that 
resembles Freud’s metaphor of the mind in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). 
The ‘germ’ of The Haunt is a story set in the Second World War which concerns the 
death of a German pilot on the site of the Bellechasse hotel, where much of the 
action of Barker’s novel takes place. This story and the book’s original title, The Place, 
reveal The Haunt’s preoccupation with how traces of the ancient and primitive 
survive in the modern, domesticated landscape and the ways in which people may 
be haunted by the barbarism of past history.6 Drawing on ideas of the inherited 
shared unconscious, I introduce Barker’s notion of ‘retropulsion’ or ‘pushing 
backwards’, the sense of being involuntarily plunged backwards into the past. This is 
similar to the idea of the repression and return of the individual and collective past 
in psychoanalysis and the modernist notion of involuntary memory. Through 
moments of retropulsion, The Haunt stages the ways in which the past returns in 
moments, and time loops and repeats. Finally, the book problematises the 
equivalence of the child with the primitive, aggressive unconscious. 
The third section focuses on one particular ‘moment’, a passage in the novel 
when Owen experiences what appears to be a Romantic epiphany. I propose that the 
novel’s engagement with Romantic views of selfhood is signalled by James, a hooting 
‘Boy of Winander’ figure. Taking Barker’s cue I read The Haunt in the light of 
Wordsworth’s Prelude, arguing that the novel engages critically with Wordsworthian 
constructions of childhood. James’s presence during Owen’s epiphanic experience 
makes it difficult to read: is this a genuine moment of movement and change for 
Owen? Or is the idea of Romantic epiphany undermined and revealed to be 
superficial and inert? I argue the latter, proposing that just as The Haunt calls into 
question the function of the idealised child in Wordsworthian ‘spots of time’, so 
Barker’s novel problematises Owen’s conception of an ‘ideal’ old age full of new 
insights and experiences. 
In the final section I revisit Barker’s notion of ‘retropulsion’, arguing that this 
idea sheds light on the assumed connections between old age, physical immobility 
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and mental stasis. These ideas are examined through the character of Gilbert 
Eashing, who embodies what Haim Hazan calls the ‘structural immobility’ of old age. 
The construction of old age as static and intransigent is challenged by an anti-
retropulsive moment in The Haunt in which the present cuts through Eashing’s 
solipsistic focus on the past. This is triggered by Eashing’s friendship with Bettony, 
suggesting the importance of intergenerational relationships to both children and 
the aged. I go on to examine the distance between The Haunt and a ‘typical’ book of 
old age, suggesting a connection between Barker’s experiences of ageing and her 
rejection of the conventions of fiction written by older people. Alongside this I discuss 
the book’s staging, through its formal structure, of the relationships between the 
past and the present of ageing identity, showing how the form of The Haunt puts 
emphasis on the imbrication of different stages of life (childhood, middle-age, old 
age) rather than their opposition to one another. The Haunt resists and undermines 
stereotypes of old age and childhood, and thus enables us to draw a more complex 
and rounded picture of these stages of life. 
 
I. Age and Place 
In The Go-Between (1953), a novel about his childhood, L. P. Hartley writes: ‘[t]he 
past is a foreign country: they do things differently there’.7 May Sarton adapts the 
phrase, observing in As We Are Now (1973) that ‘old age is […] a foreign country with 
an unknown language’.8 In this section I propose that the language of age is one of 
place. I argue that much writing about old age employs a metaphorical language that 
conceives of ageing spatially, and that older people are associated with particular 
spaces and places. As suggested in earlier chapters, this is also true of childhood, a 
phase of life conceived of in spatial as well as chronological terms. Both old age and 
childhood are figured as ‘foreign’ countries, separate realms, marginal stages of life 
that are assigned their own particular places and spaces. Viewing childhood and old 
age in relation to place emphasises the ways in which both categories have been 
                                                          
7 L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between, 1953 (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 5. 
8 May Sarton, As We Are Now, 1973 (London: Women's Press, 1992), p. 17. 
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constructed as ‘other’ to middle-aged adult identity, ‘foreign’ places that are 
separated or closed off from ‘normal’ adult experience.9   
We find the language of place in narratives of old age in popular culture, in 
academic writing that takes ageing as its subject, and in literary accounts of ageing. 
In his research on the use of spatial metaphors as images of ageing, Andrew Blakie 
highlights phrases such as ‘life’s journey’, ‘going downhill’, ‘reaching a crossroads’ 
and ‘mapping retirement’.10 Two recent examples from academic writing about the 
elderly include the phrases ‘boundaries of transitions’, ‘late life as a negotiated 
terrain’, ‘pathways across the lifecourse’ and ‘mapping the contours’ of care; they 
discuss the ‘landscapes’, ‘sites’ and ‘shifting topology’ of care and the idea of ‘ageing 
in place’.11 Blaikie argues that ageing identity is framed by place, with particular 
places such as seaside resorts and nursing homes being associated with the elderly.12 
Indeed, titles of novels about ageing often signal their preoccupation with a 
particular place: Elizabeth Taylor’s Mrs Palfrey at the Claremont, Gorleston by Henry 
Sutton, or Penelope Lively’s The Road to Lichfield.13  
Children are also expected to reside in particular places, and spatial language 
and preoccupation with place feature in writing about and for children. The phrase 
‘world of childhood’ is common in popular culture, and academic studies of 
childhood often discuss the child in relation to particular environments: the home, 
the nursery, the school, the playground, and the garden. Susan Honeyman points out 
that children in literature are often situated in particular places, observing that: 
‘[f]ictional children… often have a magical place to visit, inhabit, explore, or even rule. 
[…] The most popular landscapes are the garden and remote island, but all of these 
childhood spaces share one quality – they are clearly bound and inaccessible to 
                                                          
9 I use the term ‘middle-aged’ adults to mean adults who are neither children nor old people. These 
adults might also be called ‘mainstream’ in the sense that their position is opposed to the marginal 
positions of children and old people. 
10 Andrew Blaikie, 'Imagined Landscapes of Age and Identity', in G. J. Andrews and D. R. Phillips, 
eds., Ageing and Place (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 164-75, pp. 164-165.  
11 See Amanda Grenier, Transitions and the Lifecourse: Challenging the Constructions of ‘Growing 
Old’ (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2012), pp. 9, 11, 12; Christine Milligan, There’s No Place Like Home: 
Place and Care in an Ageing Society (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 9, 8, 20, 1. 
12 Blaikie, 'Imagined Landscapes of Age and Identity', p. 169. 
13 Mike Hepworth, Stories of Ageing (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), pp. 20-21. 
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adults’.14 As observed earlier, under the influence of Wordsworth’s Ode the 
Victorians imagined childhood as the Garden of Eden, a place to which adults cannot 
return, a stage of life they have lost. Honeyman argues that ‘[a]dults imagine such 
inaccessible spaces in order to be the exception to the rule- the adult who has 
access’.15 She proposes that ‘we spatialize childhood to receive us by creating 
escapist fantasy worlds. Such spaces reflect an increased awareness of the 
inaccessibility of that inner identity we call childhood’.16  
Both childhood and old age are imagined as places closed off and separate 
from middle-aged adult experience but, unlike childhood, old age is not likely to be a 
place in which fantasies of visitation, inhabitation and exploration are based. 
Whereas adults desire to access realms of childhood, they do not wish to enter the 
spaces and places of old age. Haim Hazan argues that even though ‘a host of socio-
psychological forces operate to remove aged people from the rest of society and to 
assign them to a symbolic and physical enclave […], the awareness that most of us 
will eventually occupy that enclave is ever-present. The sense of continuity of self is 
betrayed by the fear of ‘being there’’.17 This fear may be seen in the continual 
separation of ‘old people’ from, and by, those who do not consider themselves to be 
old. The elderly are not only expected to reside in particular places, such as 
retirement homes, there is an assumption that they belong there, and prefer to 
associate with those of their own age in special designated places. They may be 
subject to discrimination if they are found ‘out of place’ in the spaces of middle-aged 
adult society. Similarly, although adults desire access to the spaces and places of 
childhood, children are not permitted access to certain ‘adult’ locations and 
environments. Thus, adult society allows neither children nor old people free access 
to spaces and places reserved for middle-aged adults.  
The tendency to understand age categories through metaphors of place and 
space suggests an anxiety about how old age or childhood should be defined. On the 
one hand, thinking of old age or childhood spatially as a ‘landscape’ or ‘terrain’ with 
                                                          
14 Susan Honeyman, Elusive Childhood: Impossible Representations in Modern Fiction (Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2005), p. 51. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Hazan, Old Age, p. 3. 
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borders allows it to be more easily comprehended. Jenny Hockey and Allison James 
note ‘the centrality of metaphor to understanding the life course,’ arguing that ‘the 
ageing process may only be grasped through metaphor, for it is through this that 
meaning can be given to bodily experiences which are both intangible and 
ambiguous’.18 On the other hand, the idea of old age or childhood as a ‘place’ 
counteracts ambiguity, making it easier to view old people and children as different 
from, and ‘other’ to, adult identity. Using metaphors of place and space to refer to 
old age in particular suggests a desire to separate the inhabitants of this marginal 
‘country’ from the domain inhabited by middle-aged adults. The Haunt 
problematises this kind of oppositional thinking. The current examination of the 
spatial conceptualisation of age thus builds on earlier discussions of innocence and 
experience. For Barker, there is no possibility of choosing between these states 
because neither means anything in isolation, only in relation to one another. 
Innocence and experience ‘merge’, ‘invert’, ‘infiltrate’, and ‘transmute’; they are 
necessary to one another. Just as Barker rejects innocence so she undermines the 
tendency to view categories of age as ‘countries’ that are separate from and different 
to one another. The Haunt emphasises the imbrication of individuals of different ages 
on a personal level and, by extension, the inter-connectedness of different 
‘categories’ of age on a social level. 
In The Haunt ideas of place, space, and age are explored through the pairing 
of Owen Grierson and James Hartop. Owen and his wife Elissa are newly-retired 
Londoners who have relocated to a Cornish village in order to begin ‘a new life’.19 As 
Owen and Elissa move in to their new home they are observed by James, the son of 
their neighbour, Angela Hartop. Later, exploring the overgrown garden of his new 
house and having serious doubts about the wisdom of the move, Owen comes face-
to-face with James: 
 
  He stamped through a bank of thistles, found himself facing a fence 
and a child, looking over. 
  ‘Hoo,’ said the child. 
                                                          
18 Jenny Hockey and Allison James, Social Identities across the Life Course (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), p. 24. 
19 Barker, The Haunt, p. 1. 
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  ‘We’re your new neighbours,’ said Owen. 
  ‘Hoo, hoo, hoo.’ 
  It was definitely a hoot.20 
 
The fence represents the boundary between the spaces of adult and child, a 
boundary that is problematised throughout The Haunt. The fence separates James 
from the ‘wild’ garden with ‘breast high’ grass that has formerly been his territory.21 
And so it seems that the garden, the space of the child, has been invaded by an adult. 
When Owen closes the gap in the fence, he makes excuses to Angela: ‘I did it because 
my garden’s no place for a child, there are too many thistles and stinging nettles’.22 
Owen’s assertion that the garden is ‘no place for a child’ appears to disrupt the usual 
order of things.  
The statement is also disingenuous. Owen’s emphasis on the uncultivated 
state of the garden suggests the ‘wild’ character of the child who recently inhabited 
it, and by now the reader, like Owen, knows that James is certainly at home in the 
garden and the wood. Indeed, he regularly goes to the wood alone and his hooting 
suggests that he is familiar with the moorhens at the pool.23 Owen, on the other 
hand, finds ‘the superabundance of nature hard to take’ and tends to misread it.24 
For example, when he first explores the wood he encounters ‘a gamey smell’ that he 
cannot identity. He sees white roses and thinks ‘[t]hat’s nice’, ‘[b]ut when he drew 
level the flowers were the feathers torn from the half-eaten corpse of a bird’.25 
Owen’s naïve imaginings about nature as a garden filled with ‘nice’ flowers are halted 
by a scene of death and decay. His naivety is emphasised when he worries that the 
sight of the bird corpse is unsuitable for James, who does not need to be protected 
from the natural world. On the contrary, it is clear that this child knows more than 
the adult, with James correcting Owen about the moorhens, which Owen mistakes 
for black ducks.26 This role reversal draws attention to the arbitrary nature of the 
construction of age categories. James, who has grown up in the country and has 
                                                          
20 Ibid., p. 4. 
21 Ibid., pp. 3, 4.  
22 Ibid., p. 41. 
23 Ibid., p. 27. 
24 Ibid., p. 26. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 29. 
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superior knowledge of the natural world, is shut out of the garden, which has 
suddenly become ‘no place for a child’. Conversely, Owen, a city-dweller, who has 
gained his first garden aged sixty and has no knowledge of how to manage it, feels 
the need to exclude James because he is a child. This suggests the fragility of the 
adult/child boundary represented by the fence. Persons assigned to the categories 
of ‘child’ or ‘adult’ do not in fact form a homogenous group of people but will differ 
wildly from one another, meaning that the distinctions between adult and child seem 
arbitrary when one encounters a precocious child or an infantile adult. Owen’s and 
James’s placing in the roles of ‘adult’ and ‘child’ suggests the instability of these 
positions.  
If we read the fence as a symbol of the boundaries of childhood space then 
James may be read as a child who does not know his place. When Owen first 
encounters James the boy is ‘looking over’ the fence, already troubling the newly-
imposed adult-child boundary. He frequently disobeys his mother’s instructions, not 
only venturing into the wood and visiting the pool alone but also refusing to be shut 
out of Owen’s garden: ‘He had found – Owen rather thought he had made – a gap in 
the fence and crept through whenever Owen was in the garden’.27 The gap in the 
fence signals James’s refusal to be restricted by his status as a child, his breaching of 
the adult-child divide. Indeed, as his and Owen’s relationship becomes closer, James 
is revealed to be ever more precocious and demanding, and Owen starts to see him 
as a threat, calling him an ‘adversary’.28 He is figured as a transgressive person and 
Owen is keen to put a stop to, perhaps even punish, James’s behaviour: 
 
The boy must have been warned not to intrude: he put his head and 
shoulders through the gap in the fence and hung there, watching. It put 
Owen in mind of someone in the stocks. 
  When James had gone to bed he went out and closed the gap with a 
plank driven into the ground and lashed to the end posts. He felt mean 
doing it, and something else – a generalised discontent; throwback, he 
supposed, to his misgivings about the wisdom of coming here to live.29 
 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p. 28. 
28 Ibid., p. 176. 
29 Ibid., p. 39. 
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When James lurks in the gap he reminds Owen of ‘someone in the stocks’, reinforcing 
the idea of James’s transgression. Owen repels James’s invasion with a gesture 
described in aggressive language: the ‘driving’ of the plank into the ground and the 
‘lashing’ evoke the language of corporal punishment (people in the stocks may be 
lashed) and even carry connotations of crucifixion. Chris Jenks argues, ‘we might 
suggest that children either occupy designated spaces, that is they are placed, as in 
nurseries or schools, or they are conspicuous by their inappropriate or precocious 
invasion of adult territory. Childhood, then, is that status of personhood which is by 
definition often in the wrong place, like the parental bedroom, Daddy’s chair, the 
public house or even crossing the busy road.’30 And indeed, after James is shut out 
of the garden, he begins to appear in places ever more unsuitable ‘for a child’. Owen 
finds him sitting in the middle of the road. On another occasion, when Owen and 
James’s mother, Angela, who have started an affair, are embracing in her bedroom, 
James is found spying on them from inside her bed.31  
The Haunt’s foregrounding of the image of the fence reveals a preoccupation 
with the ways in which adult space and childhood space are constructed and suggests 
the instability of their borders. A child ‘out of place’ is threatening to adult identity. 
When James ‘h[angs] there, watching’, his suspension on the fence not only indicates 
the fragility of the child subject but the precariousness of the adult self. Indeed, the 
instability of James’s position is mirrored by Owen’s position as a man who does not 
know his place in the world. Owen, too, transgresses through his affair with Angela. 
He becomes a father-figure to James and a husband-figure to Angela, moving him 
from one stage of life, the so-called ‘beginning’ of old age, to a stage usually 
associated with middle-age. His doubt about the wisdom of coming to Cornwall to 
live suggests not only a doubt about place but an anxiety about his position in life. 
His friendship with James at first appears to resolve his doubts but when he closes 
the gap in the fence and bars James’s entry his discontent returns.  
The relationship between James and Owen raises important questions about 
how the boundaries of age are delineated and maintained. The metaphor of the 
fence as a barrier, both breached and reconstructed, between the spaces of 
                                                          
30 Jenks, Childhood, pp. 73-74. 
31 Barker, The Haunt, pp. 75, 111.  
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adulthood and childhood reveals the instability of notions of age-specific space and 
an anxiety about constructions of age. But, as I will show, not only are notions of age 
always bound up with discussions of place, they also raise related questions about 
the ageing of place and the relationships between past and present. The way Barker 
structures The Haunt around a short story set in the Second World War is key to 
understanding the ‘haunt’ of the book’s title and its staging of the presence of the 
past by way of its intertwined, multi-perspectival narratives. 
 
II. Haunted Places 
Oddly perhaps, Barker’s epigraph for The Haunt is a quotation from David Russell, 
the National Trust Forestry Advisor: ‘At the heart of our woods still lies the germ of 
the great forest.’ The distinction made here between ‘woods’ and ‘forest’ is 
significant. The use of ‘woods’ implies their modernity and, especially because of the 
possessive ‘our’, that they are man-made. In contrast, the forest is associated with 
the past, a place once ‘great’ but now buried within the man-made landscape. The 
significance of the phrase for Barker is that ‘the germ of the great forest’ is not buried 
– it will escape and return. This return is what we see in Barker’s book, one aspect of 
the ‘haunt’ of the novel’s title.32 In The Haunt there is a primitivism at the heart of 
the domesticated Cornish landscape. The wild, sublime aspects of the landscape, 
having come first, never went away but remained, lingering, haunting.  
Barker’s epigraph to The Haunt is very like the metaphor of ‘the Eternal City’ 
of Rome, used by Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) to describe 
conservation in the mind. Freud observes that ‘much that is ancient [is] still buried in 
the soil or under the modern buildings of the town’ and imagines what Rome would 
look like if the ancient buildings rose up beside the modern ones.33 The city would 
then resemble, he argues, ‘a mental entity […], in which nothing once constructed 
had perished and all the earlier stages of development had survived alongside the 
                                                          
32 Another epigraph for The Haunt could be Owen’s statement on the second page: ‘Though you 
drive out Nature with a pitchfork, yet will she always return. Horace, 65 BC.’ (Barker, The Haunt, p. 
2.) 
33 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 1930 (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 7. 
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latest’.34 Even though Freud later abandons his metaphor the implications are clear. 
If, for Freud, everything formed in the mind ‘survives in some way or other, and is 
capable under certain conditions of being brought to light again’, then the natural 
aggression of humankind which lies beneath the thin veneer of civilisation will always 
return given the right conditions: ‘I take the view that the tendency to aggression is 
an original, autonomous disposition in man, [which] represents the greatest obstacle 
to civilization’.35 
Similarly, in The Haunt, the forest beneath the wood represents the 
underlying presence of primitive barbarism in human civilisation. In the typescript of 
her 1984 Arvon Foundation talk, mentioned previously, Barker wrote: ‘[t]he first 
story was written over 35 years ago. It appeared in a book entitled Innocents – with 
a ‘t’, mind, because that’s important. I don’t believe there is any general condition of 
unblemished purity. The germ of the contrary, the other black thing, exists in all of 
us, it is of our essence’.36 Just as the ‘germ’ of the great forest exists at the heart of 
the wood, so a ‘germ’ of aggression and violence lies at the heart of humanity, ‘the 
other black thing’ dwells in us all. Here Barker proposes a view of human nature that 
is not only similar to Freud’s but also recalls Klein’s argument, quoted in chapter two, 
that peace was impossible because the innate aggressive instincts of individuals had 
been underestimated. Like Freud and Klein, Barker emphasises that barbarism is an 
essential characteristic of humanity, which is perhaps why she adds that she ‘can’t 
define the ethics of [her theme of innocence and experience] because it hasn’t any’.37  
The Haunt is structured around a short story, a flashback section in which 
Ernie Clapham is told the tale of a German pilot who dies in the oak tree in the garden 
of the Bellechasse during the Second World War. This dark story appears to have 
been conceived prior to the rest of the narratives that make up The Haunt.38 This 
story is both the ‘germ’ of the book and the source of ‘the haunt’. It begins when 
Ernie, on a childhood holiday to Cornwall, encounters the elderly reclusive Miss 
                                                          
34 Ibid., p. 8. 
35 Ibid., pp. 7, 56. 
36 Barker, Arvon Foundation tutorial, p. 3, my italics.  
37 Ibid. 
38 See Barker’s 1988 diary used as a notebook, in which she notes a reminder to check historical 
details of the story for accuracy. Barker, Black 1988 Diary, box 6, folder 8, HRHRC. 
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Pendennis. She makes Ernie promise not to climb in the large oak tree in her garden 
and he wonders why. (‘She probably thought he would fall.’39) In fact, Miss Pendennis 
insists that Ernie avoid the tree because it is the scene of the death of a German pilot 
in which she participated years before:  
 
‘That’s where he died.’ Ernie turned to find her close behind him. 
‘Koenig,’ she said, ‘in that tree.’ […]  
  ‘He was shot down, his parachute caught in the branches. He hung 
there three days and nights, he couldn’t free himself, both his arms 
were broken. I think he must have had internal injuries as well, he bled 
so much. He cried, every time I went to him he cried, pleading, like a 
child to its mother.’ […]  
  ‘I didn’t tell anybody he was there. The beach was mined and the 
creek fenced off with barbed wire, so no one came this way. I left him 
to die. After the atrocities he and his kind committed should I have had 
pity? I hardened my heart, my heart was like a stone.’40  
 
The fact that Koenig died in the huge ancient oak tree is significant because the oak 
is the English national tree and has been used historically as a symbol of England. So 
Miss Pendennis’s individual act of barbarity, the novel suggests, is representative of 
wartime violence and destruction in general, on all sides of the conflict. Indeed, after 
telling Ernie the story of the pilot’s death and justifying her actions, Miss Pendennis 
adds: ‘[a]nd then we bombed Dresden, thousands of women and children were 
slaughtered and that beautiful city was razed to the ground. I thought enough is 
enough, one more is too much, and I went out to him. It was too late, he had 
strangled in the cords of his parachute’.41  
The image of Koenig’s slow and agonising death is echoed by that of a sapling 
being ‘squeezed dry’ in artist Charlie Olssen’s sketch of a cliff-top tree, ‘a skinny 
sapling lodged in a crevice and clinging in virtual extremis to the rock face’:  
 
He said, ‘See this tree? Its guts are being squeezed dry and it’s got 
nowhere else to grow.’ He sketched a penumbra round the tree, 
intensifying it. ‘There’s an altar-piece by a German Renaissance painter 
showing an arm and a leg sticking out from under a stone slab. The 
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40 Ibid., pp. 71-72.  
41 Ibid., p. 72.  
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unquiet grave. It was done for the chapel of a hospital order and the 
sick saw it every time they went to pray for a cure. […] This little tree 
has been buried alive and is trying to escape.42 
 
The image of the unquiet grave is significant when considered in relation to Koenig. 
His grave is also ‘unquiet’ in the sense that what he did and what was done to him 
cannot be forgotten or erased. History is preserved. It is transmitted via texts and 
artefacts such as Koenig’s diary which Miss Pendennis shares with Ernie. It is passed 
on by way of myths of place, in which certain natural objects such as trees acquire 
special significance as sites of historical events. The Haunt suggests that past events 
cannot be laid to rest because they live on in people’s minds, passing from one 
generation to the next. Miss Pendennis tells Ernie: ‘The evil those men did lives on in 
all of us. Even you, blameless child’.43 The phrase ‘blameless child’ is significant given 
my earlier discussion of the essential aggression of humankind and the ‘haunting’ of 
human civilisation by the underlying presence of primitive barbarism. In her Arvon 
talk Barker states: ‘I don’t believe there is any general condition of unblemished 
purity.’ In The Haunt the evil done by previous generations ‘lives on’ in the child. The 
suggestion is that the child is not ‘blameless’, ‘unblemished’ or ‘pure’ but is tarnished 
by ‘the other black thing’. Barker’s figuring of the child speaks to the ideas of an 
inherited shared unconscious I discuss later in relation to the ‘haunting’ of Pam 
Wallington. 
The structuring of The Haunt around the wartime story of Koenig’s death 
allows the book to stage the ways in which the present reaches back into the past 
and the past intrudes into the present. On the margin of an early draft typescript of 
The Haunt, Barker noted the sentence: ‘Retropulsion (pushing backwards). Tendency 
of the paralysed to walk backwards. (dict.)’44 The OED definition of retropulsion does 
carry this sense of ‘[a] tendency to walk backwards involuntarily or in an uncontrolled 
manner’, although it has this ‘occurring in parkinsonism’.45 The word also means 
‘[t]he action of pushing something backwards’ and also carries a now rare 
                                                          
42 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Barker, ‘Haunt I (Old) 26.5.94’, p. 16 a), box 2, folder 7, HRHRC. 
45 "retropulsion, n.". OED Online. March 2015. Oxford University Press. 
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connotation of the ‘inward movement of a disease’ that is described as being similar 
to blood poisoning.46 Retropulsion is important to The Haunt because of the text’s 
preoccupation with, first, the processes by which underlying, primitive elements of 
the past may be transmitted into the modern, ‘civilized’ world and, second, the ways 
in which the ‘civilized’ adult mind ‘pushes back’ (represses) what is primitive and 
infantile, only for these half-buried elements to return unannounced in memories 
and dreams.  
The Haunt’s preoccupation with involuntary memory and unexpected return 
suggests the influence not only of Freud but of modernist fiction. Stevenson notes 
the challenge to conventional temporality posed by Freud’s The Interpretation of 
Dreams (1899), arguing that, for Freud, ‘past and present are crucially connected, 
though not necessarily in chronological sequence’.47 Freud’s influence, argues 
Stevenson, may be detected in the fiction of the period, including Marcel Proust’s À 
la recherche du temps perdu (1913-1927), which I discuss in a moment. The influence 
of modernist fiction on The Haunt may be seen in the book’s sense of the presence 
of the past, and time in the mind. The book contains moments of time in which the 
narrative flow is interrupted (frozen, paralysed) and a character is involuntarily 
plunged backwards (retropulsed) into their own past or the past time of the place. In 
addition, the intersecting narratives and shifting perspectives stage ideas of time 
looping and repeating. Nearly all of the characters in The Haunt experience 
nightmares and hallucinations and witness supernatural occurrences. As one 
character, Antony Wallington puts it: ‘[t]his place brings out the morbid streak […] 
There’s Olssen painting monsters, Mrs Clapham attacked by her own saucepan, the 
Soulsbys are trying to work miracles and a deaf woman heard wolves’.48 This gives 
the impression of a shared consciousness of the history of Cornwall and a sense that 
the past time of the place is somehow being incorporated into these individual 
selves. 
This is especially the case for Pam Wallington. She has repeated visions that 
are centred on the area around the Bellechasse hotel and cannot master her 
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ambivalence towards the place: ‘She sighed. ‘This lovely place worries me. The 
loveliness doesn’t go deep. […] Yesterday I was lying on the beach watching the gulls 
[…] Then I saw a huge great face, up on the cliff, leering at me. […] hundreds of feet 
of face in the rock’.49 In addition to these visions, Pam has a recurring dream which 
recalls The Haunt’s central story through its focus on the creek next to the oak tree 
where Koenig died: 
 
When Pam Wallington first dreamed the dream it stayed with her all 
day: nothing else could get through. She kept coming over sick and 
faint, her body behaving as if it was trying to expel something. She had 
believed it was only one night’s nightmare, but all that day was aware 
of imperfection, as if she had the power of seeing to a faulty source. 
    The dream kept recurring, undimmed. She tried recapturing the 
worst moments in her mind, hoping to see them in a different light. 
Because there must be hope, the source which had produced 
dinosaurs and phased them out in favour of humans must get it right 
in the end.50 
 
What the ‘source’ is, is not entirely clear. It appears to be a primordial force 
responsible for the creation and evolution of life on earth. But it is also ‘faulty’ and 
Pam’s dream has enabled her to see this ‘imperfection’. It inhabits her mind, 
repeating, blocking all else, and at the same time incorporating the fault or 
imperfection into her body. The sickness Pam experiences brings to mind morning 
sickness and thus pregnancy, and the sense that her body is ‘trying to expel 
something’ foregrounds the foetus figure Pam later sees.  
The image of an ancient force existing within the human mind recalls 
modernist conceptions of time in which it is represented not as linear but rather as 
fragmentary, and in which a moment from the past may be triggered by experience 
and recalled through memory into the mind at any time. Modernist texts aim to 
represent these fragments in the mind of past, present and future moments, 
thoughts and memories. The passage in The Haunt that describes Pam’s dream as 
inhabiting her mind and body evokes the famous moment of involuntary memory in 
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Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu when Marcel bites into the tea-soaked 
Madeleine. Stevenson argues that this moment, which transports Marcel back to an 
‘identical’ childhood moment, shows past time ‘continuing to exist not only in the 
recesses of the mind, but virtually in the body – digested, deeply engrained, within 
the physical structure of the self’.51 For Pam, as for Marcel, past time exists ‘within 
the physical structure of the self’. The difference, of course, is that Pam’s dream 
recalls a moment in the past of the place rather than a moment from her own 
individual life. This is a moment of ‘retropulsion’; Pam is compelled to move 
backwards as the past returns and inhabits her body. 
The sense that Pam incorporates into the structure of her self a trace of these 
events, or rather that the trace is already there, again evokes Freud’s figuration of 
the mind in Civilisation and Its Discontents. I want to read this moment in the light of 
ideas of an inherited shared unconscious. In Moses and Monotheism (1939) Freud 
states that ‘what may be operative in an individual’s psychical life may include not 
only what he has experienced himself but also things that were innately present in 
him at his birth, elements with a phylogenetic origin – an archaic heritage’.52 He goes 
further than this, though, proposing ‘that the archaic heritage of human beings 
comprises not only dispositions but also subject-matter – memory-traces of the 
experience of earlier generations’.53 Freud suggests that the universal symbolism in 
language and in dreams gives evidence to support this, as do the extreme reactions 
of neurotic children ‘which seem unjustified in the individual case and only become 
intelligible phylogenetically’.54 In ‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis’ Freud argues that: 
‘dreams bring material to light which can come neither from the dreamer’s mature 
life nor from his forgotten childhood. We are forced to regard this as part of an 
archaic inheritance that the child, influenced by the experience of his forebears, 
brings into the world with him prior to having and experiences of his own.’55 Freud 
argues that the material in dreams may be explained with reference to ‘the earliest 
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legends of mankind and in surviving customs’ and concludes that dreams are 
therefore ‘a source of human prehistory that we should not dismiss out of hand’.56 
In The Haunt, Pam’s dreams reflect the ‘memory-traces of the experience of 
earlier generations’, bringing to the present a trace of the events of the past – the 
events that occurred at the Bellechasse, as well as those which occurred across the 
world during the war. Pam’s dream of the ‘faulty source’ is joined by one about a 
foetus. After having the dream, she leaves her bed, goes to the creek and looks into 
a boat with a broken deck: 
 
[…] visible through the gaps in the bottom boards was a wash of cloudy 
yellow liquid. 
    The dream began. Beneath the surface of the liquid, only just 
beneath – it was so light, weighed next to nothing – was the thing she 
had been obliged to cradle in her arms night after night. It was 
coloured by the waters in its wooden womb: it looked up, eyeless, 
stretched its buds of arms in entreaty, turned its faceless head and 
cried, soundlessly, from a non-existent mouth.57 
 
After her first dream Pam exhibits symptoms that resemble morning sickness and her 
body ‘tr[ies] to expel something’. The Haunt thus suggests that this ‘eyeless’, 
‘faceless’, voiceless ‘thing’ that Pam sees under the boat is born of the ‘imperfection’ 
of the ‘faulty source’ in Pam’s previous dream. This source, which ‘produced 
dinosaurs and phased them out in favour of humans’, appears to be evolutionary. 
What it produces is a baby born too soon. This image of a premature infant, 
conceived by an ancient source, lying ‘only just beneath’ the surface of the liquid is 
significant because of what the child represents in psychoanalysis: the primitive and 
aggressive unconscious. If, as Freud suggests, the (ancient, primitive, infantile) 
unconscious lurks in the depths of the (modern, ‘civilised’, adult) conscious mind then 
this equates the child with the old and the adult with the new. The Haunt suggests 
that if we follow this logic then the child is not innocent or ignorant or ‘blameless’ 
because it is born bearing the trace of the ‘evil’ of previous generations which ‘lives 
on’ inside the child. This trace or imperfection, The Haunt suggests, produces a 
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distorted infant. This recalls Shuttleworth’s argument, quoted in chapter one, that 
‘[p]sychiatric models’ create ‘a new evolutionary rendering of the biblical notion that 
the sins of the fathers will be visited on the sons’.58 Perhaps, though, the infant is 
distorted not because the sins of its forebears live on in its mind but by the idea that 
this is the case – the idea of the child as ‘the father of the man’. 
The structuring of The Haunt around a story which recalls the barbarism of 
the Second World War is related to the book’s preoccupations with the relationships 
between past and present and the identities not only of people but of places. The 
distinction made in the epigraph to The Haunt between domestic man-made 
woodland and ‘the great forest’ is crucial to Barker’s understanding of the duality of 
the landscape of Cornwall and, in turn, the divided nature of human identity. For 
Barker, Cornwall is an ambiguous place, at once beautiful and grotesque, familiar and 
strange. This duality of place illuminates the complex, conflicted nature of childhood 
and of ageing identity. The Haunt stages the ways in which the present and the past 
(of people and of places) are interlinked and cannot be separated. This in turn signals 
the book’s interest in the deconstruction of oppositions of young and old and the 
assumed attributes of different ageing identities. In the following section I explore 
this further by returning to Owen and James. I argue that their relationship not only 
undermines the ideal of the innocent Romantic child but also explores the tensions 
between the idealisation of retirement and Owen’s individual experience of this 
stage of life. 
 
III. The Lingering Child 
The Haunt begins as Owen and Elissa move into their new bungalow to begin 
retirement in rural Cornwall. Barker’s decision to begin the novel at the start of the 
Griersons’ retirement is significant, signalling a preoccupation with the tensions of 
this stage of life. Owen and Elissa are every bit the image of the ‘ideal’ retired couple. 
Positive and forward-looking, they reject the idea of retirement as the beginning of 
old age and see it instead as what Mike Hepworth calls ‘a period of refurbishment’.59 
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Both feel that their move to Cornwall represents a new life: ‘‘It will be like turning a 
page,’ said Elissa’.60 The idea of retirement as a new beginning replaces clichéd 
conceptions of this stage of life as the start of the ‘second childhood’ of old age, 
suggesting that it may be a time when individuals develop new ways of perceiving 
and contemplating things and forge new identities. However, the image of 
retirement as a ‘new beginning’ is itself a cliché, something that The Haunt registers 
and explores through its representation of an experience Owen has in nature that 
appears to be an epiphany.  
The framing of Owen’s ‘epiphany’ by the presence of James, a hooting ‘Boy 
of Winander’ figure, encourages a reading of his experience in the light of William 
Wordsworth’s Prelude.61 Like the ‘Winander boy’, James hoots instead of speaking 
and roves alone in the woods that surround the village. The allusion is reinforced 
when James and Owen visit a pool in the village wood and James stands at the 
water’s edge hooting to the birds. In Wordsworth’s poem the boy: ‘Blew mimic 
hootings to the silent owls/That they might answer him’.62 By comparison, ‘James 
stooped, uttering the same watery cries as the moorhens’.63 There is also an echo of 
the Winander boy in the description of James hanging in the gap in the fence: James 
‘hung there, watching’; the Boy of Winander ‘hung/Listening’.64 Furthermore, one of 
the important events in The Prelude is a drowning in Esthwaite’s Lake and around 
this point in The Haunt James ‘drowns’ in the pool.65  
Like Wordsworth in The Prelude, Owen undergoes a psychological crisis to 
which an epiphany appears to be the solution. Paul Maltby describes epiphany as 
‘the convention of the sudden and momentary illumination’.66 Martin Bidney agrees 
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to Wordsworth’s writing throughout The Haunt, most obviously in the title of the novel which refers 
to his prospectus to The Recluse (1814). Wordsworth describes ‘the Mind of Man’ as ‘My haunt, and 
the main region of my song’. (Wordsworth, ‘Prospectus to The Recluse’, in Abrams and Greenblatt, 
eds., The Norton Anthology of English Literature, pp. 301-303, p. 302, Lines 40-41, my emphasis.) 
62 Wordsworth, ‘The Boy of Winander’, in The Prelude, Book Fifth, Abrams and Greenblatt, eds., The 
Norton Anthology, pp. 343-344, p. 343, lines 375-390. 
63 Barker, The Haunt, pp. 31-32. 
64 Ibid., p. 39. 
65 Ibid., p. 32.  
66 Paul Maltby, The Visionary Moment: A Postmodern Critique (Albany: University of New York 
Press, 2002), p. 11. 
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that an epiphany is sudden and suggests that it is also ‘a moment that is felt to be 
expansive, mysterious and intense’.67 The convention originated with Wordsworth 
and is informed by the Romantic notion of ‘Natural Supernaturalism’, the sense that 
there is wonder, even divinity, in the everyday.68 In The Prelude, as in much of 
Wordsworth’s writing, childhood epiphanic moments or ‘spots of time’ are 
represented as an important source of adult identity. The Prelude depicts 
Wordsworth’s psychological crisis, a reaction to the failure of the French Revolution. 
His recovery is made possible by the influence of a positive sublime and a return, by 
way of memory and imagination, to the lost past of childhood. The ‘spots of time’ 
described in the first books of The Prelude are drawn on as a source of recovery. They 
nourish and repair an adult imagination which has been depressed by ‘false opinion’, 
‘contentious thought’ and the routine and trivia of everyday life. Spots of time are 
experiences by which, Wordsworth argues, ‘our minds/Are nourished and invisibly 
repaired’; these moments, he emphasises, ‘[a]re scattered everywhere, taking their 
date/From our first childhood’.69 For Wordsworth, childhood is a state to be idealised 
and drawn upon as a way of reconstructing the adult self.  
Owen’s crisis occurs as a result of his doubts about his retirement plans. His 
so-called ‘recovery’ is prompted by a moment that occurs during an expedition to a 
waterfall in the wood and bears all the hallmarks of an epiphany. It is worth quoting 
this episode in full because reading the entire passage enables us to see the way in 
which The Haunt frames Owen’s ‘epiphany’ with the presence of James, which, I will 
argue, calls into question the nature of Owen’s experience.  
 
  It was stock-still under these trees. Although a wind drove the clouds 
overhead, here below the dry twigs did not stir. But he saw something 
out of the corner of his eye, an extraneous flutter which ceased when 
he looked over his shoulder: it could have been a flash of light in his 
own eyeball. 
  The trees thinned, gave on to a field planted with low-growing green, 
a crop of some sort. Circling it, Owen was pleasantly surprised to come 
                                                          
67 Martin Bidney, Patterns of Epiphany: From Wordsworth to Tolstoy, Pater, and Barrett Browning 
(Illinois: Southern Illinois University, 1997), p. 3. 
68 Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism, p. 65. 
69 Wordsworth, The Prelude, Book XI, in Wordsworth, ed., The Prelude, p. 478, lines 260-264, 273-
275. 
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to a pool fringed with yellow irises and being musically replenished by 
the fall from a swift-running culvert. 
  He went to the brink, disturbing waterfowl which scrambled up the 
bank with fussy cries. Muddied, the water flowed into a still centre 
peppered with gnats. 
  In a relaxed mood, Owen tossed twigs into the gnats. Some twigs fell 
short, interrupting the music of the little waterfall. He took a stick and 
worked to clear them, dislodging a big stone. The fall fell stronger. 
When he lifted his stick from the depths it was draped with a shawl of 
brilliant green weed. The voice of the fall changed to a deeper, sweeter 
note; suddenly the water was shooting up at the sun. Splinters of light 
fell round him, the trees roared in the wind.  
  Like an ovation. Why not? Suddenly he felt wholly glad that they had 
come here to live. […] He looked about to identify the factor which had 
resolved his doubts. There was nothing he could pass on to Elissa […] 
As he turned to go he lifted his hand in salute, acknowledging benefit 
received. 
  On the way back he sighted someone under the trees, someone small, 
in a bright blue jump suit, running away.70 
 
Being sudden, Owen’s experience fulfils one of the criteria of epiphany. It is 
marked by the sudden feeling of gladness Owen has about moving to Cornwall, 
preceded by a moment in which the water ‘suddenly’ shoots up at the sun. Owen’s 
experience is also ‘intense’, ‘expansive’ and ‘mysterious’.71 A psychological intensity 
is suggested by the physical force with which the water shoots up at the sun, by the 
mention of the sun itself (with its connotations of heat and fire) and by the falling 
‘splinters of light’ that suggest an impact has taken place. Expansiveness is suggested 
by both the all-encompassing nature of the experience and its impact on Owen. He 
is surrounded by the light that falls around him and the noise of the trees roaring in 
the wind, which he likens to ‘an ovation’, suggesting that the trees are paying tribute. 
Owen’s participation in this moment, which simply involves the lifting of a weed-
draped stick ‘from the depths’, results in the resolution of his doubts, and therefore 
has a significance for him that resonates far beyond the actual experience. Owen’s 
experience is thus characterised by a sense of mystery: the factor responsible for the 
resolution of his doubts cannot be identified and his experience cannot be explained 
rationally: ‘There was nothing he could pass on to Elissa’. 
                                                          
70 Barker, The Haunt, p. 27.  
71 Bidney, Patterns of Epiphany, p. 3. 
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Owen’s experience certainly seems to be an epiphany but there are some 
significant differences between it and Wordsworthian ‘spots of time’. The most 
important of these is the way that Owen’s experience is framed by James’s presence 
in the wood. Before Owen’s ‘epiphany’, just as he enters the wood, James appears 
as ‘something out of the corner of [Owen’s] eye, an extraneous flutter’.72 As Owen 
turns to leave the waterfall and salutes, James appears again: ‘[Owen] sighted 
someone under the trees, someone small, in a bright blue jump suit, running away’.73 
As I suggested earlier, The Haunt emphasises James’s precocity and transgression, 
his invasion of adult space. So his peripheral presence during Owen’s experience 
makes it difficult to read: is this a genuine moment of restoration for Owen? Or is the 
idea of Romantic epiphany being undermined and revealed to be superficial and 
inert? I suggest the latter reading. It is my contention that Barker’s unchildish-child 
draws attention to and problematises the function of childhood in Wordsworth’s 
‘spots of time’.  
In The Haunt, childhood is not represented as a place to which adults may 
return and draw on for comfort and a sense of identity, as it is in The Prelude. In order 
for the child to provide a source of restoration for the adult experiencing 
psychological crisis, the meaning of ‘child’ must be fixed, it must mean particular 
things: innocence, tranquillity, and purity. As I noted earlier, Wordsworth conceives 
of the child as being divine, writing in his ‘Ode’: ‘trailing clouds of glory do we 
come/From God’.74 In contrast to the divine, ‘visionary’ child, he presents the 
blinkered adult: ‘Inmate Man’, who ‘can see no more’.75 The problem with this kind 
of construction is that it renders the meaning of ‘child’ static and inert, refusing to 
recognise the complexity and instability of the term. If instead the category of ‘child’ 
is unstable, if the child is a fragile subject who cannot be fixed as an innocent, tranquil 
being, then this in turn has implications for the stability of the adult subject, which is 
dependent for its meaning on the child. I propose that it is these ideas about the 
fragility of the child, and the subsequent instability of the adult self, that are being 
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74 Wordsworth, ‘Ode’, in Gill, ed., Selected Poems, p. 159, lines 64-65. 
75 Ibid., pp. 157-160, lines 56, 82, 9. 
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considered in The Haunt when it evokes the Wordsworthian child and stages Owen’s 
‘epiphany’. The reconstruction of Owen’s adult identity is not aided by James. Instead 
it is repeatedly interrupted by an ever-present child who turns out not to be childish 
at all. For Barker, James is an anti-‘Winander boy’ figure: a child who invades the 
physical and mental spaces of adulthood, breaching the limits of ‘the child’ as 
constructed by adult imagination. 
The representation of retirement in The Haunt is a second factor that suggests 
that Owen’s experience undermines the Romantic epiphany. For the Griersons, 
ageing is a narrative of actively ‘growing’ older rather than passively ‘getting’ older. 
As I suggested earlier, they are positive and forward-looking, an ‘ideal’ retired couple. 
Owen appears to try to preserve this ideal even after he has started an affair with 
Angela. But there is an inauthenticity to his actions, and this extends to his experience 
of ‘epiphany’. Abrams notes that Romantic conceptions of ‘renovative’ modes of 
perception, including the epiphany, place emphasis on seeing everyday things with 
‘the child’s sense of wonder and novelty’.76 The main obstacles to this, as noted 
above, are custom, habit and regularity. One might argue that, as a retired person, 
undergoing ‘the… radical change of not having a job to go to’, Owen has acquired a 
‘freshness’ of perception, having been released from his regular customs and 
habits.77 The Haunt undermines this view by representing Owen’s experience as a 
‘perfect’ epiphany. Owen goes into the woods plagued by doubts about the move to 
Cornwall and, by extension, his metaphorical and literal ‘place’ in life. At the end of 
his ‘epiphany’, which meets every criterion of the convention, he feels ‘wholly glad 
that they had come here to live’ and his doubts are ‘resolved’. This idealised 
encounter with nature is so perfect that it appears staged, as though it is an 
experience Owen feels he should have rather than one he actually undergoes. My 
suggestion is that in addition to problematising the ideal Romantic child The Haunt 
calls into question the idealisation of retirement. Barker’s novel puts emphasis on 
the tension between the Grierson’s idealised image of retirement and their actual 
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experience of this stage of life, foregrounding the importance of individual 
experiences of age and ageing.  
The Haunt’s questioning of Romantic constructions of childhood and selfhood 
through its representation of the relationship between James and Owen enables us 
to view Owen’s experience for what it is: an anti-epiphany in the tradition of 
modernist writers such as James Joyce. Barker’s novel avoids the idealisation of 
childhood. It also complicates the idea of retirement as a period of renovation but, 
at the same time, does not figure this stage of life in wholly negative terms. Barker’s 
emphasis is on the complexity and ambiguity of these different life stages, and this 
carries through to her representation of Eashing’s experience of old age and 
immobility, which I address in the following section. While The Haunt puts emphasis 
on old age as a time of new experience, a stage of life that is not static and fixed, it 
does not conceal the negative consequences of Eashing’s old age. I argue that The 
Haunt is able to represent the complexity of age and ageing through both its 
characterisation and its formal structure, which is partly a result of Barker’s own old 
age and immobility. 
 
IV. ‘The Inconsistent Texts of Ageing’ 
The Haunt took six years to complete. Beginning the book in 1992 as a collection of 
short stories, Barker finished the manuscript in 1998 and finally saw it published by 
Virago Press in 1999, by which time she was living at the Lodore Nursing Home in 
Sutton, Surrey. In June 1995, having redrafted the manuscript three times, Barker 
had converted The Haunt into three novellas with an articulated structure similar to 
that of The Joy-Ride and After. Despite these revisions both her agent, Jennifer 
Kavanagh and Lennie Goodings of Virago were unsatisfied and pushed for a novel. 
Barker continued to write, revise and edit the manuscript throughout several 
episodes of severe ill-health. She had experienced her first stroke in early 1994. Her 
diary for the year 1997 shows that after falling and fracturing her pelvis on the 6th 
January, and suffering a further fall a week later, she decided she could no longer 
remain at home. On the 18th January she wrote: ‘Pain very bad. Took several pain-
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killers. Increasingly difficult to get about, decided to go into residential care’.78 In fact, 
she was not admitted into Lodore until 16th June 1998, after another ‘incapacitating’ 
stroke.79 As the following extract shows, Barker’s diaries for this period are 
preoccupied with two things, her failing mobility and the progress of The Haunt:  
 
8th February: ’35 days since fall. Still very stiff + painful left leg’. […] 
4th February: ‘7 weeks today since fall’. […] 
6th March: ‘Started typing final copy of 3rd novella’. 
9th March: ‘Work all day on typescript of 3rd Haunt’. 
11th March: ‘Finished typing 3rd Haunt (the place) about 11,500 words 
(took 6 days) final copy on 13th March’. 
17th March: ‘Posted typescript (Reg.) of 3rd Haunt’. 
25th March: ‘J.K. [Jennifer Kavanagh] rang – “likes” 3rd Haunt ’ 
29th March: ‘Finished 3RD HAUNT revision (last page) ready to send to 
J.K.’. 
31st March: ‘Posted to J.K. 1) 3rd Haunt Revised last page of’. 
15th  April: ‘Rang JK. She sent Haunt 1,2,3 to […] Virago on 4th April. 
Advises a novel next!’ 
17th April: ‘Started revisions 1st HAUNT’. […] 
12th May: ‘Finished typing Haunt I (approx. 35,000 words)’; ‘1st Haunt 
(original) finished typing revised version 12th May 1997’; ‘J. K. not 
enthusiastic […] you were going to do a novel’. 
29th May: ‘I walked to Post Box – 1st time this year’. 
24th June: ‘JK rang – Tony Whillems has HAUNT’. 
14th July: ‘Rang J.K. “will take time”!! 50 years?’  
21st July: ‘J.K. rang, still no decision’.  
31st July: ‘Long letter from JK in answer to my plea for news of 
HAUNT. Must be a novel’. […] 
4th September: ‘finished 1st draft of novel (Haunt)’. […] 
14th September: bad fall in kitchen. 
15th September: to hospital for check. 
25th September: ‘working all day to finish final draft (for processing) 
estimate about 40,000 words – processed version 50,000’. 
2nd October: ‘Sent draft of HAUNT as novel for processing’. […] 
14th November: ‘Laura Longrigg rang […] sending [The Haunt] to 
Lennie Goodings of Virago’.  
2nd December: ‘Rang MBA – spoke Laura… (no reaction yet from 
Virago)’. 
16th December: ‘NEWS!! Laura rang: a v. nice conversation with 
Lennie G., she likes HAUNT as novel, has read it 3 times, showing to a 
colleague before giving a definite answer’. 
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79 Gardam, ‘Introduction’, in Barker, Submerged, p. viii. 
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29th December: fall in night, hit head – to hospital to have wound 
stitched.80 
 
Using the ideas of immobility, stasis and revision in Barker’s diary as a starting 
point, I make two proposals in this section. The first concerns the way in which 
Barker’s notion of retropulsion or pushing backwards relates to the assumed 
connections between old age, physical immobility and mental stasis. Hazan argues 
that ‘[o]ne of the most deeply rooted stereotypes of the aged is that they are 
conservative, inflexible, and resistant to change. The aged are perceived as incapable 
of creativity, of making progress, of starting afresh’.81 The Haunt explores this 
stereotype through the character of Gilbert Eashing, who embodies what Hazan calls 
the ‘structural immobility’ of old age. The assumed association between old age, 
physical paralysis and mental stasis is challenged by a moment in The Haunt in which 
the present cuts through Eashing’s solipsistic focus on the past, the opposite of 
retropulsion. My second proposal is that, through the constant revision and pulling 
together of her stories into a book, Barker succeeds in creating a text that conveys 
the experience of ageing: fragmented, emplaced, intertextual, complex and 
ambiguous, with past and present intertwined. The labour of revision, the writing 
and rewriting, represents the process of living a life and brings Barker’s experience 
of old age and immobility into the structure of The Haunt. I conclude this final chapter 
by arguing that, although it is preoccupied by issues of immobility, pain, lack of 
progress, and stasis, The Haunt paints a complex picture of ageing experience, 
challenging ideas of old age as a time of physical, mental and social immobility and 
foregrounding the huge changes it entails.  
In addition to Barker’s definition of ‘pushing backwards’, retropulsion carries 
the senses of involuntary or uncontrolled backward movement, and inward 
movement.82 The Haunt’s concern with retropulsion is expressed through Eashing, an 
aged, disabled antiquarian who is in Cornwall researching funerary sculpture. For 
Eashing, old age is ‘a nasty business’.83 He warns his new companion Bettony, ex-
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maid at the Bellechasse: ‘[d]on’t be deceived by talk of tranquil old age[…] one is not 
cured of strong emotions. The most ignoble remain’.84 Eashing rejects the idea of old 
age as a period of wisdom and peace: ‘He said sharply, ‘Getting old is a nasty 
business. There’s nothing to commend it, certainly not the illusion of learning.’85 
Although some of his comments challenge stereotypes of old age – that older people 
are wise and have a calm and settled existence, for example – Eashing has taken on 
many of the negative assumptions about old age common to Western culture.  
These assumptions are examined by Hazan, who notes the disparity between 
the perception of old age as a static period of life and the pace of change experienced 
by many older people. ‘On the one hand’, he argues, ‘the aged are seen as being at a 
social standstill; on the other, the changes occurring in their lives are extraordinarily 
rapid and extreme.’86 Thus:  
 
[A]geing is commonly perceived as a static condition with the aged as 
its unchanging inhabitants. […] Among the non-aged, moving from one 
stage of life to another, the opportunity for socially approved 
transformations is a culturally cherished privilege. The old, however, 
are not supposed to change as others do and, accordingly, are denied 
such opportunity. This structural immobility stands in absolute 
contradiction to their personal experience and sensibility, for they are 
in fact undergoing rapid and important changes in roles, identities, 
abilities and bodily functions that influences their self-perception and 
their capacity to handle everyday affairs.87 
 
Eashing embodies Hazan’s notion of ‘structural immobility’. Not only is he physically 
immobile, he has also rendered himself socially and mentally immobile through his 
acceptance and proliferation of negative stereotypes of ageing. Other characters 
perceive him in negative terms; for example, when George Soulsby watches Eashing 
asleep in his wheelchair he notes that he is ‘sleeping like a baby’, reiterating the 
clichéd image of old people as helpless and infantile.88 But Eashing is complicit in 
constructing an image of old age as ‘a nasty business’. He is unable to see the 
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disparity between his personal experience of old age, which involves huge emotional 
change and novelty, and social constructions of old age as static.  
Eashing’s sense of self is reliant on free movement. He equates physical 
immobility with immobility in general and thus feels himself to be at a standstill: ‘That 
ambition should dwindle to the performance of a simple reflex was humiliating. He 
yearned for the privileged years when he could move about unaided. He watched 
everyone else exercising the right of passage […] and on the quiet wept tears of 
impotence and despair.’89 Eashing has taken on conventional ideas about old age, 
equating physical restriction with humiliation, helplessness and, crucially, with 
mental stasis. Central to this passage is the double meaning of the phrase ‘rite of 
passage’ as both a ‘right’ to movement and a ritual of transition through which a 
subject’s status or identity may be changed. Eashing’s sense that his ambition has 
dwindled suggests that he believes his identity and role in life to be static and his only 
desire is to walk again, as he did in ‘the privileged years’. Clearly the idea of 
retropulsion applies to Eashing here. His paralysis provokes a tension between 
stillness and movement, stasis and change, and past and present. We might say that 
he ‘walks backwards’ in the sense that he is unable or unwilling to live in the present, 
being caught in a loop of remembering and dreaming about his past. 
Despite Eashing’s sense of himself as static and the anger this provokes he 
does experience a moment of physical pleasure and joy when he touches an ancient 
Cornish cross. Although he dismisses the idea of reverence for the old, which is 
significant given his profession, he is in awe of this particular object: 
 
  He wanted to touch the cross, feel the granite, the grit, under his 
fingers – it was one of the obscure compulsions which he observed in 
himself from time to time. So much was denied to him now in the way 
of physical experience, minor episodes had to be savoured to the full. 
[…]  
  He stretched out his hand, laid his palm on the stone, rolled the 
detritus of centuries under his fingertips. ‘Feel how warm it is, from the 
heat of the sun, the heat of thousands of suns.’ […] He sighed. ‘It is so 
very old.’90  
 
                                                          
89 Ibid., pp. 53-4.  
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For Eashing, this is an intensely physical experience. He connects with the past 
through physical contact with a historical artefact, a reminder that one of the ways 
in which the experiences of earlier generations are communicated to the present is 
through objects. This moment is not primarily about the past, though; it is significant 
to how Eashing views himself in the present. For Eashing, a researcher of funerary 
sculpture, old objects have value in a way that old people do not. While he is 
compelled to interact physically with the cross, interpreting its age positively, he 
avoids identifying himself with his own physical body, which he regards as an 
encumbrance to be hauled around. His view is altered when, after leaving the cross 
and entering the church, Eashing experiences a seizure while gazing at the sixteenth-
century burial effigy of a noblewoman: ‘When the pain ceased and he was still alive, 
fear took over, the pure and simple fear of not being. During all his researches into 
funerary concepts he had never felt it so keenly.’91 This encounter appears to be 
opposite to a moment of retropulsion: the immediate, present fear of ‘not being’ cuts 
through Eashing’s absorption with the past.  
Eashing assigns the cause of the fear he feels to Bettony’s conviction that the 
burial effigy resembles her Aunty Viv. As he passes the effigy ‘[its] eyes, which had 
appeared closed, now appeared wide open; the marble lids had become the whites, 
blank and blind. […] Bettony’s influence could not be discounted’.92 At this moment, 
Eashing is suddenly afraid of ‘not being’, perhaps because he recognises the 
importance of his relationship with Bettony, something to which he has previously 
been blind. Bettony represents the future and reignites Eashing’s ambition. Their 
relationship not only benefits him but makes her life better: he defends her from Mrs 
Clapham and reads with her. Eashing recognises the differences between himself and 
Bettony: ‘Her world is alien, she is cut off from so much of mine, or perhaps I should 
say I am cut off from hers. I have had no contact with young people and this poor 
child has been misused. […] She is as unsure of me as I of her. It leads to some 
unexpected exchanges.’93 For Eashing, the meeting of the worlds or countries of old 
age and childhood (which are, we remember, both figured as foreign to adult 
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identity), leads to an ‘unexpected exchange’, a moment that resembles an epiphany 
and is a source of meaning and power. Active old age, The Haunt suggests, is not 
necessarily about being physically active but is about other kinds of action, such as 
forging new emotional relationships. Eashing’s experience suggests the importance 
Barker assigns to genuine moments of insight in old age, which are achieved by new 
experience. In The Haunt, old age is characterised neither as decline nor necessarily 
as progress but by novelty of experience and emotional connection. 
The tension Hazan notes between the assumption of old age as static and the 
rapid pace of change actually experienced by many older people is one reason why 
literary portrayals of old age may not effectively represent the realities of older 
people’s experience. The conventional novel of ageing, in which the end of life equals 
the dénouement of narrative, tends to oversimplify old age, suggesting that it is a 
period in which all of the ‘loose ends’ of life are tied up: ambiguity is resolved, 
meaning is understood, lessons learned are passed on. However, if we, like Barker, 
see old age as a period of transition and disruption then we might question its 
association with dénouement. At the beginning of the chapter I noted that narratives 
of old age tend to focus on the negative aspects (‘getting’ older) or try to see ageing 
as a time of development (‘growing’ older, ‘progress narrative’). The Haunt suggests 
that old age is not a phase of resolution at the end of a chronological narrative. It 
undermines a teleological conception of history, which assumes that people learn 
more as they age and human history is progressive. Indeed, the latter half of the book 
consists of the endings of a series of unresolved narratives and repeated images of 
stasis, paralysis and repetition, all of which suggest a preoccupation with alternatives 
to chronology, linear time.  
The Haunt departs from many other conventions of books about old age. 
These have been charted by Hepworth, who groups them into five ‘variations on a 
theme’.94 The Haunt has no central ageing character and the book’s focus is neither 
                                                          
94 See: Mike Hepworth, Stories of Ageing, p. 20. Hepworth groups novels concerned with ageing 
into five key ‘variations on a theme’ which are listed, he notes, according to ‘the space taken up by 
ageing as a theme in each novel, ranging from central in variation 1 to peripheral in Variation 5, and 
the intensity of interest in subjective experience and social interaction between characters in various 
age groups.’ (Ibid.) In the first variation, the narrative concerns one central ageing character; the 
second variation is focused on a collection of older characters living in a residential group; the third 
focuses on ‘family interaction’; and the fourth on relationships between older characters and friends 
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on older people’s family relationships nor on the interactions between elderly people 
living in a community. Although The Haunt is interested in relationships between 
older people and neighbours and strangers, its main focus is on the interactions older 
people have with landscape and place and, as I proposed above, on the ageing of the 
Cornish landscape itself. The Haunt is unusual, too, because so much of the action 
takes place outside, whereas novels about older people are often set in interior, 
domestic locations. Often, as Hepworth puts it, ‘The home is seen as the most 
appropriate place for older people’.95 However, in The Haunt older people are most 
frequently encountered outside the home in natural environments such as gardens, 
woods, beaches, and church yards. Barker’s portrayal of old age, then, is neither 
wholly negative nor wholly optimistic. It resists ideas of old age as resolution and the 
conventions of the traditional novel of old age and instead highlights the complexities 
of this period of life.  
The Haunt represents this complexity not in spite of but because of the fact 
that Barker was pushed to rewrite her book from short stories to novella to novel in 
order to secure publication – a request perhaps motivated by the sort of assumptions 
considered above about what a book written by an older person should be. The 
pulling together of Barker’s original short stories creates a text which represents the 
fragmentary, layered, emplaced, ambiguous nature of old age. The final structure of 
The Haunt suits its content perfectly. The form of the book, with its intertwined, 
overlapping stories of people and of place, represents the experience of ageing by 
staging the ways in which people’s lives intersect, clash, come together, grow apart, 
and the ways in which personal individual lives are always interwoven with public 
events, histories, places, and the physical world. The idea of human lives as texts with 
many strands of narrative, suggested by William L. Randall and A. Elizabeth McKim, 
is useful here: 
                                                          
or strangers. In the fifth variation, older characters are often incidental and the focus is more on 
descriptions of older people and the processes of ageing. The Haunt does not fit comfortably into 
any one of the variations. Although it has similarities with novels in the second variation, for 
example Elizabeth Taylor’s Mrs Palfrey At The Claremont, The Haunt is not so much interested in 
social relationships between older people as in their relationships with a variety of people of other 
ages. In this respect it is most like Hepworth’s description of the fourth variation, though not at all 
similar to the novels he lists in that category.  
95 Ibid., p. 90.  
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[O]ver time, [our lives] are not merely lengthening but continually 
thickening as well, their countless strands becoming ever more 
intertwined, not just with one another but with the texts of others’ 
lives as well. What is more, they are woven through with countless 
larger texts in turn: the contexts of the families, relationships, and 
communities by which our personal worlds are shaped. Most 
important, they are texts whose potential for meaning intensifies with 
time. In effect, they are living works of literature – blends of fact and 
fiction that grown more imbued with depth, emotional and 
metaphorical, as the end draws nigh.96  
 
The idea in this passage of the effect of ageing being the lengthening, thickening and 
deepening of these strands speaks to Barker’s project. In The Haunt many different 
strands of personal human narratives are interwoven with the history and mythology 
of Cornwall and Europe and strands of narrative about public events affecting whole 
communities and nations. Drawing further strands into the text, Barker builds up 
layers of intertextuality: Daphne De Maurier’s Rebecca (1938) echoes through the 
pages of The Haunt; the work of Romantic writers such as Blake and (as we have 
seen) Wordsworth is also evoked; the central story of Koenig’s death alludes to ‘The 
Darkness Out There’ (1980), a short story by Penelope Lively. The stories that make 
up The Haunt mean that the book speaks to ideas of old age as a fragmentary 
experience punctuated by the narratives of other people and other places, literary or 
otherwise, and by moments of insight rather than a resolution achieved by the 
culmination of the narrative of life. 
Barker’s struggles with ageing and form are played out on the page, not only 
in her characters’ experiences but in The Haunt’s construction. The diary entries 
quoted at the start of this section reveal the work Barker had to do to turn the stories 
into a book, and her recording of details, such as days taken to write sections and 
word counts, makes salient the labour involved. The energy that Barker put into 
redrafting The Haunt, and with which she pursued the progress of her book’s 
publication, stands in contrast to her physical immobility, the extent of which we are 
reminded when she writes on the 29th May, ‘I walked to Post Box – 1st time this 
                                                          
96 Randall and McKim, Reading Our Lives, pp. 5-6. 
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year’.97 Physical immobility, experienced by Barker when revising the book, and by 
Eashing in The Haunt, almost guarantees a degree of marginalisation. In spite of her 
stated decision to move to a nursing home, though, Barker’s response to her 
immobility was not to leave her home and go into residential care. And her avoidance 
for as long as possible of this conventional space of old age parallels Barker’s initial 
rebellion against the demands her publisher made of her book – it ‘must be a novel’. 
Thus The Haunt not only represents, but is produced by, liminal experience and 
Barker’s resistance to both the conventions of old age and those of books about this 
stage of life. 
The restrictions put in place by Barker’s publishers regarding the form of her 
book speak to the restrictions of the experience of old age. I noted above that Eashing 
calls physical movement a ‘right of passage’ and that this phrase carries two 
meanings: a ‘right’ to movement and, more importantly, a ritual of transition. Change 
in old age is restricted (especially with regard to place) and the fiction of old age is 
expected to adhere to certain conventions. The restrictions of old age – mental, 
social, and physical – speak to the restrictions placed on the fiction of old age. In 
trying to make her stories into a novel, then, Barker has created a narrative which 
stages the difficulties of the restrictions placed on the elderly. But The Haunt, itself a 
liminal text, between the short story and the novel, does not see the liminality of old 
age as a wholly negative condition; rather, Barker suggests, the transitions 
undergone by the elderly have the potential for insight. This insight, however, may 
not be gained in opposition to or from the child, but through relationships between 
generations. The child as a fixed symbol of ‘innocence’ is empty and devoid of 
meaning. Similarly, an understanding of ‘the old’ as a homogenous group of people 
will miss the complexities and subtleties of this stages of life. Just as Hazan’s notion 
of the ‘structural immobility’ of the aged relates to the stereotyping of older people, 
so it relates back to the ideas of the figure of the child I have explored in this thesis. 
The idea of ‘the child’ as static, fixed and categorised, a pure object for study, speaks 
to the view of old age as a fixed, intransigent stage of life. It is only with difficulty that 
                                                          
97 Barker, Daybook 1997, box 16, folder 1, HRHRC. 
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the child and the old person can break free from the constructions of age assigned 
to them by society.  
This recalls the ideas of the places and spaces of childhood and old age 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter and the sense that middle-aged adults 
continually push children and the elderly to the margins of ‘mainstream’ adult space. 
As Kathleen Woodward points out, stereotyping requires ‘a certain kind of 
spectatorship – of distance’.98 This distancing allows us to generalise rather than 
focusing on individual characteristics. The Haunt employs images of place and space 
to portray Owen’s navigation of his new role, James’s conflict with his parents, Pam’s 
uncanny dreams, and Eashing’s struggle to come to terms with his immobility. 
However, the book also shows the dangers of observing old age or childhood as a 
place from which we ourselves are distanced, suggesting that this kind of 
spectatorship leads us to understand these stages of life in terms of false dichotomies 
and stereotypes. Judging by the passage from her commonplace book with which we 
began, Barker was herself persuaded by some of these stereotypes in middle age. 
Presenting these two texts, written by the same person at least twenty-five years 
apart, this chapter considered how they might help us to make sense of the 
intersections between different narratives of age – what Hazan calls ‘the inconsistent 
texts of ageing’.99 The Haunt takes the ambiguity of categories of age as its subject, 
presenting a number of narratives of ageing, representing the confluences and 
disparities between them. The novel thus draws attention to the ways in which age 
is constructed, as well as enabling us to draw a more complex and rounded picture 
of old age.
                                                          
98 Kathleen Woodward, Aging And Its Discontents: Freud and Other Fictions (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 57. 
99 Hazan, Old Age, p. 91. 
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Conclusion 
 
Barker finished writing her first collection in late Spring 1946, a year after V.E. Day.1 
Innocents was partly written during the war when Barker was working first in the 
women’s land army and afterwards as a firewoman.2 Why, during the war, did Barker 
write a collection in which all of the stories bar one are about a child? What are the 
implications of her claim that the relation between innocence and experience is the 
‘fundamental principle’ of her work? Why are children so uncanny not only in her 
early short fiction but throughout her oeuvre? What is it about being adolescent or 
elderly that renders a person out of place or time? And why is age so often inverted 
and queered in Barker’s fiction?  
I began this thesis by introducing the metaphor of the ‘eye of childhood’ and 
argued that Barker’s fiction compels us to view the world through this eye. I do not 
mean that when we read Barker we look at things from the point of view of the child, 
although some of Barker’s writing does attempt this. Rather, I argue that it is through 
the child that we can access her fiction. When we read Barker’s work, and interpret 
her historical moment through her writing, we look through a lens that focuses our 
eye on questions about the child. 
The most important of these concerns innocence and experience. Barker’s 
oeuvre troubles both these concepts and their relationship. She insists not only on 
the undecideability of the child but on the ambiguity and instability of all categories 
of age which, her writing suggests, are constructed against and in relation to one 
another. As queer theory has shown, the idea of homosexuality is always present in 
discourses of heterosexuality. Similarly, for psychoanalysis as for the Romantics, the 
idea of the child is always present when ‘the adult’ is considered, notions of 
childhood and adulthood are necessary to define adolescence, just as the idea of 
                                                          
1 Barker received a rejection letter from Jonathan Cape on 14th June 1946 (see chapter two). 
2 In a draft of a talk to would-be writers Barker discusses her ‘spare-time’ writing done, she writes, 
on trains, in buses and queues, even walking down the street. She adds: ‘During the war when I 
worked as a land girl I managed it.’ See: Barker, ‘Advice to young would-be writers’ (undated), box 8, 
folder 6, HRHRC. For information on Barker’s employment see: box 16, folder 5, HRHRC. 
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youth is implicit in constructions of age. In this respect, Barker’s oeuvre may be read 
as a genealogy of innocence and experience. In ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ 
(1971) Michel Foucault argues that genealogy ‘must seek […] in the most 
unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love, 
conscience, instincts’.3 Age has been seen as an ‘unpromising’ place, a place ‘without 
history’. Because age seems ‘natural’ rather than constructed we tend not to 
question it. Categories of age are often fixed with certain attributes: children are 
innocent, adolescents disrupted and disruptive, old people static. The ‘queering’ of 
age that we find in Barker’s fiction seeks to destabilise assumptions about what 
different identities of age entail.  
Barker’s genealogy of age speaks to the preoccupation with adult and child 
relationships in British society and culture at mid-century. During the war the child 
was a figure of anxiety and, for psychoanalysis, a figure through which people’s 
reactions to wartime anxiety could be understood. Wartime experience is frequently 
represented in mid-century literature as a ‘second childhood’, a moment of temporal 
discontinuity in which people are overwhelmed by the incomprehensible nature of 
international events and suspended in the present. In my introduction I noted that 
Rosamond Lehmann, among others, explains the post-war preoccupation with 
childhood by arguing that youth represents stability and security for uneasy and 
anxious mid-century writers and readers. For Lehmann youth is ‘the time when [and] 
the place where they knew where they were’.4 Barker rejects the idea of childhood 
as a period of stability. Her fiction stages and reworks literary, psychoanalytic and 
anthropological ideas about children, questioning the tendency to observe the child 
as an object and try to ‘fix’ it as one thing or another in order to shore up adult 
identity.  
So while some mid-century writers retreated to childhood innocence, others, 
like Barker, put emphasis on its instability and danger. In Barker’s fiction ‘innocents’ 
(those who have innocence but no experience) are shown to threaten not just 
                                                          
3 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 1971, in Donald F. Bouchard ed., Language, 
Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1977), pp. 139-164, pp. 139-140. 
4 Lehmann, ‘The Future of the Novel?’, in Stevenson, A Reader’s Guide, p. 80. 
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themselves but the people around them. Youth, writes Barker, is ‘the greatest of all 
weapons’ because when it is mishandled the holder ‘gets the sympathy and her 
opponent […] bleeds’.5 Barker’s emphasis on the potential destructiveness of youth 
registers and responds to the mid-century anxiety about what war-damaged children 
might become, which was expressed in the panic about juvenile delinquency in the 
1940s and 1950s. The period was marked by a deep uncertainty about changes in 
intergenerational relationships and the impact this might have on society, politics 
and culture. Concern over the precocity of the post-war generation was coupled with 
worries about the ‘parental’ role of the newly-established Welfare State. As the age 
inversion in Barker’s articulated novels registers, just as children were growing more 
mature, so adults were becoming child-like. Barker’s genealogy of innocence and 
experience necessarily raises epistemological questions, the most salient being ‘what 
is a child?’ This uncanny figure, suggests Barker, cannot be ‘known’ and can never be 
definitively understood because it is both familiar and strange, ‘close’ and ‘closed’.  
Barker’s genealogy of age is written in a number of forms that are other to 
the chronological novel: the short story, the ‘articulated novel’, and the retropulsive 
text. For Barker, the ambiguity of the child and other age categories considered to be 
‘other’ to adult identity is best expressed in alternative forms. The short story, for 
example, is a genre that is able to tolerate opposition and ‘hold’ and unify difference. 
It does not unify in the sense that difference is overcome but in the sense that 
opposing interpretations can coexist within it. As well as identifying Barker’s 
innovative use of the ‘articulated novel’ and the retropulsive text, I have shown how 
these texts stage through their formal construction the connections and 
disconnections between adult and child, and the ways in which intergenerational 
relationships invert and intertwine. Both the form and the style of Barker’s fiction 
play important parts in an understanding of her writing life. Throughout the thesis I 
have tried to show that Barker’s preference for alternative forms of fiction affected 
her publication history and contributed to her marginality. I also suggested that 
Barker’s fiction is understudied because the restrained precision of her prose means 
that she tends to be read as a ‘writer’s writer’. Her ‘perfect finish’ (in Quigly’s words) 
                                                          
5 Barker, ‘Introduction’ to Hester Lilly, p. vii. 
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conceals her anger about the inequalities of twentieth-century Britain or, as Thwaite 
puts it, the ‘claws beneath the surface’. 
Like her work, Barker’s writing life is inflected by a tension between surface 
and depths, between revealing herself and remaining secret. She is compelled to 
write but wants ‘nothing of [her]self on paper’. In my introduction I suggested that 
Barker’s self-effacement may be a further reason for her marginality. Neither Barker 
nor her fiction announce themselves. There is a quietness to her work that is often 
mistaken for conservatism, a lack of energy, or disengagement from social and 
political concerns. Barker always considered herself to be a ‘spare-time writer’ and 
her fiction to be somehow different to or apart from that of more canonical writers. 
It is difficult to gauge Barker’s views on the work of others, apart from Rebecca West 
with whom she had an acquaintance based on mutual admiration. The archive shows 
that Barker read and appreciated the work of Henry James, James Joyce, Stella 
Benson, Katherine Mansfield, and Elizabeth Bowen. In what seems to be a response 
to a list of questions about her writing from an academic researcher, Barker wrote: 
‘V.S Pritchett, Walter de la Mare, Katherine Mansfield, Elizabeth Bowen, Daphne du 
Maurier – and a host of others classic and moderns – I admire and envy because they 
demonstrate how it should be done.’6 The words in italics have been added in pen to 
replace the previous phrase, ‘but cannot think they have influenced my work’, which 
was crossed out.7 Barker’s reluctance to admit the influence of other writers on her 
own work might be interpreted as arrogance. Does Barker feel her work is entirely 
original? I suggest not. Rather, this statement is another example of Barker’s 
underestimation of her work. Barker feels that these writers ‘demonstrate how it 
should be done’, the word ‘should’ suggesting that her writing falls below this ideal 
standard. Such a lack of confidence is typical from a writer who was known for her 
self-condemnation. ‘[N]ever have I met a more self-critical writer’ wrote Smallwood 
to Barker in 1951. ‘But that’s why you’re so good.’8  
                                                          
6 Barker, draft response to questions about her writing, c. September 1993, box 8, folder 6, HRHRC. I 
presume these questions were sent by a member of staff at the School of Cultural Studies, Sheffield 
Hallam University, because a compliments slip with this address, dated 19.09.93, is stapled to 
Barker’s response. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Smallwood, letter to Barker, 20th June 1951, box 8, folder 8, HRHRC. 
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Barker was wrong not to recognise the importance of her oeuvre. As my title 
Figuring the Child suggests, I think that her fiction at once represents and tries to 
‘figure out’ the child and, by implication, related categories of age. Barker’s project 
is to (re)write the child, and she does this for over sixty years, from the mid-1930s at 
the Amalgamated Press to the late-1990s. Another answer to the question of why 
Barker is an understudied writer is that many of the suggestions her fiction makes 
are in response to questions that were not being seriously asked until the end of her 
writing life. The central questions asked about childhood in the last 25 years are 
anticipated in Barker’s writing. For example, since the 1980s Childhood Studies has 
put emphasis on childhood as a cultural construct. The discipline rejects notions of 
the innocence and passivity of children and recognises their agency and rights.9 The 
attention that Barker’s fiction pays to age and to the ways it has been conceptualised 
also anticipates many of the arguments of Age Studies, a discipline that has gained 
traction in recent years, and which puts emphasis on the importance of literary 
representations to an understanding of age. Age is starting to become a category of 
attention in the same way as race, gender, sexuality, or class, meaning that Barker’s 
oeuvre, which reveals the cracks in historical constructions of age, would be useful to 
researchers considering the queering of age and intersecting attributes of identity in 
twentieth century fiction. Finally, the place of childhood in literary modernism has 
gained more critical attention recently. My thesis makes a contribution to this 
emerging field of scholarship by drawing attention to the ways in which Barker’s 
fiction reads and rewrites modernism’s child, and by putting emphasis on age as a 
key critical concept for modernist and after-modernist research, as well as for 
scholarship on post-war and postmodernist fiction.  
I began writing this thesis with a distinct aim. In addition to examining how 
the figure of the child and innocence and experience are represented in Barker’ work 
alongside theoretical and historical frameworks about childhood, I wanted to 
introduce Barker and her work to the literary community. My visit to Barker’s archive 
at the HRHRC was essential to this aim. But writing Barker’s life has been challenging; 
I have not studied life writing and I am wary of the trap of equating work and life. 
                                                          
9 See: Allison James and Adrian James, eds., Key Concepts in Childhood Studies (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 2012), pp. xi, 68-72, 3-5, 105, 5. 
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What I have tried to do is to read the archival documents in the same way as the 
literary texts: to carefully consider the language being used and not to privilege so-
called ‘fact’ over ‘fiction’. It is worth noting that Barker saw no distinction between 
these terms, writing in a draft ‘blurb’ for Life Stories: ‘I think that fiction is 
autobiography’.10 With this in mind, I have used her fiction, her ‘autobiography’, her 
correspondence and many other sources to suggest explanations for puzzles such as 
Barker’s marginality, the twelve-year gap in her publication history in the 1950s, and 
the rejection of ‘View in a Long Mirror’. A biography written by an accomplished life 
writing scholar would be an invaluable resource for present and future readers of 
Barker’s work. 
One implication of reading Barker’s fiction through the lens of childhood is 
that the child structures the thesis. The ‘eye of childhood’ serves as a metaphor for 
the way in which the child provides a frame for and sets the parameters of my study. 
On the one hand, this lens provides clarity, like the water in A Heavy Feather which 
grants Almayer ‘a vision clear and scrupulous’. It aims to correct the distortion caused 
by the absence of the child in literary criticism about modernist and after-modernist 
books about children for adults (I discuss this in my introduction). Without the child 
we cannot perceive Barker’s fiction with clarity. And without Barker’s fiction the child 
in mid-twentieth-century literature would be less clear, perhaps even distorted. 
Through her dialectic of innocence and experience and her genealogy of age, Barker’s 
oeuvre shows us that the concept of age is essential for reading mid-century fiction. 
On the other hand, my decision to view Barker’s fiction through the lens of childhood 
creates its own distortions. The ‘eye of childhood’ looks at Barker’s writing at a 
particular angle and having the child frame the thesis puts parameters in place that 
no doubt exclude other ways of looking at Barker’s fiction. It must be noted that I 
never really ‘decided’ to view Barker’s fiction through the lens of childhood. My 
intention was not to have innocence and experience and the child as a frame to the 
thesis but to produce a more exhaustive and conventional chronological study. But 
Barker’s fiction resisted these intentions. Her concern with experience and innocence 
was salient in both the fiction and the archive. Perhaps, then, innocence and 
                                                          
10 Barker, ‘Blurb for Life Stories’, in letter to ‘Dennis’, 27th January 1981, box 11, folder 1, HRHRC. 
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experience are the terms with which Barker invites us to read her oeuvre, the way 
that she wants to be read.  
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